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Cloud computing has emerged as a de facto approach throughout society, commercial and 
government sectors, and research/academic communities. In the last decade, many organizations 
have considered outsourcing their IT service to the cloud where the services would have better 
availability and quality. However, this requires mobile and desktop clients for different 
stakeholders, in a domain such as healthcare, to obtain information from multiple systems, that 
may be: operating with different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web 
services); utilize alternate cloud service providers; and, employ diverse security/access control 
techniques. This raises two main problems: services integration and security policies integration.  
The services integration problem focuses on the difficulties that occur when a client is trying to 
access services that could be operating with different types of APIs.  The security policies 
integration problem occurs since the alternate cloud service providers may have different access 
control capabilities, making it difficult for the client developer to realize a cohesive security 
solution. In order to address these two problems, this dissertation presents a Framework for 
Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) that provides a set of global cloud services 
for use by clients and systems with access control provided by RBAC, MAC, and DAC. The 
work presented herein involves five research areas: Architectural Blueprints for Supporting  
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FSICC that contain options for connecting clients and systems with FSICC; an Integrated RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC Model for Cloud Computing via a Unified Cloud Computing Access Control 
Model (UCCACM) that contains a set of definitions necessary for supporting the work on 
FSICC; Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms for Global Security Policy Generation and 
Global API Generation which includes Security Policies and Services Registration, Global 
Services Generation, and Global Security Policy Generation; a SOA-Based Security Engineering 
Process (SSEP) for FSICC that is utilized to combine security policies from different systems 
into one global security policy in which SSEP also includes a process for security enforcement 
code generation; and,  Dynamic Enforcement via Intercepting Process involves a set of 
programmatic mechanisms that are able to intercept a service call from a client to a FSICC 
global service to perform security enforcement checks. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Cloud computing has emerged as a de facto approach throughout society, commercial and 
government sectors, and research/academic communities. In fact, the wide usage of mobile 
devices means that average users understand the storage and synching of photos, videos, email, 
contacts, files, etc., in the cloud. In the last decade, many organizations have considered 
outsourcing their IT service to the cloud where the services would have better availability and 
quality. However, this requires mobile and desktop clients for different stakeholders, in a domain 
such as healthcare, to obtain information from multiple systems, that may be: operating with 
different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web services); utilize alternate 
cloud service providers; and, employ diverse security/access control techniques. This raises two 
main problems: services integration and security policies integration.  The services integration 
problem focuses on the difficulties that occur when a client is trying to access services that could 
be operating with different types of application programmer interfaces (APIs).  In this case, the 
developer of the client will need to work with different paradigms such as programming language 
APIs or web services that may be constantly changing and must also be integrated in order to be 
successfully utilized for the client.  The security policies integration problem occurs since the 
different paradigms and alternate cloud service providers may all have different types of security 
and access control capabilities, making it very difficult for the developer of the client to realize a 
cohesive security solution. 
Currently, there is no set of technologies and/or a framework that provides solutions for the 
service integration and security policy integration problems. The notion of having a unified set of 
global cloud services is one possible solution to the services integration problem.  An approach 
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that supports the combination of different security policies such as Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001), Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976), or Discretionary Access Control (DAC) (Dittrich, Härtig, & 
Pfefferle, 1988), from multiple sources into one global security policy is a possible solution  to the 
security policies integration. For services integration at the system level, the HL7 Fast Healthcare 
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) (Health Level 7, Fast Health Interoperable Resources list, 
2016) provides a service integration infrastructure that can be extended to support RBAC, MAC, 
and/or DAC models in which the infrastructure can serve as an initial solution for the two 
problems above (i.e., services integration and security policies integration). 
 The main objective of this dissertation is to provide a solution to the service integration and 
security policy integration problems that will allow clients and systems to interact with one 
another in a framework.  Such a framework would provide the unification of services and security 
capabilities from different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web services), 
alternate cloud service providers, and diverse security/access control (RBAC, MAC, and/or 
DAC); the main intent of the unification is to offer global services that can be available to clients 
and systems alike. Towards this main objective, this dissertation presents a Framework for Secure 
and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC), shown in Figure 1.1, that provides a set of global 
cloud services for use by clients and systems with access control provided by RBAC, MAC, 
and/or DAC.   
To facilitate the discussion of Figure 1.1, we briefly review the following key terms: 
application programmer interface (API), web service, cloud service, system, client, and registry. 
An API is a general concept that creates a programming interface for a system that can be utilized 
by another system or application without disclosing the actual source code of that system. In this 
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dissertation, API refers to the programming interface for legacy programming languages such as 
Java, C++, C, etc. A web service is a programming interface (such as REST and SOAP) that 
typically operates over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). A cloud service is a web service 
hosted in a cloud environment that makes a cloud service more available and accessible than a 
normal web service. A system is a type of software that provides services that can be API, web 
services, or cloud services, where the system is intending to publish its services to FSICC. A 
client is a desktop, web, or mobile application that is built using different sets of services (API, 
web services, or cloud services) provided by systems via FSICC. A registry is a special service of 
FSICC that enables a system to register and add its services to FSICC (System Registry), and, a 
client to utilize services of FSICC (System Registry). 
 
Figure 1.1. The Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC). 
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FSICC as presented in Figure 1.1 has two main actors that are interacting via FSICC to 
develop applications in the service-oriented architecture (SOA) manner (IBM, 2015). These 
actors are   Clients, top of Figure 1.1, and Systems, bottom of Figure 1.1. From an overall 
viewpoint, each system builds and publishes their cloud, programmatic, or web services, as shown 
at the bottom of Figure 1.1. Then, a developer of a mobile or desktop client, at the top of Figure 
1.1, discovers such services and utilizes them to develop the client application. The FSICC in the 
middle of Figure 1.1, augments SOA application development with two additional layers and their 
interactions: Global Services and Global Security Policy boxes. The interactions of clients and 
systems with FSICC occurs in a number of different ways.  From a system perspective, each 
system creates an Integration Layer API in front of their API and modifies their Security Policy to 
be defined against the Integration Layer API. Each system then registers the system’s name, the 
Integration Layer API, and the Security Policy into the FSICC using the Systems Registry box in 
the middle of Figure 1.1.  
In support of systems, the security engineer of the FSICC creates a global resource that 
includes: a set of Global API (Services) based the integration layer APIs of each system utilizing 
the Services Mapping box; and, a Global Security Policy based on systems’ Security Policies 
which utilizes the Security Policy Mapping box in the middle of Figure 1.1.  From a client 
perspective, each client creates an Integration Layer API, top of Figure 1.1, in front of their API. 
Each client then registers the client’s name into the FSICC, using the Clients Registry box and 
reconfigures the client Integration Layer API to call the Global API. In support of clients, the 
security engineer of the FSICC performs actions that: associates each registered client with one of 
the registered systems; and, defines a Global Security Policy that enables the 
authorized/authenticated clients, via the RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptor and Global Authentication 
5 
 
boxes in the middle of Figure 1.1, to access services of the appropriate system based on the client 
and system names. Note that in Figure 1.1, registered clients are first authenticated by the Global 
Authentication box and then authorized by the RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptor box, before access 
to Global Services is allowed. 
 
1.1 Motivation for Access Control for Cloud Computing 
 
Cloud computing provides services in the cloud to be utilized by mobile applications/users and 
businesses. The Gartner group indicated that cloud computing  represents the majority of IT 
funding by 2016 (Shetty, 2013). The International Data Corporation (Idc.com, 2015) reported that 
organizations and enterprises around the world spent approximately $70 billion to adopt cloud 
computing services in 2015 with the number of cloud-based services expected to triple by 2020. 
Cloud computing is provided by major corporations such as Amazon (Amazon.com, 2016), 
AT&T (AT&T, 2016), Dell (Dell.com, 2016), etc. Security breaches have come to the forefront 
(Kelion, 2014) especially in personal cloud storage (Wingfield, 2015). Outsourced data and 
services are located on servers that belong to security domains which are different from an 
organization’s security domain, raising numerous security and privacy issues  (Takabi, Joshi, & 
Ahn, 2010). Other efforts have included: a survey of the different data/network security, 
authentication, authorization, and confidentiality issues that impact cloud computing (Subashini & 
Kavitha, 2011); a review of the available cloud computing advances in concepts, functionalities, 
unique features, and technologies (Wang, Von Laszewski, Younge, He, & Kunze, 2010); and, the 
characterization of cloud computing as the likely dominant technology for computing on the 
Internet (Pallis, 2010). 
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Outsourcing services to the cloud has many advantages including (Skyhigh Networks., 2016): 
better availability, since most cloud providers ensure more that 90% uptime; better mobility 
where the hosted services are typically accessible from any place on earth as long as internet 
connection is available; and cost effective due to that fact that computing equipment are provided 
by the cloud provider. Such advantages attract governments and businesses to move their services 
to the cloud. However, the movement to the cloud has resulted in new attacks to illegally access a 
crucial and sensitive data, such as electronic health records of large number of patients. This is 
possible since these cloud services are typically designed to be utilized without any type of access 
control. There is an emergent need to control who can access which cloud services at which times 
and under which conditions. The publishing of services in the cloud leads to a large number of 
consumers of such services in which controlling access to which services each consumer can 
utilize is not supported in existing paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web 
services), and available cloud service providers.     One approach is to have cloud services 
controlled using the three main aforementioned access control models, RBAC, MAC, and DAC, 
since they provide unique capabilities that can control how services are accessed by users, clients, 
and systems.  
RBAC provides an efficient way to manage consumers by using the concept of role in which 
each role can be authorized to access a sub-set of the available cloud services and each consumer 
is assigned one or more suitable roles. When cloud services need to access very sensitive 
information such as patient data that needs to be more strongly controlled than other parts of the 
patient data, MAC can be employed to control access to services. In this case, MAC can be 
utilized to label cloud services and their consumers using sensitivity levels which are 
hierarchically ordered from most to least secure:  Top Secret (TS) < Secret (S) < Confidential (C) 
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< Unclassified (U). Using MAC, each cloud service can be assigned a sensitivity level known as a 
classification, and each consumer can be assigned a sensitivity level known as a clearance along 
with read and write properties. DAC can offer the ability of a consumer of the cloud services to 
enable another consumer to utilize all or a sub-set of its authorized cloud services (that are 
assigned based on a role or a clearance) through a delegation of authority. In this case, DAC can 
be utilized to keep a list of delegated services, along with authorized delegated users, where each 
consumer can delegate all or a subset of his/her authorized cloud services to another consumer 
anytime. 
 
1.2 Motivation for Healthcare Systems and Applications 
 
In this dissertation, we utilize healthcare as the primary vehicle to justify and explain our 
work since it represents as a critical emergent application for cloud computing.  In the United 
States, the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services released the Meaningful Use Stage 3 
(Himss.org., 2016) guidelines that require all health information technology (HIT) systems to 
have cloud services to access, modify, and exchange health-related data. HIT systems include 
electronic health records (EHR) such as OpenEMR (OpenEMR, 2016), OpemMRS (OpenMRS 
Inc., 2016), and Drchrono EHR (Gibraltar Dr., 2016); and personal health records (PHR) such as 
Google Health (Google Inc., 2016), Microsoft HealthVault (Microsoft Inc., 2016), and WebMD 
(WebMD LLC., 2016).   In support of the interoperability and exchange of healthcare data, the 
international Health Level 7 (HL7) (Health Level 7, Health Level Seven INTERNATIONAL, 
2016) organization has taken a leadership role for standards to allow the integration, sharing, and 
exchange of electronic healthcare data, specifically: HL7 Version 2 (Health Level 7, HL7 
Version 2, 2016), HL7 Version 3 (Health Level 7, HL7 Version 3, 2016), the Clinical Document 
Architecture (CDA) (Health Level 7, Clinical Document Architecture, 2016), and HL7 Fast 
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Healthcare Interoperability Resources (HL7 FHIR) (Health Level 7, Fast Health Interoperable 
Resources, 2016).   
In support of this dissertation, we strongly leverage the Healthcare Interoperability Resources 
(FHIR) which provides a RESTful Application Program Interface (API) to share data in a 
common format. FHIR conceptualizes and abstracts information for HL7 into 119 currently 
defined (and always increasing) Resources that effectively decompose HL7 into logical 
components to track a patient’s clinical findings, problems, allergies, adverse events, history, 
suggested physician orders, care planning, etc.  The intent is to allow a unified access to FHIR’s 
RESTful health-related data sharing APIs so that applications can be easily built to uniformly 
utilize multiple HIT systems.  Concurrent with these activities has been an explosion of mobile 
health (mHealth) applications for both patients and medical providers (Aitken, 2013). These 
mHealth applications also require access to health data via cloud services from multiple HIT 
systems to ensure that all of the necessary information is collected for patient care. Each of these 
HIT systems may operate with different paradigms (e.g., cloud, API, web services) and employ 
different security/access control techniques.  Thus, mHealth applications would need to work 
with a heterogeneous collection of paradigms and security protocols, with the strongly likelihood 
that set of information sources may grow or shrink over time.  This makes it problematic to 
develop mHealth applications that are easily maintained and evolved.    
The main issue for healthcare is to ensure that the available services of these HIT systems are 
carefully authorized to control which mHealth application can utilize which service at which 
time; this is specifically what FHIR has been defined to provide.  For example, an HIT system 
for a pharmacy would have cloud services for: a physician to submit a prescription (Rx) 
electronically to the pharmacy (service S1); a pharmacist to be able to fill the Rx and reduce the 
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number of refills (service S2); the pharmacist to send notification via text/phone to the patient 
that the Rx is available (service S3); the insurance company to access the information on the Rx 
for approval and payment (service S4); the physician to have the Rx inserted into his/her EHR 
(serviceS5); the patient to access medications in the PHR (service S6); and, so on. Access control 
for cloud services of an HIT system can ensure that the mHealth application and its authorized 
users are restricted to particular services. 
The problem is that there is currently no solution that allows cloud services to be controlled 
on this basis, complicated by the fact that cloud services are available from different cloud 
suppliers that may not be compatible with one another. For example, the cloud services S1 to S6 
listed above can be controlled by the three access control models, RBAC, MAC, and DAC. For 
RBAC, four roles can be created: physician (authorized to access services S1 and S5), pharmacist 
(authorized to access services S2 and S3), insurance company (authorized to access service S4), 
and patient (authorized to access service S6). In this case, a user that has been authorized to a 
given role would be limited to only invoke those Services of the role through the client 
application. For MAC, each cloud service can be assigned a classification level: (S1, C); (S2, S); 
(S3, U); (S4, S); (S5, C); and (S6, TS). In this case, the user that has been authorized to a clearance 
level, say, S, would be limited to invoke those services whose classification levels are less than 
or equal to the clearance of the user, namely S, C, and U. For DAC, each cloud service can be 
delegated from one consumer to another by delegating role or clearance that is authorized to each 
authorized cloud service.   
 
1.3 Motivation of Security Requirements and Cloud Computing 
Capabilities for FSICC 
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As  discussed  in Section 1.2, the healthcare domain is an emergent application for cloud 
computing, in which the Meaningful Use Stage 3 guidelines recommend health information 
technology (HIT) systems to provide cloud services that enable health-related data owners to 
access, modify, and exchange data. This requires mobile and desktop applications for patients and 
medical providers to obtain healthcare data from multiple HITs, that may be operating with 
different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web services), use different 
cloud service providers, and employ different security/access control techniques. To address these 
issues, we have identified four of security requirements and three cloud computing capabilities 
that will need to underlie and support FSICC. These four security requirements and three cloud 
computing capabilities for FSICC simplifies and enables client access via global resources using 
standardized system APIs.  
The four security requirements of FSICC are: Numerous and Varied Access Control Models, 
Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using 
DAC, and Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC; each are briefly reviewed. The 
Numerous and Varied Access Control Models security requirement  is intended to support a wide 
range of access control such as RBAC (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 
2001), MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976),    DAC (Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988), Attribute-
based Access Control (ABAC) (Yuan, E. & Tong, J. , 2005), Usage Access Control (UCON) 
(Sandhu, R. & Park, J. , 2003), etc.; this is since each system may utilize any access control 
model.  The Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC security requirement dictates that 
access to cloud services will be realized by enhancing RBAC by extending permissions from 
objects to services.  The Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC security requirement 
dictates that access to cloud services will be realized by enhancing MAC by extending the 
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labeling of objects with classifications to services with classifications.  Lastly, the Support 
Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC security requirement dictates that access to cloud 
services will be realized by enhancing DAC by providing the ability to delegate services on a user 
by user basis. 
The three cloud computing capabilities of FSICC are: Local Service Registration and Mapping 
to Global Services, Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy, and 
Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and Service Discovery for Consumers; each 
are briefly reviewed. The Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global Service cloud 
computing capability is for systems to register their local services which are then mapped to a 
global set.  The Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy cloud 
computing capability is for systems to register their local security policy that is utilized to 
generate a global security policy.  The Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and 
Service Discovery for Consumers cloud computing capability is to support the process of a 
consumer (mobile, web, or desktop app) to register within FSICC to discover and be authenticated 
and then authorized to utilize services.  
 
1.4 A High-Level View of Presented Approach 
 
In this dissertation, the architecture view of our presented Framework of Secure and 
Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) in Figure 1.1 can be complemented with a component 
view as given in Figure 1.2. Specifically, in Figure 1.2, there are six main components outlined 
boxes.   The first component Involved Parties, topmost component in Figure 1.2, refers to clients 
and systems and their APIs previously shown in the top and bottom of Figure 1.1, and consists 
of: a Clients box that includes an API; and, multiple Systems boxes that includes an API and a 
security Policy. As the first step toward creating a global security policy and services, clients and 
12 
 
systems may utilize two separate components: the Security Policy Mapping component which 
refers to the process and algorithms that can be utilized to generate the global security policy that 
was shown in the middle of Figure 1.1; and, the Architectural Blueprint component which refers 
to the process and steps that can be followed to create different integration layers for clients and 
systems.  
An integration layer is a standard API (e.g., FHIR API for a healthcare case as discussed in 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2) that converts the data format of a system or client from/to a common 
data format. Such a common data format can be utilized by other systems and clients, in addition 
to the FSICC, to easily exchange data. An integration layer exists with an integration framework 
(IFMWK) which is a set of standards and associated technologies that allow different systems to 
interact with one another utilizing one common data representation. The associated technologies 
allow integration servers to be designed and implemented to facilitate the exchange of 
information using the common data representation via a set of shared unified services via an 
integration layer.  The FHIR standard is one example of an integration framework which has a 
set of resources in XML, JSON, RDF, and Turtle that are a common data representation with 
associated services for CRUD and searching.   
In FSICC, all security policies (that can be any combination of RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC) of 
each system go through two main phases: the Policies Combining phase (RBAC integration, 
MAC integration, and DAC integration) that creates one set of policy (global security policy) 
that has all policies from different systems; and, the Policies Updating phase (only for RBAC 
and MAC) that is needed to update role names (for RBAC) and update global MAC with users 
and services form systems based on the global sensitivity levels (for MAC). In addition, there are 
a number of different Application Integration Options to allow an application to send/receive 
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data with multiple mixed clients and pure or mixed systems, via FSICC, by the creation of an 
integration layer API in front of their API (services) by utilizing one of the Architectural 
Blueprint options.  An Architectural Blueprint option is a guideline that defines the way of 
placing and creating an integration layer for a systems or client to allow such them to 
exchange data with other systems and clients in one common data format. There are three 
Architectural Blueprints options as shown in Figure 1.2: a Basic Architecture that includes an 
IFMWK server that works directly with the App repository and IFMWK servers of different HIT 
systems; an Alternative Architecture that includes a IFMWK server that works directly with the 
App RESTful API and IFMWK servers of different HIT systems; and, a Radical Architecture 
that removes the repository and has IFMWK servers for the App API and a number of HIT 
systems.  
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Figure 1.2. A Component-Level View of the presented FSICC. 
 
The selection of an  architectural blueprints option is determined based on four factors that 
describe the situation of a client or system: the overall architecture of the application (i.e., one-
tier, two-tier, and three-tier architecture); the involved technologies that can be used to develop 
the application (i.e., RESTful APIs, programmatic APIs, database API); the source code 
availability of the application, APIs, server code, or database; and, the allowable access to 
system sources (RESTful APIs, programmatic APIs). Based on the output of the Architectural 
Blueprints component and after a system has registered at the Integration Layer, the security 
engineer of FSICC can establish the global API (services) in a two-step process.  First, the 
security engineer creates a set of common services from the integration layer API, utilizing the 
Services Mapping process using the Generation of Global Policy and Services component in 
Figure 1.2, where each system in the global API is configured to send/receive requests to/from 
the integration layer API of the appropriate system. Second, each client can configure its 
integration layer API to send/receive requests to/from the Global API. Based on the output of the 
Security Policy Mapping component, the security engineer utilizes the Access Control Models 
component to define the security policies of systems that was shown at the bottom of Figure 1.1 
and in the process to establish the global security policy that was shown in the middle of Figure 
1.1.  The security engineer can develop the global security policy by: creating global roles in 
which each global role can be authorized to a subset of the global services and creating new 
users (from clients) in which each global user can be assigned to one or more global roles 
(RBAC); assigning classification for each global service, and assigning clearance for each global 
user with read and write properties (MAC); and, enabling role or service delegation from one to 
another global users (DAC).  
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The resulting global services (API) and global security policy comprise the Generation of 
Global Policy and Services component, shown in the middle of Figure 1.2. After establishing the 
global security policy, a number of security interceptors can be created to enforce the global 
security policy on the users’ access requests, after such users have been authenticated. A security 
interceptor can be defined as a programmatic mechanism that is able to intercept a service call 
from a client application to an API (service) in order to perform appropriate security enforcement 
checks. The Global Policy Enforcement component shown at the bottom of Figure 1.2 refers to 
the RBAC/MAC/DAC interceptors box that was shown in the middle of Figure 1.1, consists of 
four boxes. The Global Authentication box is utilized to verify the claimed credentials, ID and 
security token, that a user (client) provided is correct or not. The RBAC Interceptor box provides 
the ability to allow/deny a global user with a global role from accessing a specific global service. 
The MAC Interceptor box provides the ability to allow/deny a global user with a clearance from 
accessing a specific global service. The DAC Interceptor box provides the ability to allow/deny a 
global user (with a delegated global role, global service, or global clearance) from accessing a 
specific global service.  Collectively, FSICC as presented in Figure 1.2, represents a set of 
interacting components that allows from a transition to isolated clients and systems being able to 
join and utilize a global environment that provides a single common way to access services. 
 
1.5 Research Objectives and Expected Contribution 
 
In this section, we discuss the research objectives and expected contributions of this 
dissertation.  Since the component-level view of the presented FSICC in Figure 1.2 does not 
provide an adequate representation of the underlying models, concepts, and research of FSICC 
for the dissertation, we supplement Figure 1.2 with Figure 1.3 which provides a high-level view 
of the research of FSICC as discussed in Section 1.4, organizing and grouping the components of 
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Figure 1.2 into a perspective that identifies the research areas and foci of the dissertation. Figure 
1.3 has horizontal boxes that contain the main research foci of this dissertation and vertical boxes 
that span across multiple foci.   
The five horizontal boxes are: Architectural Blueprints that contain the different options for 
architectural option for  connecting clients and systems with FSICC that was shown in the upper 
left portion of Figure 1.2; Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model with boxes for 
Schema Definitions, Enterprise Definitions, Policy Definitions, FSICC Definitions, and 
Intercepting Definitions; Access Control Models for the ability to control services via RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC as discussed for FSICC's security requirements in Section 1.3 and that was 
shown in the middle of Figure 1.2; GSP  (Global Security Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global 
API) Generation for generating the security policy from multiple systems to make global APIs 
available to clients what’s showing in the lower portion of Figure 1.2; and, Global Security 
Policy and Global API Utilization and Security Enforcement that utilizes security interceptors 
that was shown in the bottom of Figure 1.2 to allow/deny clients from access global services of 
FSICC. The security requirements introduced in Section 1.3 are represented by the upper right 
vertical box SECURITY REQUIREMENTS in Figure 1.3 that spans two horizontal boxes: 
Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model and Access Control Models. The cloud 
computing capabilities introduced in Section 1.3 are represented by the lower right vertical box 
CLOUD COMPUTING CAPABILITIES in Figure 1.3 that spans two horizontal boxes: Global 
Security Policy and Global API Generation and Global Security Policy and Global API 
Utilization and Security Enforcement. 
From a research perspective, the presented Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud 
Computing that was shown in Figure 1.2 has the following four expected contributions (EC-A, 
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EC-B, EC-C, and EC-D) which are presented and discussed using the security requirements and 
cloud computing capabilities of Section 1.3 and Figures 1.2 and 1.3. The expected contributions 
are also highlighted in the horizontal and vertical boxes of Figure 1.3. 
EC-A: Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC: This contribution facilitates 
the interoperability and information exchange of clients and systems and presents a 
collection of three architectural blueprints (i.e., Basic Architecture, Alternative 
Architecture, and Radical Architecture) for the design and development of integration 
framework (IFMWK) servers utilizing a standard integration framework (e.g., FHIR in 
the healthcare domain) that enable the integration between systems with applications. 
This was shown in the upper half (left) of Figure 1.2.   The architectural blueprints are 
represented as the first horizontal box Architectural Blueprints in Figure 1.3 and includes 
three main boxes for: Interoperability Issues, Integration Options, and Integration 
Blueprints.  Each blueprint is based on the location that IFMWK servers can be placed 
with respect to the components of the application (UI, API, Server) or a HIT system in 
order to define and design the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the exchange of 
information via IFMWK.  
 
EC-B:  An Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for Cloud Computing: This 
contribution involves a Unified Cloud Computing Access Control model (UCCACM) for 
the FSICC that provides a single view of global services to applications (i.e., clients) and 
allows those global services to be authorized according to RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
policies. The UCCAC model is represented by the second horizontal box Unified Cloud 
Computing Access Control Model in Figure 1.3 that includes five main boxes for: 
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Schema Definitions, Enterprise Definitions, Policy Definitions, FSICC Definitions, and 
Intercepting Definitions. The contribution will include a set of formal definitions for 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC access control models that specifies, in detail, the way that: each 
system can register its services and security policies; and, a security engineer can define a 
set of global RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC policies on a unified set of global cloud services. 
The UCCAC model basically provides formal definitions for the main components of 
Figure 1.2.  
 
EC-C:  Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP: The Security 
Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms aspect of this expected contribution is realized within 
the horizontal box near the bottom of Figure 1.3, labeled GSP (Global Security Policy) 
Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation which includes Security Policies and 
Services Registration, Global Services Generation, and Global Security Policy 
Generation. This SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) aspect of this expected 
contribution for FSICC that can be utilized to combine security policies (that can be 
RBAC, MAC or DAC) from different systems into one global security policy, in which 
SSEP also includes a process for security enforcement code generation. This was shown 
in the upper right half of Figure 1.2. A portion of the SSEP is human assisted in order to 
reconcile naming issues of roles, mapping sensitivity levels, etc., that are integrated from 
multiple clients and systems. Once the policies are successfully mapped, all of the 
security enforcement code can be automatically generated by algorithms. The SSEP for 
FSICC is represented by the left vertical box SOA-BASED SECURITY ENGINEERING in 
Figure 1.3 that spans all of the five horizontal boxes: Architectural Blueprints, Unified 
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Cloud Computing Access Control Model, Access Control Models, Global Security Policy 
and Global API Generation, and Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and 
Security Enforcement. 
 
EC-D:  Dynamic Enforcement via Intercepting Process: This contribution involves a 
set of programmatic mechanisms that are able to intercept a service call from a client app 
to an API in order to perform appropriate security enforcement checks.   This was shown 
in the bottom of Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.3, these security interceptors are represented 
within the last horizontal box Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and 
Security Enforcement in Figure 1.3, and the Security Enforcement via Interceptors box in 
Figure 1.2. Interceptors include: a RBAC Interceptor that is able to determine at runtime 
if the requested API call on a global service can be executed for a specific user with a 
specific role; a MAC Interceptor that is able to determine at runtime if the requested API 
call on a global service can be executed for a user with a clearance and limited by if the 
services is read or write; and a DAC Interceptor that is able to determine at runtime if the 
requested API call on a global service can be executed for a specific user with a delegated 
role/service/clearance.  
 
Throughout the remainder of the dissertation, these expected contributions (EC-A, EC-B, EC-C, 
and EC-D) will be high-lighted when relevant. 
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Figure 1.3. High-Level View of FSICC Research Areas and Foci. 
 
1.6 Research Progress to Date 
 
In support of the presented Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing, a 
number of articles have been published:  
 Baihan, M., Sánchez, Y., Shao, X., Gilman, C., Demurjian, S., & Agresta, T. (2018). A 
Blueprint for Designing and Developing M-Health Applications for Diverse Stakeholders 
Utilizing FHIR. In R. Rajkumar (Ed.), Contemporary Applications of Mobile Computing 
in Healthcare Settings (pp. 85-124). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.  
 Baihan, M., and Demurjian, S. (2017). A Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud 
Computing. In Research Advances in Cloud Computing, S. Chaudhary (ed.), Springer.  
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 Baihan, M., Demurjian, S., Rivera Sánchez, Y., Toris, A., Franzis, A., Onofrio, A., 
Cheng, B., and Agresta, T. (2017). Role-Based Access Control for Cloud Computing 
Realized within HAPI FHIR. Proceedings of 16th International Conference on 
WWW/INTERNET 2017 (ICWI 2017), October 2017. 
 
Other published or submitted articles: 
● Rivera Sánchez, Y., Demurjian, S., and Baihan, M. (2017). Achieving RBAC & MAC 
on RESTful APIs for Mobile Apps using FHIR. In The 5th IEEE International 
Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering. 
● Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M., and Agresta, T. (2017). An 
Architectural Solution for Health Information Exchange. In International Journal of 
User-Driven Healthcare (IJUDH), 6(1), 65-103. 
● Rivera Sánchez, Y., Demurjian, S., and Baihan, M. (2017). A Service-Based RBAC & 
MAC Approach Incorporated into the Fast Healthcare Interoperable Resources (FHIR) 
standard. Submitted to The Digital Communications and Networks Journal, special issue 
on The Security, Privacy, and Digital Forensics of Mobile Networks and Mobile Cloud. 
 
1.7 Dissertation Outline 
 
The remainder of the dissertation has seven chapters. In Chapter 2, we review background 
on: cloud computing and its main technologies; RBAC, MAC, and DAC models that are 
utilized to enforce authorization on cloud services; application programming interfaces (APIs); 
and, the Fast Health Interoperable Resources (FHIR) standard and its HAPI FHIR 
implementation. In Chapter 3, we present and explain four security requirements and three 
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cloud computing capabilities for FSICC that both simplifies and enables client access via global 
resources via standardized system APIs. Chapter 4 defines a Unified Cloud Computing Access 
Control model (UCCACM) for RBAC, MAC, and DAC access control for a cloud setting; this 
addresses Contribution EC-B: An Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for Cloud 
Computing. In Chapter 5, we present a set of blueprints for the design and development of 
IFMWK servers in which an application can interact with multiple HIT systems via IFMWK 
through the design, implementation, and usage of IFMWK servers. The architectural blueprints 
consist of three main architectural integration options: Basic Architecture, Alternative 
Architecture, and Radical Architecture; this addresses Contribution EC-A: Architectural 
Blueprints for Supporting FSICC. Chapter 6 has two main parts. The first part presents a set of 
algorithms for generating the global security policy of FSICC; this partially addresses 
Contribution EC-C:  Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP by focusing on 
Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms. The second part introduces and discusses three 
security interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and DAC via a number of checks and an algorithmic 
approach for each interceptor; this addresses Contribution EC-D: Dynamic Enforcement via 
Intercepting Process. Chapter 7 introduces and discusses an SOA-based security engineering 
process for FSICC that is intended to help security engineers of systems and clients, on one side, 
and the security engineer of FSICC, on the other side, to establish and maintain secure 
interoperable services via RBAC, MAC, and DAC; this partially addresses Contribution EC-C:  
Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP by focusing on SSEP. Finally, Chapter 8 
summarizes the contributions of the dissertation and discusses future work.     
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Chapter 2 
Background 
 
This chapter provides background material on the main concepts and topics that support 
the discussion and explanation in the remainder of this dissertation. Section 2.1 presents the 
cloud computing concept and underlying application programming interfaces (APIs), and 
discusses the main technologies behind cloud computing with an emphasis on the service-
oriented architecture (SOA) technology that underlies the cloud service model. Section 2.2 
reviews the three classic access control approaches: role-based access control (RBAC) 
(Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001), discretionary access control (DAC) 
(Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988), and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 
1976). Section 2.3 introduces and explains the Fast Health Interoperable Resources (FHIR) 
standard with an emphasis on the FHIR Resources and reviews the HL7 Application 
Programming Interface FHIR (HAPI-FHIR) which is one popular reference implementation of 
the FHIR standard. Section 2.4 introduces and presents a sample healthcare scenario utilized 
throughout this dissertation.  
 
2.1 Cloud Computing and APIs 
 
Cloud computing has emerged as a de facto approach throughout society, commercial , 
governmental sectors, and research/academic communities. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) (Mell & Grance, 2011) defines: “Cloud computing is a 
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction.” Historically, cloud computing emerged from the 
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evolution of existing technologies (Zhang, Cheng, & Boutaba, 2010), such as service-oriented 
architecture, that are combined in a certain way to provide a new business model. Service-
oriented architecture (SOA) (IBM, 2015)  is a model for designing systems in which the focus is 
around offering services for different consumers. An SOA implementation, such as the web 
services standard, could adopt the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) as an SOA approach that 
enables systems to provide and consume services in a common manner without the need to use a 
specific programming language or operating system.  
This facilitates services integration. Service suppliers define and publish services for use by 
consumers.   Cloud services are provided and delivered based on the cloud service model 
(Microsoft.com, 2016) by leveraging concepts from SOA. In the cloud service model in Figure 
2.1, there are three main components: Cloud Service Registry, Cloud Service Supplier, and 
Cloud Service Consumer. The Cloud Service Registry component maintains information on 
available cloud services. The Cloud Service Supplier component publishes services to the Cloud 
Service Registry. The Cloud Service Consumer component discovers services from Cloud 
Service Registry and consumes them. Cloud services are the APIs that define the way that cloud 
consumers can access and utilize cloud-computing resources such as software. 
Cloud computing utilizes an Application Programming Interface (API) to support the 
definition of services.  An API requires a set of inputs via an HTTP request to generate a 
response in a specific format such as the Extensible Markup Language (XML), the JavaScript 
Object Notation (JSON), etc., based on the inputs. In cloud computing, the cloud services are the 
APIs that define the way that cloud consumers can access and utilize cloud-computing resources 
such as software. Some benefits of creating an API are: (1) data can be transferred from one 
system to another system easily and smoothly; (2) an API can be called and processed by almost 
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any programming language that can be different from the programming language of the actual 
system implementation; and, (3) an API can be utilized to encourage external developers to add 
new features or to enhance current features of a system. An API can be designed using web 
services such as: Representational State Transfer (REST) (Fielding, 2000), Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) (Microsoft Inc., 2016), etc. Any API designed based using the REST protocol 
is called a RESTful API, which is defined as a set of definitions for methods of the Back-end 
system. A RESTful API utilizes a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request to interact with 
the API consumers and the back-end system (Rouse, 2014). RESTful requests are frequently 
referred to as CRUD, which is short for Create, Read, Update, and Delete functions. CRUD 
operations from an HTTP perspective are typically defined as: GET to retrieves data; PUT or 
POST to insert data; POST, PUT, or PATCH to update data; and, DELETE to remove data. 
RESTful APIs have become a dominant choice for designing and implementing cloud services. 
Cloud Service 
Registry
Cloud Service 
Supplier
Cloud Service 
Consumer
Bind
 
Figure 2.1. Cloud Service Model. 
 
 
2.2 Access Control Models 
 
Access control models have gained wide acceptance in computing, traditionally in controlling 
access to data in objects that are in a database or a  repository. The three classic approaches are: 
role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001), 
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discretionary access control (DAC) (Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988), and mandatory access 
control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976). RBAC provides an efficient way to manage consumers, 
users of a system, by utilizing the concept of role in which each role can be authorized to access a 
sub-set of the available cloud services and each consumer is assigned one or more suitable roles. 
The RBAC model as shown in Figure 2.2 consists of three main components: elements that 
describe the different components; constraints that can be defined on the elements; and, relations 
that exist between the various elements.  
There are five main elements in RBAC: objects that represent functionality for an application; 
operations that are defined on objects; permissions that are the allowed operations on the different 
objects; roles that represent a set of responsibilities for a user of the application to capture the 
defined permissions; and, users that are assigned to a role during a session of an application. 
RBAC supports a number of constraints that can be defined to restrict a user playing a specific 
role. Finally, RBAC elements can be organized into relations: a role-user relation to assign users 
to roles; a role-permission relation to assign permissions to roles; a role-session relation to assign 
sessions to roles; a user-session relation to assign users to sessions; an operation-object relation 
to assign objects to operations; and, a role-role relation to define a role hierarchy. Moreover, the 
role-role relations form a partial order and are represented using an isa role hierarchy based 
on generalization (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001). That is, any 
role that is located higher up in the hierarchy, is a more general role than roles lower in the 
role hierarchy. As a result, a non-root role inherits all of the permissions authorized to the 
roles above, namely, the ancestors. In addition, some roles in the role hierarchy are abstract 
roles in which no users will be assigned to such roles. For example, in healthcare, a physician 
role can be at a higher level than a private physician role, which inherits all of the permissions 
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authorized to the physician role; in such a role hierarchy,  the physician role is a more general 
role. 
 
RolesUsers OBSOPS
PRMS
Sessions
UA
Session_rolesUser_sessions
PA
RR
 
Figure 2.2. RBAC Model. 
 
 
When cloud services need to access very sensitive information such as patient data that needs 
to be more strongly controlled than other parts of the patient data, MAC can be employed to 
control access to services using the concept of a sensitivity level, which is a security label that can 
be assigned to an object or a user to indicate the importance of such service or user. In MAC, 
sensitivity levels are assigned to subjects (clearance) and objects (classification) with the 
permissions for the subject to read and/or write an object dependent on the relationship between 
clearance (assigned to users) and classifications (assigned to objects).   MAC typically is modeled 
using four sensitivity levels which are hierarchically ordered from most to least secure:  Top 
Secret (TS) < Secret (S) < Confidential (C) < Unclassified (U); this is referred to as the multi-
level security model (MLS). These terms are defined in the U.S. classification of information 
systems in a Presidential Executive Order (National Archives, 1982): 
“(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. 
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. 
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(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.” 
 In MAC, the central authority maintains a classification (CLS) for each object and a 
clearance (CLR) for each user in the system. The MAC model (Bell & La Padula, 1976) also 
has a set of properties, namely, Simple Security (SS), Simple Integrity (SI), Liberal* (L*), and 
Strict* (S*) that has both Read and Write capabilities. Such properties are defined to determine 
under which conditions a user with a CLR level can read or write a given data item with a CLS 
level.  First, the SS property (or read-down, no read-up) is the permission to read an object that 
has an equal or lower CLS level. That is, a user is allowed to read an object with a CLS level 
equal to or lower than their CLR level, but not those objects with a higher CLS level. Second, the 
SI property (or write-down, no write-up) is the permission to write an object that has an equal or 
lower CLS levels. That is, a user can write an object of equal or lower CLS level when compared 
to their CLR level, but not to those objects with a higher CLS levels. Third, the L* property (or 
write-up, no write-down) is the permission to write an object that has an equal or greater CLS 
level (the opposite of SI). Forth, S* Write property (or write equal) is the permission to write an 
object that only has an equal CLS level. Finally, the S* Read property (or read equal) is the 
permission to read an object that only has an equal CLS level. From a definition and management 
perspective, an Security engineer of a system would set the CLR level of users following the 
predefined sensitivity levels (e.g., TS, S, C, and U) to establish the levels for both users and 
objects. These levels are then augmented on a user-by-user basis by assigning the ability to read 
an object (via SS or S* Read properties) and the ability to write an object (via SI, L*, or S* Write 
properties). 
29 
 
To explain the read/write properties, assume that there is an object O1 with a confidential 
classification; an object O2 with a top secret classification; a user U1 with a top secret clearance, 
with SS read property and SI write property chosen for that user. Assume another user U2 with a 
secret clearance with SS read property and SI write property chosen for this user. In this setting, 
U1 can read and write O1 and O2, while U2 can only read and write O1, as shown in Figure 2.3.  
U1 O1 Class: C
O2 Class: TS
Clear: TS
U2Clear: S
 
Figure 2.3. An Example of MAC. 
 
However, the four sensitivity levels typically used in MAC are insufficient to classify data in 
some complex areas such as healthcare. For this reason, a number of healthcare-based sensitivity 
level sets have been proposed in the literature. Two main works are: the HL7 v3 standard 
confidentiality labels (Health Level 7., 2014); and a proposed healthcare multi-level security 
labeling system (Demurjian, Sanzi, Agresta, & Yasnoff, 2018). In the first work, the HL7 
organization introduced the HL7 v3 standard which contains a definition for a set of 
confidentiality labels that is defined to accurately classify healthcare related data. Specifically, the 
HL7 v3 standard defines six confidentiality labels: U – unrestricted, L – low, M – moderate, N – 
normal, R – restricted, and V – very restricted; these six levels replace the four traditional 
sensitivity levels of MAC. Figure 2.4 presents the HL7 v3 confidentiality labels with a definition 
and examples for each confidentiality label, taken from 
(http://www.hl7.org/documentcenter/public_temp_DFF235EF-1C23-BA17-
0CB382A77F4391FB/standards/vocabulary/vocabulary_tables/infrastructure/vocabulary/vs_Conf
identiality.html). Note that these confidentiality labels indicate the type of healthcare related data 
that needs to be protected and are different from the typical four sensitivity levels of MAC.   
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Figure 2.4. Confidentiality Labels from HL7 Release 3 Standard. 
 
In the second work, Demurjian et al., (Demurjian, Sanzi, Agresta, & Yasnoff, 2018)  proposed 
a multi-level security labeling system for healthcare domain which has five    healthcare 
sensitivity levels (0-4) and within each level there are different categories of data that will be 
given to different users based on their need as Figure 2.5 shows, where Level 0 is the least secure, 
while Level 4 is the most secure. Specifically: 
 Level 0 (Basic Information) is public data available to anyone without control in which 
data in this level can be categorized into: 0-DM for basic demographics such as city 
and state of residence, 0-C for general health condition, and 0-FT for information 
related to tracking fitness data.  
 Level 1 (Medical History Data) contains data that has some restrictions in which data 
in this level can be categorized into: 1-DM for detailed demographic data, 1-MHx for 
history of the patient and his/her family, 1-FHx for more sensitive patient-collected 
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fitness data, 1-IM for immunizations, and 1-MH-Hx for mental health history of the 
patient.  
 Level 2 (Summary Clinical Data) contains clinical data in which data in this level can 
be categorized into: 2-Rx for prescription, 2-OTC for over-the-counter medications, 2-
ALL for allergies, 2-Dx for medical diagnoses and problem list, 2-PL for plan for 
treatment or other related instructions, 2-MH-Dx for mental health, separate medical 
diagnoses and problem list, and 2-MH-PL for plan for treatment or other related 
instructions.  
 Level 3 (Detailed Clinical Data) is for use by medical providers in which data in this 
level can be categorized into: 3-RP for reports from imaging studies (CT Scans, MRIs, 
X-Rays, etc.), 3-IM for the images from the studies, 3-EN for detailed information on 
each medical visit, 3-LB for laboratory tests ordered, dates, and results including 
surveillance data, 3-MH-EN for information about mental health encounters, 3-SR for 
surveillance data, and 3-FT for clinical data from fitness devices.  
 Level 4 (Sensitive Clinical Data) contains sensitive information on a patient that is 
used by medical specialists in which data in this level can be categorized into: 4-G for 
data on genetics, 4-SA for substance abuse, 4-MH for mental health psychotherapy 
notes, 4-RH for reproductive health, and 4-DV for domestic violence.  
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Figure 2.5. A Multi-Level Healthcare Sensitivity Levels. 
 
 
DAC can be defined as an access control mechanism that can restrict operations (e.g., read, 
write, execute) on objects (or services) based on the identity of subjects (users) and/or groups to 
which they belong, as shown in a Figure 2.6. The word “discretionary” in DAC indicates that a 
subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that permission on to any other 
subject so that the delegated user may utilize the delegated permission. A subject is also called an 
original user which means that the user was assigned the role directly in the security definition 
process. A role that is assigned to an original user is referred to as an original role, in such an 
original role has original role permissions. An original user may also be assigned a clearance 
level if they are assigned mandatory access capabilities which is reference to as an original 
clearance. An original user may have delegation of authority which allows the original user to 
pass on the original role to a delegated user who acquires all of the capabilities of the original 
uses role.  When the original role is passed to the delegated user, is it is referred to as the 
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delegated role of that delegated user. The delegated role in turn has delegated role permissions, 
and if the original user had an original clearance, it too could be passed to the delegated user as a 
delegated clearance. Two other important concepts for DAC are delegation authority and pass on 
delegation of authority. Delegation authority is the authority given to an original user that allows 
the original user to delegate his or her role to a delegated user.  Pass-on delegation authority, 
PODA, is the authority given to an original user or delegated user that allows that user to delegate 
on a useful set of definitions and rules for delegation which underlie a proposed delegation 
language (Zhang, L., Ahn, J., & Chu, T., 2001).  
In a cloud computing setting, DAC can offer the ability of a consumer of the cloud services to 
enable another consumer to utilize all or a sub-set of the consumer’s authorized cloud services, 
that are assigned based a role or a clearance, through a delegation of authority. DAC, as shown in 
Figure 2.6, utilizes the concept of delegation to pass privileges among users to delegate both 
authority and permissions to another user. For example, in healthcare, a physician Charles that is 
leaving the office on the weekend could delegate his responsibilities (e.g., patients) to the on-call 
physician Lois who will be covering any queries from patients.   Charles can delegate all of his 
permissions and also the ability to further delegate those permissions beyond the original scope.  
For example, if the on-call physician Lois has to attend to an emergency, she could then employ 
user-directed delegation to delegate the permissions passed to her by Charles to another user 
Thomas.  Administrative-directed delegation has a security engineer to control delegation.   
Users OBSOPS
PRMS
Delegate
 
Figure 2.6. DAC Model. 
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Traditionally, RBAC, DAC, and MAC models define permissions over objects and operations 
of a system. However, the work in this dissertation is focused on a Framework for Secure and 
Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) which involves the definition of Global Services and the 
need to define security policies that allow the ability to determine which user can access which 
service at which times. The work in this dissertation is very cloud-computing focused with an 
emphasis on services, and since we are interested in supporting Access Control in FSICC the 
RBAC, DAC, and MAC models need to be upgraded, extended, and modified so that permissions 
can be defined against cloud services. Such an extension to access control will provide us with the 
ability to: specify which role can access which cloud service at which time and under which 
situation thereby supporting RBAC; define a classification of each cloud service and a clearance 
for each user/client in order to control which Services can be accessed thereby supporting MAC; 
and, delegate a cloud service from one user to another user thereby supporting DAC. This allows 
the FSICC to authorize a mobile, web, and desktop applications, by roles/clearance, to access 
cloud services.  
 
2.3 FHIR and HAPI FHIR 
The Fast Health Interoperable Resources (FHIR) is a health integration standard developed by 
the Health Level Seven International (HL7) organization (Health Level 7, Fast Health 
Interoperable Resources, 2016). FHIR is primarily structured around the concept of FHIR 
resources (Health Level 7, Fast Health Interoperable Resources list, 2016) which are the data 
elements and associated RESTful APIs that can be leveraged for exchanging healthcare 
information, particularly between mobile applications and HIT systems.    FHIR Resources, the 
main building block in FHIR, can hold any type of information that FHIR deals with to be 
exchanged from one health information technology system to another via RESTful API services 
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that utilize with an XML or JSON format. Resources are broadly classified into different 
categories: Clinical Findings; Patient Problems, Allergies, and Adverse Events; Patient History; 
Suggested Physician Orders; and, Interdisciplinary Care Planning.  To illustrate, sample FHIR 
resources from the 119 currently defined (and always increasing) are: the Practitioner resource to 
track medical providers (physicians, nurses, office staff, etc.);  the Patient resource can track 
demographic data on patients; the RelatedPerson resource to track parents/guardians; the 
FamilyMemberHistory for  basic information on a family medical history; the Condition 
resource to track the relevant medical conditions; the Observations resource to track symptoms, 
and other medical observations; and, the Encounter/EpisodeOfCare resources to track the 
different times that changes to patient data occur based on a visit (Encounter) or action at the 
visit (EpisodeofCare).  
FHIR Resources can be utilized by HIT systems and applications for different purposes. For 
example, an mHealth application may use the Patient resource to store and exchange information 
about patients back and forth with different HIT systems. All FHIR resources have five main 
properties in common: a unique URL for identification purposes; common metadata; a human 
readable section; a number of predefined data elements; and, an extension element that enables a 
system to add new data elements. FHIR provides four main equivalent representation formats: 
the Unified Modeling Language (UML) format for a diagrammatic representation of the 
resource; an XML schema that is subset of the HL7 schema for the resource; a JSON 
representation to facilitate a programmatic exchange via a RESTful APP; and, a Turtle resource 
definition format (RDF) to assist the process of bridging between operational data exchange 
within formal knowledge processing systems.  Figure 2.7 shows an example of a FHIR Patient 
resource represented in the JSON format. FHIR supports a number of REST API services to 
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enable a system to retrieve and modify data in the Resources. The main five services are: Create 
to add a new instance of a resource; Read  to retrieve an existing instance of a resource; Update 
to manipulate data in an existing instance of a resource; Delete to remove an existing instance of 
a resource; and, Search to retrieve all existing instances of a resource.  The first four services are 
similar to CRUD, while the fifth service for search is intended to allow repositories to be 
accessed. 
   
{ "resourceType": "Patient",
"id" : "1",
"meta" : { "versionId" : "1", }
"text": { "status": "generated", },
"identifier": [  { "label": "OpenEMR",
"system": "http://www.healthorg.org/openemr",
"value": "10“ } ],
"name": [ {"family": "Levin",
"given": "John" } ],
"gender": {"text": "Male" },
"birthDate": "1985-02-12“ }
 
Figure 2.7. An Example of Patient Resource in JSON. 
 
One popular reference implementation of the FHIR standard is the HL7 Application 
Programming Interface FHIR (HAPI-FHIR) (HAPI community, 2016) which is an open-source 
Java-based library of the FHIR standard. Following the FHIR standard, the HAPI-FHIR library 
provides a HAPI-FHIR server that can be used in front of a system. Figure 2.8 shows the HAPI-
FHIR server architecture that consists of three components: HAPI ResfulServer, Resource 
Providers, and, the Back-end system. The HAPI ResfulServer is a Servlet that a developer 
utilizes to: create instances of user-defined resource providers; and, specify the Servlet path. A 
Resource Provider is a class that represents one FHIR resource (e.g., Patient) that has a number 
of empty annotated methods for CRUD verbs that a developer needs to implement.  These empty 
annotated methods are utilized to to parse HTTP requests and convert the transferred data 
to/from FHIR format/Back-end System format, and to interact with the Back-end System. The 
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Back-end System is a Health IT system (HIT) that handles the Resource Providers requests to 
retrieve or modify the actual Electronic Health Records (EHR).  
 
Figure 2.8. The HAPI-FHIR Server Architecture (HAPI community, 2016). 
 
The HAPI-FHIR library also provides a general HAPI server interceptor (University Health 
Network, 2016) which is programmatic approach that allows a developer to examine each 
incoming HTTP request to add useful features to the HAPI ResfulServer such as authentication, 
authorization, auditing, logging, etc. The general HAPI interceptor,  the InterceptorAdapter class, 
defines a number of methods that enable a developer to interact with the incoming HTTP 
requests at different points of the request lifetime. As Figure 2.9 shows, these methods are: 
incomingRequestPreProcessed that is invoked before performing any action to the request; 
incomingRequestPostProcessed that is invoked after determining the request type which 
classifying the request; incomingRequestPreHandled which is invoked before sending the 
request to the Resource provider; and, outgoingResponse which is invoked after the request is 
handled by the appropriate Resource provider. Each of these methods must returns either true, to 
continue processing the request, or false, to abort and reject the request. Moreover, a developer 
may extend the InterceptorAdapter class and implement the needed methods and register the 
extended class in the HAPI ResfulServer. 
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Figure 2.9. The Methods of HAPI Interceptor (University Health Network, 2016). 
 
 
2.4 A Healthcare Scenario 
 
To assist in explaining FSICC and all of its components and features in this dissertation, this 
section presents a healthcare scenario that has two mHealth client apps, the Connecticut 
Concussion Tracker (CT
2
) and ShareMyHealth, and two HIT systems, the open electronic health 
record, OpenEMR  (OpenEMR, 2016) and MyGoogle.   To begin, CT
2
 is a mHealth app, as 
shown in Figure 2.10 for Android and iOS devices, which is developed as a joint effort between 
the Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at the 
University of Connecticut, in collaboration with faculty in the Schools of Nursing and Medicine.  
The CT
2
 app allows the user (e.g., parent/guardian, coach, athletic trainer, school nurse) to report 
and manage the concussion incidents of students from kindergarten through high school. The CT
2
 
app uses an HIT system (i.e., OpenEMR) as a back-end system to maintain patients-related data.  
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The CT
2
 contains seven tabs starting from the top left and continuing to the second row in 
Figure 2.10 (‘Login’, ‘List’, ‘Student’, ‘Cause’, ‘Symptoms’, ‘Follow-up’, and ‘Return’) where: 
the ‘Login’ tab allows the user to enter a concussion, to retrieve an open case, or to find a student 
by name; the ‘List’ tab which contains the list of students the user has permission to view and, for 
each student gives him/her the option to add a concussion or edit an existing one; the ‘Student’ tab 
allows the user to input the student’s general information (e.g., name, birthdate, school, and the 
date of concussion); the ‘Cause’ tab allows the user to specify how and where the concussion 
occurred; the ‘Symptoms’ tab allows users to record the symptoms the student had within 48 
hours and other pertinent data; the ‘Follow-up’ tab allows users to record the status of the student 
over time; and, the ‘Return’ tab allows users to specify when the student can return to school 
activities. Both versions (Android and iOS) of CT
2
 utilize an API (services) to manage CT
2
 data 
as given in Table 2.1. Services CT1 and CT2 are used to: add/modify a student concussion status, 
and, retrieve such status information, respectively. CT
2
 utilizes CT3 and CT4 services to:  retrieve 
all information about a student, and create/update new student information, respectively. Services 
CT5 and CT6 provide ways for the CT
2
 to: create/update a student follow-up summary, and 
retrieve follow-up information, respectively. Finally, by calling services CT7 and CT8, CT
2
 can: 
retrieve all information about a student concussion, and add/modify new student concussion 
information, respectively. CT
2
 defines four roles (see Table 2.2): Coach, Nurse, Trainer, and 
Parent. All of the four roles can access: all GET services CT2, CT3, CT6, and CT7; and two PUT 
services CT4, except Coach, and CT8. Moreover, Trainer has an additional PUT service (CT5) 
while Nurse has access to all PUT services.  
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Figure 2.10.  CT
2
 Mobile Application - iOS Version Interceptor. 
 
ShareMyHealth is an mHealth app as shown in Figure 2.11 developed by a team of 
undergraduate students at the University of Connecticut, for Android and iOS devices. 
ShareMyHealth provides patients with a means to manage and share their fitness data across 
multiple systems. Patients can gather data from multiple sources (e.g., MyGoogle, OpenEMR, 
etc.) that can then be made available to medical providers.  The first row of Figure 2.11 contains 
four screens: Welcome for the initial opening of the app; Sign In with Google to authenticate the 
user credentials to access his/her fitness data, such as Google Fit API (via MyGoogle system); 
Initial Access for the user to define fitness data; and Home where the user sees their basic 
information and can access their “Health” and “Settings” pages. The second row of Figure 2.11 
contains four screens: Health View for viewing information on steps, calories, weight, and 
height; and a Settings page to view setting such as name, gender, date of birth, etc.; and, a second 
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setting page that to modify information. Pressing the “View Steps” button utilizes the user’s 
Google API Token to pull their data from the Google Fit cloud (via MyGoogle system). When a 
user presses the “Sync Steps” button, the app packages the data into Google Fit via MyGoogle 
system which in turns sends the information into OpenEMR via OpenEMR API. Settings such as 
name, gender, etc., are updated by direct calls from ShareMyHealth to OpenEMR. 
 
Figure 2.11.  ShareMyHealth Mobile Application. 
 
ShareMyHealth has access to a RESTful API (SMH1 to SMH5 services, see Table 2.3). 
Moreover, the ShareMyHealth API makes calls (via MyGoogle system) to: Google OAuth API 
that prompts the current user (patient) to allow ShareMyHealth access to the user’s Google Fit 
data; Google REST Fit API to access measurement data (step, height, weight, and calorie); and 
OpenEMR API to read and update patient data. Specifically, ShareMyHealth utilizes services 
SMH1 and SMH2 to add/update and read a patient’s measurements data, respectively. 
ShareMyHealth calls services SMH3 and SMH4 to add/update and read a patient’s demographic 
information. In addition, service SMH5 is used to grant ShareMyHealth app (using its Token) an 
access to the user (patient) fitness data. ShareMyHealth has two roles (see Table 2.4): Patient, 
that has access to all five services, and Physician, that has access to all services but SMH1 and 
SMH3.  
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Table 2.1.  CT
2
 Services. 
Sid Service Name 
CT1 PUT /CT2/concussion/status    statusINFO 
CT2 GET /CT2/concussion/status    statusID 
CT3 GET /CT2/student    studentID 
CT4 PUT /CT2/student/add    studentINFO 
CT5 PUT /CT2/followup/add    followupINFO 
CT6 GET /CT2/followups    followupID 
CT7 GET /CT2/concussion/student studentID 
CT8 PUT /CT2/concussions/add    concussionsINFO 
 
Table 2.2.  CT
2
 Roles. 
Rid Role Service Name 
CTR1 Coach CT2, CT3, CT6 – CT8 
CTR2 Nurse CT1 – CT8 
CTR3 Parent CT2 – CT4, CT6 – CT8 
CTR4 Trainer CT2 – CT8 
 
Table 2.3.  ShareMyHealth Services. 
Sid Service Name 
SMH1 PUT /SMH/newMeasure/mID    mINFO 
SMH2 GET /SMH/Measures/mID     
SMH3 PUT /SMH/newPatient/pID    pINFO 
SMH4 GET /SMH/Patients/pID     
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SMH5 PUT /SMH/Users/uID    Token 
 
Table 2.4.  ShareMyHealth Roles. 
Rid Role Service Name 
SMHR1 Patient SMH1 – SMH5 
SMHR2 Physician SMH2, SMH4, SMH5 
 
OpenEMR (OpenEMR, 2016)  is an open source Electronic Health Record (EHR) system 
and a medical practice management app that can be utilized by any health/medical organization 
around the world. OpenEMR is a Meaningful Use Stage 2 certified (Himss.org., 2016) and is 
expected to be a Meaningful Use Stage 3 EHR certified soon (Himss.org., 2016). In addition to a 
web-based interface, OpenEMR has a RESTful API from which we have selected a subset of 
eight services as shown in Table 2.5. Services OEMR1 and OEMR2 enable an app (or a user via 
an app) to add/update a note about a patient, and, retrieve information about such a note, 
respectively. An app may utilize services OEMR3 and OEMR4 to: retrieve patient information, 
and, create/update new patient information, respectively. Services OEMR5 and OEMR6 provide 
ways for an app to: create/update a patient follow-up summary, and, retrieve information about 
such a follow-up, respectively.  
Finally, by calling services OEMR7 and OEMR8, an app can: retrieve patient condition 
information, and, add/modify new patient condition information, respectively. Moreover, the 
OpenEMR system defines eight roles (see Table 2.6): Patient, Physician, Coach, Nurse, Trainer, 
Parent, CT
2
, and MyGoogle in which the last two roles are designed for CT
2
, and MyGoogle, 
respectively. The roles Nurse, Trainer, and Parent can access: all GET services OEMR2, OEMR3, 
OEMR6, and OEMR7; and two PUT services OEMR4 and OEMR8. Moreover, Trainer has an 
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additional PUT service (OEMR5) while Nurse and Physician roles have access to all PUT 
services. In addition, the Physician can only access OEMR2 and OEMR4 services, while the 
Patient role can access the services OEMR1, OEMR2, OEMR3 and OEMR4. The Coach role can 
access all services except OEMR1, OEMR4, and OEMR5. Moreover, the MyGoogle role is 
restricted to access OEMR1 and OEMR2 services, while the CT
2
 role can access all services. 
Table 2.5.  OpenEMR Services. 
Sid Service Name 
OEMR1 PUT /OpenEMR/updatepatientnotes    noteINFO 
OEMR2 GET /OpenEMR/getnotes    noteID 
OEMR3 GET /OpenEMR/getallpatients    patientID 
OEMR4 PUT /OpenEMR/addpatient    patientINFO 
OEMR5 PUT /OpenEMR/addvisit    visitINFO 
OEMR6 GET /OpenEMR/getvisits    visitID 
OEMR7 GET /OpenEMR/getlist    conditionID 
OEMR8 PUT /OpenEMR/addlist    conditionINFO 
 
Table 2.6.  OpenEMR Roles. 
Rid Role Service Name 
OEMRR1 Physician OEMR2, OEMR4 
OEMRR2 Patient OEMR1 – OEMR4 
OEMRR3 Coach OEMR2, OEMR3, OEMR6 – OEMR8 
OEMRR4 Nurse OEMR1 – OEMR8 
OEMRR5 Parent OEMR2 – OEMR4, OEMR6 – OEMR8 
OEMRR6 Trainer OEMR2 – OEMR8 
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OEMRR7 CT
2
 OEMR1 – OEMR8 
OEMRR8 MyGoogle OEMR1, OEMR2 
 
Table 2.7.  MyGoogle Services. 
Sid Service Name 
MG1 PUT /MyGoogle/fitness/dataSources/dsID    dsINFO 
MG2 GET /MyGoogle/fitness/dataSources/dsID     
MG3 PUT /MyGoogle/newPatient/pID    pINFO 
MG4 GET /MyGoogle/Patients/pID     
MG5 PUT /MyGoogle/Users/uID    Token 
 
Table 2.8.  MyGoogle Roles. 
Rid Role Service Name 
MGR1 SMH MG1 – MG5 
 
Finally, MyGoogle is a HIT that we developed to act as a middle layer between the 
ShareMyHealth app and the two HIT systems: OpenEMR and Google Fit (Google, 2017), which 
is an open HIT system for sharing and managing patient fitness data (e.g., step, height, weight, 
and calorie) that is maintained in the Google Fitness Store (in the cloud) that enables multiple 
apps to access such data via Google Fit APIs. Google Fit consists of two APIs: Fit REST API to 
add/update patient fitness data; and, Google OAuth API to authenticate apps to access users’ 
fitness data. MyGoogle HIT has an API (Table 2.7) to access OpenEMR API and Google Fit 
APIs and acts on behalf of apps. The MyGoogle API consists of five services. MG1 and MG2 
enable an app to add/modify and read users’ fitness data from/into Google Fitness Store via Fit 
REST API, respectively. MG3 and MG4 add/update and read a patient’s demographic 
46 
 
information from/into OpenEMR via OpenEMR API, respectively. MG5 utilizes Google OAuth 
API to authenticate an app (using its Token) to access a user’ fitness data. In addition, MyGoogle 
defines one role, i.e., SMH, (see Table 2.8) which is designed to be assigned to ShareMyHealth 
app. The SMH role can access all MyGoogle API services. 
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Chapter 3 
Security Requirements and Cloud Computing Capabilities for 
FSICC 
 
As we discussed earlier in Section 1.2, the healthcare domain is an emergent application for 
cloud computing, in which the Meaningful Use Stage 3 guidelines recommend health information 
technology (HIT) systems to provide cloud services that enable health-related data owners to 
access, modify, and exchange data. This requires that mobile and desktop applications for patients 
and medical providers  obtain healthcare data from multiple HITs, which may be operating with 
different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web services), use different 
cloud service providers, and employ different security/access control techniques. To address these 
issues, this chapter presents the four Security Requirements and the three Cloud Computing 
Capabilities that underlie and support FSICC. These four security requirements and three cloud 
computing capabilities for FSICC simplifies and enables client access via global resources using 
standardized system APIs. A security requirement represents what we consider to be the key 
security features for supporting security in FSICC. The four security requirements are: Numerous 
and Varied Access Control Models, Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support 
Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC, and Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. A 
cloud computing capability represents what we consider to be the critical characteristics for 
supporting cloud computing in FSICC.  The three cloud computing capabilities of FSICC are: 
Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global Services, Local Security Policies Registration 
to Yield Global Security Policy, and Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and 
Service Discovery for Consumers. To understand the role of security requirements and cloud 
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computing capabilities for FSICC, we reexamine Figures 1.1 to 1.3 which also provides a more 
complete discussion of FSICC and its functionality. 
To begin, recall that Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1  presented the architecture of  FSICC.   The top 
of Figure 1.1, had client Applications (Web, Mobile, and Desktop) which corresponds to the 
Clients box in the Involved Parties component that was at the top of Figure 1.2 from Chapter 1. 
These client applications are interested in utilizing a subset of the available global services and 
global security policies of FSICC. FSICC was shown in the middle of Figure 1.1 and had eight 
boxes that interact with one another. The Clients Registry box, at the top of FSICC, is for clients 
to register themselves into the FSICC. The next lower box is the Global Authentication box that is 
responsible for verifying clients’ identities before allowing them to be authorized to access global 
services of FSICC. The next box down is the RBAC/MAC/DAC interceptors box that is in charge 
of allowing/denying clients requests to access global services of FSICC based on roles/clearances. 
The Clients Registry, the Global Authentication, and the RBAC/MAC/DAC interceptors boxes 
refer to the Global Policy Enforcement component that was shown in Figure 1.2. The Global 
Services box, in the middle of FSICC, is the set of global services that mirror services of 
registered systems and are available to interested clients to utilize.  
The next lower box is the Global Security Policy box which has the global security policy that 
defines what set of global services each client can access based on RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
models. The two next boxes are: the Security Policy Mapping box that is responsible for 
combining a set of security policies from different systems and generating the global security 
policy; and, the Services Mapping box which combines a set of services from systems into one set 
of global services. The System Registry, at the bottom of FSICC, enables systems to provide their 
services and security policies. The System Registry, the Services Mapping, the Global Security 
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Policy, and the Global Services boxes refer to the Generation of Global Policy and Services 
component that was shown in Figure 1.2. The Security Policy Mapping box refers to Security 
Policy Mapping component that was shown in Figure 1.2.  The bottom of Figure 1.1 had Web, 
Programming, and Cloud Applications, which corresponds to the Systems box in the Involved 
Parties component at the top of Figure 1.2, that are willing to provide their services and security 
policies into the FSICC. Security requirements have influence on security policy and mapping 
boxes as well as the RBAC, MAC, and DAC models and interceptors.  Cloud computing 
capabilities have influence on the services, service mapping, and system registry boxes. 
In addition, FSICC that was given in Figure 1.2 is an infrastructure for cloud computing that 
provides a global policy authorization and enforcement mechanism and is capable of supporting 
different access control models such as RBAC, DAC, and MAC in the Access Control Models 
component in the middle of the figure. This is the main component where security requirements 
have an impact. FSICC organizes and globally manages the cloud services, APIs, and web 
services from multiple service suppliers (systems) via the Systems box in the Involved Parties 
component at the top of Figure 1.1 into a set of global services in the Global Services box in the 
Generation of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2. These are the main 
components where cloud computing capabilities have an impact.  This allows the mobile, web, 
and desktop applications clients in the Clients box in the Involved Parties component at the top of 
Figure 1.2 to be used to easily discover and utilize them in order to interact with multiple 
constituent systems with a common interface. Representative technologies to support the 
implementation of FSICC  include: the  HAPI FHIR reference model (Health Level 7, Fast Health 
Interoperable Resources, 2016) from Section 2.3; the DIRECT project (The Direct Project, 2016) 
that allows for the sharing of information with best practices that have trust and privacy 
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considerations; and, the HEART WG project (OpenID, 2016) that provides privacy and security 
specifications for authorization and access to health-related RESTful APIs. 
Furthermore, Figure 1.3 from Chapter 1 presented a high-level view of the FSICC’s main 
aspects. Figure 1.3 has five horizontal boxes for each main aspect of FSICC and vertical boxes 
that span across the horizontal boxes. The five horizontal boxes are: Architectural Blueprints box 
that contain the different options for architectural option for connecting clients and systems with 
FSICC; Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model box with boxes for Schema Definitions, 
Enterprise Definitions, Policy Definitions, FSICC Definitions, and Intercepting Definitions; 
Access Control Models box for the ability to control services via RBAC, MAC, and DAC; GSP  
(Global Security Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation box for generating the 
security policy from multiple systems to make global APIs available to clients; and, Global 
Security Policy and Global API Utilization and Security Enforcement box that utilizes security 
interceptors to allow/deny clients from access global services of FSICC. Moreover, the security 
requirements for FSICC, which will be described in this chapter, are represented in Figure 1.3 by 
the upper right vertical box SECURITY REQUIREMENTS that spans two horizontal boxes: 
Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model and Access Control Models. The three cloud 
computing capabilities, which will be described in this chapter, are represented in Figure 1.3 by 
the lower right vertical box CLOUD COMPUTING CAPABILITIES that spans two horizontal 
boxes: Global Security Policy and Global API Generation, and Global Security Policy and Global 
API Utilization and Security Enforcement. 
The presentation in the remainder of this chapter is in four parts.  Section 3.1 defines and 
explains the four security requirements for FSICC: Numerous and Varied Access Control Models, 
Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using 
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DAC, and Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. Section 3.2 details the three cloud 
computing capabilities with associated components of the FSICC: Local Service Registration and 
Mapping to Global Services; Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy; 
and, Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and Service Discover for Consumers. 
Section 3.3 discusses related research in cloud computing as compared with FSICC. Note that the 
work in this chapter has been published in (Baihan, M. & Demurjian, S., 2017). 
 
3.1 FSICC Security Requirements 
 
This section discusses four security requirements for FSICC, exploring the impact of the 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS vertical box in Figure 1.3. A security requirement represents 
what we consider to be the key security features for supporting security in FSICC. To facilitate 
this discussion, there must be a shift in focus on the concept of RBAC, DAC, and MAC 
permissions on objects and operations to one that assigns permissions to individual cloud services. 
For RBAC, this corresponds to the global services being assigned to different users by role. For 
MAC, global services are assigned classifications (TS, S, C, U) with a user having a clearance and 
performing domination checks on classification vs. clearance for every service invocation. For 
DAC, this corresponds to the ability to delegate services from user to user by role and potentially 
limited by classification/clearance checks if MAC has defined. The remainder of this section 
presents and discusses the four security requirements: Numerous and Varied Access Control 
Models, Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support Delegation of Cloud Services 
Using DAC, and Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. 
 Security Requirement 1 - Numerous and Varied Access Control Models. The first security 
requirement acknowledges that the constituent systems (i.e., service suppliers) that wish to 
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publish access to cloud, API, or web services may have access control and security protocols that 
are varied. Thus, FSICC must be capable of supporting a wide range of access control models 
such as  Role-based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & 
Chandramouli, 2001), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976), Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) (Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988), Attribute-based Access Control 
(ABAC) (Yuan, E. & Tong, J. , 2005), Usage Access Control (UCON) (Sandhu, R. & Park, J. , 
2003), etc. This leads to Security Requirement 1 - Numerous and Varied Access Control Models 
and is represented in the Access Control Models horizontal box in Figure 1.3.  
From the healthcare scenario of Section 2.4, we know that each HIT (MyGoogle and 
OpenEMR) supports RBAC as illustrated in Tables 2.6 and 2.8. These systems also support DAC 
to allow permissions (services) to be delegated from a physician Charles (user) to the on-call 
physician Lois (user) after hours and weekends. FSICC,  as was shown in Figure 1.1, enables 
these systems to register their security policies (as shown for MyGoogle and OpenEMR in Tables 
2.6 and 2.8) into FSICC via the System Registry box in Figure 1.1.  This is the Registration and 
Services Mapping box of the Generation of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2, 
in which security policies are combined via the Security Policy Mapping box in Figure 1.1, 
Security Policy Mapping component in Figure 1.2, to generate the global security policy via the 
Global Security Policy box in Figure 1.1, Global Policy box of the Generation of Global Policy 
and Services component in Figure 1.2. Specifically, the global security policy should define, for 
each role, the global services assigned by role. This was accomplished as discussed by mapping 
permissions to call systems’ services (cloud, web, and API) from Table 2.5 and 2.7 into 
permissions to call global cloud services.  
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Security Requirement 2 - Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC. The second 
security requirement involves the large number of services that are published in the cloud by 
multiple systems which are to utilized by numerous consumers, meaning that the usage of such 
services is expected to be high, which needs to be controlled so that only certain consumers at 
different times can have access to specific services. Thus, when all of the system services are 
collected into a set of global cloud services, the resulting set can be controlled based on roles,  as 
shown in  the RBAC box of the Access Control Models horizontal box in Figure 1.3, in which 
each role can be assigned on a consumer-by-consumer basis. This leads to Security Requirement 
2-Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC where global services can be assigned by role, 
see the Role-based Access Control box of the Access Control Models component in Figure 1.2.  
To illustrate, the global security policy may define nine global roles: GPhysician (global 
physician), GPatient (global patient), GCoach (global coach), GNurse (global nurse), GParent 
(global parent), and GTrainer (global trainer) would be assigned to individuals that are utilizing 
applications, while GCT
2
 (global CT
2
), GMyGoogle (global MyGoogle), and GSMH (global 
SMH) represent the roles of the systems and applications that may need to utilize services. The 
GPhysician role is used by a doctor to access his/her patients’ electric information and to provide 
better healthcare services for his/her patients. The GPatient role is used by a patient to access 
his/her digital information and to request different healthcare services. The GCoach role is used 
by a coach to report a health incident (e.g., concussion) at an athletic event with very limited 
information on the patient. The GNurse role is used by a nurse to manage a patient’s health 
incident from its occurrence to its resolution. The GParent role is used by a parent to both report a 
health incident on his/her child while attending the athletic event or to track the current status of 
his/her children that have health incidents. The GTrainer role is used by a trainer to do a limited 
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preliminary assessment if a health incident occurs at a training event. Moreover, The GCT
2
 
application role is used by a CT
2
 application to gather information related to patients’ concussion 
incidents. The GMyGoogle system role is used by the MyGoogle system to gather medical and 
fitness information of patients. Finally, The GSMH application role is used by the ShareMyHealth 
application to retrieve/add fitness information of patients. In addition, there is also a need to work 
on the ability to constrain the invocation of a service based on values.  
 Security Requirement 3 - Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC. Users of 
applications, which consume services, may need: to collaborate with other users to accomplish a 
better job; and/or to have other users to perform some of their tasks on behalf of them in case of 
emergency. This leads to Security Requirement 3 - Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using 
DAC where FSICC supports the ability to delegate cloud services from one user to another, see 
the Discretionary Access Control box of the Access Control Models component in Figure 1.2 and 
the DAC box of the Access Control Models horizontal box in Figure 1.3. For example, consider a 
user Charles with a GPhysician role is leaving the office for the day or the weekend and is 
interested in delegating his/her authority to access the services for his patient to the on-call 
physician Lois who will be covering night and weekend inquiries from patients.  In this case, Lois 
will then be utilizing a mobile application to access patient data that is available via OpenEMR 
services (see Section 2.4). Charles could delegate all or some of his OpenEMR services to Lois. 
For example, Charles may delegate global services that involve patient data. If the delegation for 
Charles to Lois is during the week (Monday to Thursday) it could go into effect at 5pm (close of 
business) and be revoked at 9am (start of business). For weekend calls the delegation would go 
from Friday at 5pm to Monday at 1am.   
55 
 
Security Requirement 4 - Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. Many services 
may access very sensitive information such as patient data that needs to be more strongly 
controlled than other parts of the patient data.  For example, mental health data is limited to a 
psychiatrist or psychologist and not available to a family medical provider. This leads to Security 
Requirement 4 - Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC as shown in the Mandatory access 
control (MAC) box of the Access Control Models horizontal box in Figure 1.3. This supports the 
definitions and usage of classifications (for services) and clearances (for users) which are 
instrumental in controlling access to a service and the data passed by a service.  Thus, to further 
restrict access to cloud services, FSICC supports MAC in addition to RBAC and DAC, has shown 
in the Mandatory Access Control box of the Access Control Models component in Figure 1.2. 
That is, all of the global services may be labeled with classification levels, and all users may be 
labeled with clearance levels. Specifically, each of the global cloud services in FSICC can all be 
labeled with a classification level (i.e., TS, S, C, or U).  
 
 
3.2 FSICC Cloud Computing Capabilities 
 
The set of security requirements in Section 3.1 leads to the definitions of a set of three FSICC 
cloud computing capabilities, as shown in the CLOUD COMPUTING CAPABILITIES vertical 
box in Figure 1.3, that bring together all of the concept and focus on the process and components 
of FSICC. Cloud Computing Capability 1, Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global 
Services, is for systems to register local services which are then mapped to a global set.  Cloud 
Computing Capability 2, Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy, is 
for systems to register their local security policy which is utilized to generate a global security 
policy.  Cloud Computing Capability 3, Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and 
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Service Discover for Consumers, is to support the process of a consumer's (mobile, web, or 
desktop app) registration to discover and be authenticated and then authorized to utilize services. 
The remainder of this section discusses these three cloud computing capabilities using the 
healthcare scenario of Section 2.4.  
 Cloud Computing Capability 1 - Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global 
Services. This cloud computing capability of FSICC enables a service supplier (system) to register 
its cloud, programming, and/or web services as indicated by the arrows at the bottom of  Figure 
1.1, as shown in the Security Policies and Services Registration and Global Services Generation 
boxes of the GSP Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3. Referring to 
column 2 in Tables 2.5 and 2.7, OpenEMR registers the cloud services OEMR1 to OEMR8 and 
MyGoogle registers its services MG1 to MG5. For eexampl, OpenEMR registers OEMR1 with 
name OpenEMR, URI (/OpenEMR/updatepatientnotes), PUT CRUD method, and input variable 
noteINFO; MyGoogle registers MG1 with name MyGoogle, URI 
(/MyGoogle/fitness/datasource/dsID), PUT CRUD method, and input variable dsINFO.  
The end result of the registration is that all of the cloud services, API calls, and web services of 
systems are transitioned to a set of equivalent global services. For each registered cloud, API, or 
web service, a global cloud service is created with appropriate components that mirror the 
signature of the system service named as a new global cloud service, which was represented in 
Figure 1.1 by the Services Mapping and Global Services boxes that car spawns to the Generation 
of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2. For example, the service OEMR1 can be 
mapped to a new global service in FSICC.  Note that the existence of OEMR1 is no longer visible 
to the mobile, cloud or web application; this is true for all of the converted services/API calls. The 
end result is a unified set of global cloud services to be presented to the mobile, web, or desktop 
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applications as supported by the Services Mapping box of FSICC as was shown in Figure 1.1, 
which maintains a mapping list of system to global cloud services.    
      Cloud Computing Capability 2 - Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global 
Security Policy. This cloud computing capability allows HIT systems to register their local 
security policies (roles and permissions to APIs) that can then be combined to yield a global 
security policy, as shown in the Security Policies and Services Registration and Global Security 
Policy Generation boxes of the GSP Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 
1.3.  The local policy registration process of this cloud computing capability enables a service 
supplier (system) to specify the security requirements or policy to access its services (cloud, web, 
and API) as indicated by the arrows at the bottom of Figure 1.1. After the systems register the 
local services, as given in Tables 2.5 and 2.7, they can then register the local security policies that 
are available in their systems as given in Tables 2.6 and 2.8.  This includes for a particular HIT 
system: the defined roles, the permissions that are defined on each local service, the permissions 
authorized to each role, the classifications for each service, and the allowable delegations.  
As local security policies are registered over time, a security administrator or policy engineer is 
responsible to design and evolve an appropriate global security policy that would encompass all 
of the local security requirements (from all different access control models) and provides a 
unified, global view for the applications.  This is supported in FSICC as shown in Figure 1.1 by 
the Security Policy Mapping and Global Security Policy boxes, which correspond to the Security 
Policy Mapping component and the Generation of Global Policy and Services component, 
respectively, in Figure 1.2.  The security engineer defines a global security policy over global 
cloud services based on defined local roles and associated permissions in the bottom of Figure 1.1 
to define a set of global roles and their permissions.  This is accomplished by: defining global 
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roles, assigning global permissions to global cloud services, authorizing global roles to global 
permissions, and defining constraints over these assignments.  In the healthcare scenario, the 
global roles can be defined and evolved over time by considering and unifying all of the particular 
roles of the originally registered HIT systems (such as MyGoogle and OpenEMR) and new 
systems that are added over time.   
Specifically, for the healthcare scenario from Section 2.4, the RBAC permissions as given by 
the roles and API services in Tables 2.6 and 2.8 are mapped to a global set of roles and the global 
API services, respectively.   For example, for the patient role in Table 2.6, the permissions to the 
OpenEMR services OEMR1-OEMR5 are mapped into the permissions to equivalent global cloud 
services that are the authorized global services to the global patient role GPatient. Similarly, for 
the SMH role in Table 2.8, the permissions to the MyGoogle services MG1-MG5 are mapped into 
the permissions to equivalent global cloud services that are the authorized global services to the 
global SMH role GSMH. Essentially, at a high-level, the authorized permissions of the Patient 
role of OpenEMR and the SMH role of MyGoogle are mapped into new global roles GPatient 
(global patient) and GSMH (global SMH), respectively. The security engineer needs to make 
similar mapping and define new global roles (GPhysician, GCoach, GNurse, GParent, and 
GTrainer) for the other local roles and the other systems that are also functioning as roles (GCT
2
 
and GMyGoogle). These processes are supported by the Security Policy Mapping box of  FSICC 
as was hownn in Figure 1.1. A mapping list of local to global security policies is maintained by 
the Global Security Policy box of FSICC.  
Cloud Computing Capability 3 - Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and 
Service Discover for Consumers. This cloud computing capability enables services consumers 
(mobile, web, or desktop app) to register themselves, which then allows application users to 
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discover and be authenticated and then authorized to utilize services by role, as shown in the GSP 
and GAPI Utilization and Security Enforcement horizontal box in Figure 1.3.  The intent is to 
provide access for application users to the global roles and the authorized global services.  The 
global registration activity of this cloud computing capability is supported by the Client Registry 
box of FSICC as shown in Figure 1.1, which corresponds to the Registration and Services 
Mapping box of the Generation of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2. The 
global authentication activity of this cloud computing capability is supported by the Global 
Authentication box of FSICC as was shown in Figure 1.1, which corresponds to the Global 
Authentication box of the Global Policy Enforcement component in Figure 1.2. The global 
authorization activity of this cloud computing capability is supported by the RBAC/MAC/DAC 
Interceptors box of FSICC as shown in Figure 1.1, which corresponds to the RBAC Interceptor, 
MAC Interceptor, and DAC Interceptor boxes of the Global Policy Enforcement component in 
Figure 1.2. The service discovery activity of this cloud computing capability is supported by the 
Global Services box of FSICC as was shown in Figure 1.1, which corresponds to the Global 
Services box of the Generation of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2. Note that 
we distinguish between consumers that are designing and deploying new mobile, web or desktop 
applications vs. ones that are retrofitting an existing mobile, web, or desktop application that may 
have its own access control (RBAC, DAC, and/or MAC) and cloud/web/programming APIs. 
For consumers designing and deploying a new application, we can extend the healthcare 
scenario of Section 2.4 with a mobile application for the patient and a desktop EHR application 
for the physician, where all of these applications have been developed using the global cloud 
services.   To accomplish this development, each application must register with FSICC in order to 
gain the relevant global roles to be authorized to each application user.  A user of the mobile 
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application for the patient would be authorized to the GPatient global role and limited to the 
services authorized to GPatient.  The physician using the EHR desktop application would be 
authorized to the GPhysician global role and limited to the services authorized to GPhysician.   
For the HIT systems, MyGoogle would have the GMyGoogle global role with its authorized 
global services. Note that OpenEMR services are not called by the consumers’ applications 
instead MyGoogle services utilize OpenEMR services to store/retrieve patient demographic data 
(see the healthcare scenario of Section 2.4).  
Cloud Computing Capability 3 is also utilized to allow a consumer of a new application to 
discover global cloud services for the healthcare scenario.  This is accomplished by utilizing a 
service discovery request to the Global Services box of FSICC as seen in Figure 1.1. The 
discovery request returns a list of all available services by GSid, name, and description. Upon 
successful discovery, the service consumer (application) can then submit a request to utilize one 
or more discovered services. The application can send  a list of the global services requested and 
its identification information to the Global Authentication box of FSICC which authenticates the 
application. Then, the RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptors box of FSICC authorizes the appropriate 
global user role associated with the requested services, and then forwards the service access 
request along with the application’s global role to the Global Security Policy box of FSICC. The 
Global Security Policy box then authorizes the requested global services only if the application’s 
global role is authorized to access such a service. As a result of calling a global cloud service, the 
mapped local service or API call of a local HIT system is invoked. Note that the HIT system 
allows the call only as long as the application’s global role is mapped to an equivalent local role 
that is authorized to access such a system service.  
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For example, suppose that the mobile application for the patient sends a service discovery 
request to the Global Services box of FSICC to find a service to return the demographic 
information for a patient. The discovery sends back the id of the required global service, name 
(e.g., GET /FSICC/Patient/id), and a description such as calls the OEMR3 of the OpenEMR 
system. Based on this, the patient mobile application can send a global service access request 
along with the application identification information to the Global Authentication box.  This box 
can then authenticate the application and forward the request to the RBAC/MAC/DAC 
Interceptors box that can authorize the application to utilize the GPatient role and forward the 
global service access request along with the GPatient role to the Global Security Policy box. The 
Global Security Policy box enables the patient mobile application to access the requested global 
service, since the GPatient global role can access that global service. Then, the Global Security 
Policy box retrieves the patient role, of OpenEMR system, which is mapped to the GPatient 
global role. As a result of calling the authorized global service, an access request to the mapped 
system service OEMR3 along with the patient local role is sent to the OpenEMR system. The 
OpenEMR system allows the patient mobile application to access the service OEMR3 since the 
patient local role is authorized to access OEMR3.    
For consumers retrofitting an existing mobile, web, or desktop application, there is an extra 
layer (i.e., the integration layer) of functionality that must be considered. Recall the CT
2
 and 
ShareMyHealth mHealth (SMH) applications from the healthcare example in Section 2.4. Each of 
these applications has its own API to access its database. Suppose that the developer of SMH 
needs to expand SMH capabilities in order to store/retrieve patients’ fitness and demographic 
information from MyGoogle and OpenEMR (via MyGoogle) systems, respectively.  Suppose also 
that the SMH has already defined roles for patient and physician that impact the way that the app 
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works for different users in terms of the fitness and demographic data collected can be entered, 
viewed, and/or edited.  In order to make use of the global roles and services of FSICC, the 
existing SMH app needs to be able to map its own app roles to appropriate global roles, and, 
programmatically link its API so that it will be able to call the appropriate global services of 
MyGoogle.  In order to support this programmatic link, the SMH app may also operate in the role 
of a provider per cloud computing capability 1 to define and register a new set of services for the 
SMH app that link its current API services to the global services.  This requires a similar process 
as described above to map from the local SMH roles to the global roles.     
 
 
3.3 Related Work in Cloud Computing 
 
In this section, we present a number of related efforts in cloud computing, from both academic 
and industrial communities, that are solving similar problems to FSICC, comparing and 
contrasting their work to FSICC.  The first effort (Buyya, Ranjan, & Calheiros, 2010) proposed a 
framework named InterCloud for federating cloud services to manage the services of multiple 
cloud service providers in which the framework allocates cloud services to the cloud consumers 
based on quality of service (QoS) needs of the consumer. To accomplish this, the Cloud Broker, 
which is a component of their framework, determines the most suitable cloud service provider 
based on the cloud services preferences through the Cloud Exchange, which is another component 
of InterCloud.  Our use of global services in FSICC provides a one-stop shopping location for 
consumers which is similar to InterCloud since both frameworks remove the consumers’ needs to 
search through many cloud providers. Further, our work utilizes the global roles (and their 
assigned services by RBAC, DAC, and MAC) in order to control which services each consumer is 
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allowed to perform which is different from their work that does not provide any security features 
to control access to the cloud services. 
A second effort (Nair, Porwal, Dimitrakos, Ferrer, & Tordsson, 2010)  introduced a framework 
design for cloud services that supports features including: data confidentiality and integrity for 
cloud service consumers; enable cloud service providers to publish cloud services that are unified 
to the cloud service consumers; and, manage the published cloud services.  Their framework 
allows the cloud service providers to receive access requests from the framework without the 
knowledge of the actual service consumer requesting such an access, and enforces access control 
over the published cloud services.  Their approach contrasts with our approach, particularly for 
the healthcare domain, where the knowing of the identity of the consumer by the provider is vital 
to restrict access to protected health information (PHI). Moreover, the main common features 
between our framework and their framework are: unifying multiple services from different 
providers to the consumers side, and controlling the unified services using access control means. 
A third effort in (Tordsson, Montero, Moreno-Vozmediano, & Llor, 2012) proposed a cloud 
broker that enables a heterogeneous set of cloud service providers, in which each provider may 
require a different infrastructure to operate, to integrate with the cloud broker. Such a cloud 
broker is capable of: optimizing placement of virtual infrastructures across variant clouds; and, 
hiding the processes of deploying and managing the cloud services of the cloud providers. The 
proposed broker utilizes a scheduling algorithm that manages the processes of cloud services 
deployment. Our work on FSICC is similar to their effort, since our global roles and services 
effectively hide the location of the local services providers which is similar to the cloud broker 
approach in hiding the processes of deploying and managing the cloud services. Our work utilizes 
RBAC, DAC, and MAC access control models to control which services each consumer can 
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access which is different from their work that does not provide any security features to control 
access to cloud services. 
The fourth effort (Vordel, 2016), the Vordel Cloud Service Broker, supports integrating local 
on-site applications with offsite cloud services via the Multi-Domain Registry, one main 
component of Vordel. Vordel also provides monitoring, and management services. Vordel is 
located between the cloud service providers and the cloud consumers referred to as organizations. 
An organization may utilize Vordel broker to introduce a level of trust within the cloud 
application of such an organization. The work on Vordel is similar to our efforts in FSICC since 
they map the services of cloud providers to organizations’ applications via a Multi-Domain 
Registry and we map local roles/services to global roles/services that offer RBAC, DAC, and 
MAC security.          The main difference between our and theirs is that they do not clearly 
explain the way the integrated services in the Multi-Domain Registry are controlled in term of 
what cloud services each consumer is restricted to access. 
A fifth effort (Jamcracker, 2016), the JamCracker platform, unifies the processes of cloud 
management and governance. Specifically, JamCracker provides a number of services including: 
risk and policy compliance management; operation management; and, create, deliver, and multi-
cloud services management. JamCracker also allows cloud service providers to unify delivery and 
management of private and public cloud application/services and distribute them to cloud service 
consumers. JamCracker enables cloud service providers to publish their services and virtualized 
applications along with security policies (only RBAC is supported) to control their services and 
applications via the JamCracker Connect, one main component of the JamCracker platform. The 
main similarities between our work on FSICCC and the JamCracker are both frameworks that 
unify multiple services from different providers to the consumers side, and control the unified 
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services using access control means. However, while our framework supports controlling access 
to the unified services using RBAC, MAC, and DAC, JamCracker only supports RBAC as an 
access control mechanism.    
A final effort (Amato, Di Martino, & Venticinque, 2012) proposed a cloud broker that acts as a 
component that: manages the use, performance, and delivery of cloud services; and, mediates the 
process of enabling cloud service consumers to access cloud services of service providers. This is 
achieved by the proposed cloud broker utilizing an agent that dynamically identifies a set of cloud 
services from various providers based on the service consumer requirements. The architecture of 
the cloud broker agent is presented along with its implementation in (Amato & Venticinque, 
Multi-objective decision support for bro-kering of cloud sla, 2013). Their effort is similar to our 
work on FSICC since both works remove the consumers’ needs to search through many cloud 
providers. However, their effort utilizes an agent-based approach to find one cloud provider that 
most suit the needs of the cloud consumer, while FSICC unifies many services from multiple 
cloud providers to be used by the cloud consumers. Moreover, while our framework supports 
controlling access to the unified services using RBAC, MAC, and DAC, their effort does not 
provide any security features to control access the cloud services.  
The major difference between our work in FSICC and the aforementioned efforts is that their 
focus is on solving portions of the problems that we are attempting to address in FSICC; none of 
these efforts provides a comprehensive solution to the problem of securing and integrating cloud 
and none-cloud services provided from different service provides.  
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Chapter 4 
A Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model (UCCACM) for 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
 
 
This chapter defines and explains a Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model 
(UCCACM) for RBAC, MAC, and DAC that is intended to upgrade these existing access control 
models so that they are capable of defining permissions based on services. The model has been 
motivated and influenced by the four main security requirements of FSICC as presented in 
Section 3.1. The first requirement, Numerous and Varied Access Control Models acknowledges 
that the systems providing services to FSICC may have access control and security protocols that 
are varied (i.e., RBAC, MAC, DAC, ABAC, etc.), which would require UCCACM to have broad 
access control abilities. The second requirement, Control Access to Cloud Services Using 
RBAC, offers one possible way to the availability of services to users by assigning roles that 
authorize to access a sub-set of the available cloud services on a role by role basis. The third 
requirement, Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC, offers the ability for users of 
cloud services to enable other consumers to utilize all or a sub-set of the user’s authorized cloud 
services in which DAC can be utilized to keep a list of delegated services, along with authorized 
delegated users, in which each user can delegate all or a sub-set of his/her authorized cloud 
services to another consumer anytime. Finally, the fourth requirement, Control Access to Cloud 
Services Using MAC, provides the ability users that need access to sensitive information in 
certain secure cloud services to utilize MAC to label cloud services with sensitivity levels called 
classifications (e.g.,  Top Secret (TS) < Secret (S) < Confidential (C) < Unclassified (U)) which 
can be made available to users that are assigned clearances under appropriate with read and write 
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properties as described in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. These last three security requirements for 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC, are the foundational capabilities that need to underlie UCCACM.  
In support of these requirements, this chapter presents a Unified Cloud Computing Access 
Control Model (UCCACM) for the FSICC in which UCCACM provides a set of details 
definitions to cover all aspect of the four requirements above along with examples for each 
definition. UCCACM also provides a single view of global services to applications and allows 
those global services to be authorized according to RBAC (FSICC’s security requirement 2), 
MAC (FSICC’s security requirement 4), and DAC (FSICC’s security requirement 3) policies; 
this supports expected contribution EC-B: an Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for 
Cloud Computing from Section 1.5. Moreover, UCCACM is an access control model that 
utilizes three main access control models (RBAC, MAC, and DAC) to define and enforce 
security policies for both: clients/systems, and global resources. That is, each client/system 
defines RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC security policies against its objects. Moreover, the security 
policies for the global resources of FSICC are defined and enforced against global cloud 
services of such global resources. UCCACM has a critical placement as a layer in the High-
Level View of FSICC Research Areas and Foci of Figure 1.3, that provides of capabilities and 
functionalities that are necessary to support the Access Control Models in the next layer. 
These two adjacent layers are influenced by the four security requirements. 
The rest of this chapter provides formal definitions of UCCACM in eight sections. Section 
4.1 presents a set of core definitions on schemas to support authorizing users to a set of 
schemas based on roles and/or sensitivity levels. Section 4.2 provides core definitions on 
enterprise application that include definitions for clients, systems, and types of clients and 
systems as part of the enterprise application. Section 4.3 discusses core definitions on RBAC, 
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MAC, and DAC models that describe the way that such access control models can be 
modified to support the four security requirements of FSICC. Section 4.4 describes advanced 
definitions on enterprise applications in which the security aspects of RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
models are introduced into clients and systems of any enterprise application. Section 4.5 has 
core definitions on global resources and permissions by API in which definitions that describe 
what are global services and the way that such global services are controlled via means of 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC are provided. Section 4.6 presents advanced definitions on FSICC 
that describe the way that services and security policies of different systems are mapped. 
Section 4.7 discusses core definitions on security interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
along with enforcement checks that each security interceptor utilizes. Section 4.8 presents 
related work on access control for cloud computing. Throughout the entire presentation of 
UCCACM, detailed examples will be provided utilizing the healthcare scenario of section 2.4 
Chapter 2. Note that the work in this chapter has been published in (Baihan, M., et al., 2017). 
 
4.1 Core Definitions on Schemas 
 
To begin, Definitions 1 to 4 are adopted from work on adding RBAC, MAC, and DAC to 
XML schemas (De La Rosa Algarin A. , 2014) (De La Rosa Algarin, Ziminski, Demurjian, & 
Rivera Sánchez, 2014) that allowed XML schemas to be customized based on role and 
classifications to customize what each user is authorized to see from instances of the schema.   
Defn. 1: An element  NAMEID eee ,  is defined as two-tuple that represents a single piece of a 
data abstraction that describes one aspect of a data structure, where IDe  is the element’s 
unique identifier, and NAMEe  is an element name.  
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Defn. 2: A schema (SC) is a data abstraction that represents the structure of a particular 
kind of information, and is defined as a three-tuple  ENAMEID SCSCSCSC ,,  where IDSC  is a 
schema’s unique identifier, NAMESC  is a schema name, and ESC  is a set of elements (as 
defined in Defn. 1) that represent the schema.    
Defn. 3: Each schema, jSC , has a set of jn schema instances, 
njj
sciscisciSCI ,...,, 21 , where 
 VIDi sciscisci ,  in which Vsci  is an element-value set of a schema for all elements in 
each schema. 
Defn. 4: Let o={read, insert, update, delete}, be the set of operations that can be 
performed against an element (e) of a schema. 
 
Example 4.1: A schema for the Patient resource can be represented as  EPaientPatientSC ,,11  where 
},4,,3,,2,,1{  birthDategendernameidPaientE . A schema instance of 1SC can be 
represented as 
V
scisci 11 ,1  where ,,,,,7,{1  malegenderAlinameidsci V
}782005,  birthDate .  
 
4.2 Core Definitions on Enterprise Application  
After establishing definitions for schemas and schemas’ elements that describe the way that 
data in FSICC is organized to be exchanged from system to system or from system to client via 
FSICC, in this section, we provide core definitions on main actors of FCISS that provide, 
consume, and/or maintain such data using the defined schemas and schemas’ elements. These 
actors form a concept of an enterprise application that includes clients, systems, and types of 
clients and systems as part of the enterprise application.  The next set of definitions, 
Definitions 5 to 8, are associated with a large-scale enterprise application that is comprised of 
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clients and systems. Specifically, the definition for enterprise application explains the 
Involved Parties component of Figure 1.2. Furthermore, the definitions for clients and systems 
describe that contents and types of Clients and Systems boxes of the Involved Parties 
component of Figure 1.2. 
 
Defn. 5: An Enterprise Application,  SCSSSCSNAMEID EAEAEAEAEAEA ,,,, , has a unique 
identifier (EAID), name (EANAME), sets of client applications (EACS) and systems (EASS), 
and a set of schemas (EASCS).  EA, via FSICC, allows multiple clients (mobile, web, 
desktop) to interact with multiple systems via APIs (cloud, web, programmatic). 
 
Example 4.2: An enterprise application for health information exchange (EAHIE) would allow 
applications for patients, family members, medical providers, insurance companies, etc. (e.g., 
CT
2 
and ShareMyHealth from Section 2.4), to interact with OpenEMR and MyGoogle (from 
Section 2.4) via cloud, web, or programmatic APIs. These HITs utilize FHIR Resources, the 
integration layer in Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1, (Health Level 7, Fast Health Interoperable 
Resources list, 2016) which include schema representations in both XML and JSON. The 
schemas defined in EASCS are used by each HIT system. 
 
The inclusion of schemas as part of an EA allows for the modeling of the information utilized 
in a cloud computing application to be represented.  Many cloud computing applications utilize 
cloud computing services that send/receive XML or JSON objects, which in turn based on 
underlying schemas; this is true with FHIR and the API reference implementation.  Thus, an EA 
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with schemas provides an actual link from the type of information and the APIs.  Given example 
4.2, definitions for client and system can be provided. 
 
Defn. 6: A client in an EA is a mobile, web, or desktop application, top of Figure 1.1 from 
Chapter 1, that includes, as part of its functionality, cloud-based services, web services, 
or a programming API of services, and is interested in utilizing a subset of EASCS via 
available cloud computing services. A client can be characterized based on the degree 
that it is a consumer and/or a provider in a cloud, web, or programming service-based 
setting. There are two different types of clients: 
i. A Pure Client is only a consumer of services. 
ii. A Mixed Client is primarily a consumer of services and is also a 
provider of a small number of services. 
 
Defn. 7: A system, bottom of Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1, in an EA provides functionality 
for use by clients via cloud-based services, web services, or a programming API, and is 
interested in providing access to a subset of EASCS via its services or API. A system can 
be characterized based on the degree that it is a consumer and/or a provider in a cloud, 
web, or programming service-based setting. There are two different types of systems: 
i. A Pure System is only a provider of services. 
ii. A Mixed System is primarily a provider of services and is also a 
consumer of a small number of services. 
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Example 4.3: Recall the healthcare scenario from Section 2.4 and let us assume that the CT
2
 
client does not provide services. Based on this assumption we can categorize the ShareMyHealth 
and CT
2
 client Apps; and OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems as follows: 
- CT2 client App is a pure client, since it only utilizes services from OpenEMR system  
- ShareMyHealth client App is a mixed client, since it utilizes services from MyGoogle 
system and provides a number of services 
- OpenEMR system is a pure system, since it only provides services 
- MyGoogle system is a mixed system, since it provides services and utilizes services from 
OpenEMR 
 
4.3 Core Definitions on RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Roles/Users  
 
After providing definitions on enterprise applications, clients, and systems, in this section, we 
transition to describe the way that three main access control models RBAC, MAC, and DAC, 
see RBAC, MAC, and DAC boxes of the Access Control Models component in Figure 1.2, 
can be modified to enable the clients and systems in an enterprise application to utilize such 
access control models to protect their services from unauthorized access. The next set of 
definitions, Definitions 8 to 30, discuss the way that the FSICC security requirements in Section 
3.1 from Chapter 3 are supported in our work. Specifically, providing RBAC features for 
systems and clients supports the security requirement 2 of FSICC: Control Access to Cloud 
Services Using RBAC. Moreover, providing MAC features for systems and clients supports the 
security requirement 4 of FSICC: Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. Finally, 
providing DAC features for systems and clients supports the security requirement 3 of FSICC: 
Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC.  
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Defn. 8: A role, r, is defined as a two-tuple  NAMEID rrr ,  where IDr  is a role unique 
identifier and NAMEr  is a role name.  
Defn. 9: Let },...,,{ 21/ jSC rrrR   be defined as the set of j roles for a given client/system 
where 
SCj Rr /  and  jj NAMEIDj rrr , . 
Defn. 10: In support of mandatory access control (FSICC’s security requirement 4), we 
define a linearly-ordered set of sensitivity levels (U-unclassified < C-confidential < S-
secret < TS-top secret) with the ability to assign levels of clearances (CLR) to 
users/clients and classifications (CLS) to schemas’ elements and services.  
 
In support of mandatory access control, Definitions 1 and 2 are revised in order to define the 
classification on each schema and each element of a schema.  
Defn. 1: (V2) An element  CLSNAMEID eeee ,,  is defined as three-tuple element that represents 
a single piece of a data abstraction that describes one aspect of a data structure, where 
IDe  is the element’s unique identifier, NAMEe  is an element name, and CLSe  is the 
element classification, as described in Defn. 10. 
Defn. 2: (V2) A schema (SC) is a data abstraction that represents the structure of a 
particular kind of information, and is defined as a four-tuple  CLSENAMEID SCSCSCSCSC ,,,  
where IDSC  is a schema’s unique identifier, NAMESC  is a schema name, ESC  is a set of 
elements (as defined in Defn. 1v2) that represent the schema, and CLSSC  is the schema 
classification that is equal to the least secure of all of its constituent elements.    
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Given the V2 revised Defns. 1 and 2, the corresponding permissions can be defined for RBAC 
and MAC on roles and users with Definitions 11 to 19 to present: the   concept of a permission, 
the way that permissions are associated with roles, the way that a user is defined with a 
clearance, the way that a user assigned a role, and the way that different roles are related.    
Defn. 11: A permission, p, is defined as a three-tuple  OSCID pppp ID ,,  where  IDp  is a 
permission unique identifier, 
IDSC
p is ID of the involved schema (Defn. 2v2), and Op  is 
the operation (Defn. 4).  
Defn. 12: A role permission, rp, is defined as a three-tuple  IDIDID rprprp ,,  where IDp , IDr  
are the IDs of the involved permission (Defn. 11) and role (Defn. 8), respectively.  
Defn. 13: Each role r has a role-permission set (RPS) },...,,{ 21 kr rprprpRPS  of role 
permissions (Defn. 12). 
Defn. 14: A user, u, is defined as three-tuple  CLRNAMEID uuuu ,, , where IDu is a user 
unique identifier, NAMEu  is a user name, and CLRu  is a user clearance (Defn. 10). 
Defn. 15: Let },...,,{ 21/ jSC uuuU   be defined as the set of j users for a given 
client/system, where 
SCj Uu / and  jjj CLRNAMEIDj uuuu ,, . 
Defn. 16: Each user SCi Uu / can be assigned a role SCj Rr /  for a user role assignment 
(ura),  jik ruura , , that signifies that a user is limited to playing that role and the 
authorized permissions. Note that a user can be assigned multiple roles but only plays one 
role in any session with a client/system.  
Defn. 17: The user-role-assignment set (URASC/S) for a client/system, 
},...,,{ 21/ kSC uraurauraURAS  is the set of all k user role assignments (Defn. 16), that 
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contains an entry for relevant user/role combinations that are applicable for RBAC in 
support of any client/system.  
Defn. 18: Each role r has a role-role set (RRS) 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑟𝑖 = {𝑟1, 𝑟1, . . , 𝑟𝑘} based on the isa role 
hierarchy as described in Section 2.2.  
Defn. 19: The role hierarchy (RHC/S) for a client/system, 
𝑅𝐻𝐶/𝑆 = {𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑟1 , 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑟2 , . . , 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑟𝑘} is the set of all k role-role sets (Defn. 18). 
 
In support of discretionary access control (FSICC’s security requirement 3) and based on the 
DAC concepts that were introduced in Section 2.2, we provide definitions 20 to 30 that 
distinguish between the user who performs the delegation act referred to as an original user and 
the user who acquires additional permissions based on a delegation act referred to as a delegated 
user. These definitions also present the way that an original user is supported with different 
options to perform the delegation (i.e., delegate role, delegate role permission, and delegate 
clearance).   
Defn. 20: An original role, or , is a system or client role that is delegable. 
Defn. 21: An original role permission, orp , is in the role-permission set (RPS) of a 
specific original role or . 
Defn. 22: An original clearance, oc , is a clearance (Defn. 10) in a system or client that is 
delegable. 
Defn. 23: An original user, ou , is a system or client user who assigned: an original role 
or , in which ou is illegable to delegate or or orp to another original user ou ; and/or an 
original clearance oc with read/write properties, in which ou is illegable to delegate oc
to another original user ou . 
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Defn. 24: A delegated clearance, dc , is a clearance (Defn. 10) that is delegated to a user. 
Defn. 25: A delegated role, dr , is a role that is delegated to a user. 
Defn. 26: A delegated role permission, drp , is a role permission that is delegated to a 
user. 
Defn. 27: A delegated user, du , is a user to whom a delegated role dr , delegated role 
permission drp , or delegated clearance dc will be delegated. 
Defn. 28: Delegation Authority (DA): A Security engineer determines which users in a 
system or client can delegate their roles/role permissions/clearance to other users in 
that system or client. 
Defn. 29: Pass On Delegation Authority (PODA) is a Boolean value assigned to a user 
which determines if he/she can delegate his/her roles/role permissions/clearance to 
another user (poda=true) or not (poda=false). 
Defn. 30: A Delegation Set (DS) for a system or client is a set of active role/role 
permission/clearance delegations 
SCDS / ={ 1d , 2d , … , nd } in which each active 
delegation { , , / / }id ou du dr drp dc  has three parts: original user (ou), delegated 
user (du), and a delegated role (dr), a delegated role permission (drp), or a delegated 
clearance (dc).   
 
4.4 Advanced Definitions on Enterprise Applications 
 
As previously discussed in Section 3.2, we presented three main cloud computing 
capabilities for FSICC with the associated components. These cloud computing capabilities 
were: Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global Services, see the Security Policies and 
Services Registration and Global Services Generation boxes of the GSP Generation and GAPI 
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Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3; Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global 
Security Policy, see the Security Policies and Services Registration and Global Security Policy 
Generation boxes of the GSP Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3; and, 
Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and Service Discover for Consumers, see the 
GSP and GAPI Utilization and Security Enforcement horizontal box in Figure 1.3. Based on 
this, this section provides a set of definitions, Definitions 31 to 33, that support the three 
aforementioned cloud computing capabilities of FSICC. Also, a number of definitions from 
Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 are redefined as version 2. To start, the three new definitions are for 
systems and clients with RBAC/MAC/DAC.  
  
Defn. 31: A cloud, web, or programming service of a client or system, denoted  , is 
defined as  TypeSIGNAMEID  ,,, with unique ID, name, signature, and type for 
each service. A signature SIG  is further defined in two different ways based on the 
technology used to create a service as following:    
i. Web/cloud:  VARIABLEINPUTURITYPEMETHODSIG __ ,,   where
},,,,,, Re,{_ DELETEPUTPOSTGETDeleteUpdateadCreateTYPEMETHOD   is the 
type of CRUD method, 
URI  a unified resource identifier URI, and VARIABLEINPUT _  
is the input variable. 
ii. Program:  PARAMETERSTYPERETURNNAMEMETHODSIG  ,, __  where NAMEMETHOD _  in the 
call name, 
TYPERETURN _  is the return type, and PARAMETERS  are the parameter 
names/types. 
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A service type Type  of a web/cloud-based service can be: (read) if TYPEMETHOD _  is 
Read/GET; or (write) if TYPEMETHOD _  is Create/Update/Delete/POST/PUT/DELETE.  A 
service type Type  of a program-based service can be: (read) indicating that values of all 
service parameters PARAMETERS will not be modified after the service call, (write) 
indicating that values of all service parameters PARAMETERS can be modified after the 
service call, or (read/write) indicating that values of some service parameters PARAMETERS
can be modified after the service call while values of other parameters will not. 
Defn. 32: A system, , , , , , , , , ,
S S S S S S S
i i i i i i i i i i i
ID NAME API SC R RPS RH U URAS DSS S S S S S S S S S S  , SS
i EAS   
is identified by a unique identifier, name, and  cloud, web, or programmatic API of a 
system, respectively, where a given 
i
APIS  is comprised of a set of ij API services  
},...,,,{ 321
i
j
iiii
APIS   with each j  as given in Defn. 31 along with a schema subset 
i
SCS
S , sets of roles iRSS , role permission sets 
i
RPS S
S , role hierarchy 
S
i
RHS , users 
i
US
S , user-
role assignment set iURAS SS , and system delegation set 
i
DSS
S  (Definitions 2v2, 9, 13, 19, 
15, 17 and 30 respectively).   
Example 4.4: MyGoogle and OpenEMR (from Section 2.4) are two systems in EASS where there 
are RESTful cloud services for MyGoogle, and RESTful web services for OpenEMR. Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 define MyGoogle and OpenEMR systems, respectively, with the signature σSIG as a 
placeholder for readability. 
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Figure 4.1. MyGoogle Notation for Example 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. OpenEMR Notation for Example 4.4. 
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Defn. 33: A client application, 
CS
i EAC   is defined as 
, , , , , , , , ,
C C C C C C C
i i i i i i i i i i i
ID NAME API SC R RPS RH U URAS DSC C C C C C C C C C C with unique identifier, name, 
i
APIC  the set of ij API services },...,,,{ 321
i
j
iiii
APIC  with each j  as given in Defn. 
31, and, a schema subset 
i
SCC
C , sets of roles i
RC
C , role permission sets iRPS CC , role 
hierarchy 
C
i
RHC , users 
i
U C
C , user-role assignment set iURAS CC , and client delegation set 
i
DSC
C  (Definitions 2v2, 9, 13, 19, 15, 17 and 30 respectively).   
Example 4.5: In Section 2.4 we have two clients: ShareMyHealth with RESTful cloud services; 
and CT
2 
with RESTful web services, which are in EACS. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 define 
ShareMyHealth and CT
2
 clients with the signature σSIG as a placeholder for readability. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. ShareMyHealth Notation for Example 4.5. 
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Figure 4.4. CT
2
 Notation for Example 4.5. 
 
UCCACM for cloud computing, that supports the FSICC’s security requirements (see 
Section 3.1), also provides the means to represent a unified set of global services encapsulated 
into one Global Resource for a given EA and its systems. This allows the clients to be able to 
utilize a set of shared global services rather than specific services for each system that may be 
in different formats (e.g., cloud services, web services, programmatic API services in different 
languages, etc.). This is basically meant to support the FSICC’s cloud computing capabilities 
(see Section 3.2). Although, grouping multiple systems services attracts app developers, in a 
domain such as healthcare, there is a need to create useful and rich apps (i.e., apps with many 
features) in an easy and efficient way (i.e., avoid effort duplication). This need must be 
balanced against the potential to create one great target that attackers can utilize to illegally 
access a large set of crucial and sensitive data (see Security Risks of adopting FSICC in 
Section 3.3), through services, such as electronic health records of large number of patients. 
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Thus, an access control mechanism should be developed and utilized to restrict services 
access only to the authorized users and their Apps.  
Moreover, since there is a demonstrated need to protect such global services we make two 
major observations: (1) there must be a shift in focus on the concept of RBAC permissions 
from objects and operations (in the traditional RBAC model) to permissions that define 
individual global services that are authorized by role to make invocations (calls) on objects; 
and (2) there is a need to utilize a larger set of the four sensitivity levels of MAC such that the 
set of sensitivity levels can adequately classify sensitive data in complex areas such as 
healthcare, note that the healthcare-based security level approaches discussed in Section 2.2 
are too focused on the healthcare domain. In this dissertation, we present an access control 
mechanism, i.e., UCCACM, that provides solutions for observations 1 and 2. Regarding the 
first major observation, Figure 4.5 shows the UCCACM for RBAC part that consists of four 
elements: Roles; Users; Sessions; and Permissions (i.e., the defined service calls on objects), 
and five relations: User-Role (i.e., which user assigned to which role); Role-Permission (i.e., 
which role authorized to which service in which each service calls a specific object); User -
Session (i.e., which user is active in the current session); Role-Session (i.e., which role of the 
current user is active in the current session); and Role-Role (i.e., which role, or set of roles, is 
the parent of the active role based on the isa role hierarchy).  
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Figure 4.5. The UCCACM for RBAC Part. 
 
In the case of the second major observation, recall the work presented in Section 2.2 and 
Figure 2.5. In Section 2.2, we reviewed the different HL7 confidentiality levels:  U – 
unrestricted, L – low, M – moderate, N – normal, R – restricted, and V – very restricted (Health 
Level 7., 2014). In Section 2.2, we also reviewed the work on the lattice-based categories and 
subcategories of sensitivities for healthcare that defined five main healthcare sensitivity levels: 
0 – Basic Information, 1 – Medical History Data, 2 – Summary Clinical Data, 3 – Detailed 
Clinical Data, 4 – Sensitive Clinical Data (Demurjian, Sanzi, Agresta, & Yasnoff, 2018) in 
Figure 2.5.  Using that work as a basis, for the second major observation, we present a set of 
five sensitivity levels (0-4) that can be utilized to classify data of any complex domain such as 
healthcare, but not limited to the healthcare domain as follows: 
Level 0: Public Information (PI) contains data that is freely available to anyone. Examples 
for data at this level are: basic demographics such as city and state of residence; and 
general personal information such as bachelor graduation year and university name.   
Level 1: Basic Sensitive Information (BSI) contains data that has some restrictions. 
Examples for data at this level are: detailed demographic data such as the patient name, 
full address, and date of birth.  
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Level 2: Sensitive Information Summary (SIS) contains data that groups or summaries a set 
of data that is classified as Basic Sensitive Information. Examples for data at this level 
are: clinical data including prescription and over-the-counter medications; and key data 
of a student’s academic record such as GPA.  
Level 3: Sensitive Information Details (SID) contains data that elaborates and provides 
more information about data that is classified as Basic Sensitive Information. Examples 
for data at this level are: reports from imaging studies (CT Scans, MRIs, X-Rays); and 
detailed academic information such as a report on a student academic record. 
Level 4: Very Sensitive Information (VSI) contains very sensitive information about people 
or organizations. Examples for data at this level are: sensitive information on a patient 
that is used by medical specialists including data on genetics, substance abuse, mental 
health psychotherapy notes; and sensitive employees’ information such as social security 
number. 
 
In the examples from this point forward, we refer to Level 0 to Level 4, respectively, by the 
acronyms:  PI, BIS, SIS, SID, and VSI. 
Given Figure 4.5, we revise the Definitions 9, 15, 16, 17, and 30 to version 2 (v2) that 
includes G (for global) as an option for a role set, user set, user role assignment, user-role 
assignment set, and delegation set. 
Defn. 9: (v2) Let },...,,{ 21// jGSC rrrR   be defined as the set of j roles for a given 
client/system/Global Resource where 
GSCj Rr //  and  jj NAMEIDj rrr , . 
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Defn. 15: (v2) Let },...,,{ 21// jGSC uuuU   be defined as the set of j users for a given 
client/system/Global Resource, where 
GSCj Uu // and  jjj CLRNAMEIDj uuuu ,, . 
Defn. 16: (v2) Each user 
GSCi Uu // can be assigned a role GSCj Rr //  for a user role 
assignment (ura),  jik ruura , , that signifies that a user is limited to playing that role 
and the authorized permissions. Note that a user can be assigned multiple roles but only 
play one role in any session with a client/system/Global Resource.  
Defn. 17:  (v2) The user-role-assignment set (URASC/S/G) for a client/system/Global 
Resource, },...,,{ 21// kGSC uraurauraURAS  is the set of all k user role assignments (Defn. 
16v2), that contains an entry for relevant user/role combinations that are applicable for 
role-based access control in support of any client/system/Global Resource.  
Defn. 30: (v2) Delegation Set (DS) for a client/system/Global Resource is a set of active 
role/role permission delegations 
GSCDS // ={ 1d , 2d , … , nd } in which each active 
delegation { , , / / }id ou du dr drp dc  has three parts: original user (ou), delegated 
user (du), and a delegated role (dr), a delegated role permission (drp), or a delegated 
clearance (dc).   
 
 
To complete the changes, based on the presented sensitivity levels above we revise the Defn. 
10 to version 2 (v2) to include the five sensitivity levels. 
Defn. 10: (v2) In support of mandatory access control (FSICC’s security requirement 4), 
we define a linearly-ordered set of sensitivity levels (0-PI < 1-BSI < 2-SIS   < 3-SID < 4-
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VID) with the ability to assign levels of clearances (CLR) to users/clients and 
classifications (CLS) to schemas’ elements and services. 
 
 
4.5 Core Definitions on Global Resources and Permissions by API 
 
As we introduced RBAC, MAC, and DAC into definitions for systems and clients in 
Section 4.3 and revised in Section 4.4, in this section, we present a set of definitions 
(Definitions 34 to 39) that focus on the higher-level needs of UCCACM within FSICC.  
Specifically, UCCACM provides a unified set of global services encapsulated into a number of 
Global Resources. This supports FSICC’s cloud computing capability 1 in Section 3.2, see the 
Security Policies and Services Registration and Global Services Generation boxes of the GSP 
Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3. This set of global services 
belongs to a given enterprise application and its systems in which interested clients are able to 
utilize authorized services from this set of shared global services. This is to remove the need for 
clients to utilize multiple and possibly heterogeneous services from each system, separately, that 
may be in different formats (e.g., cloud services, web services, programmatic API services in 
different languages, etc.). Moreover, the FSICC’s global services are controlled using RBAC, 
MAC, and/or DAC which supports FSICC’s cloud computing capability 2 in Section 3.2 as was 
shown in the GSP Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3. 
 
Defn. 34: A global service of a global resource, denoted  , is defined as 
 CLSSIGNAMEID  ,,, with unique ID, name, signature (similar to SIG  in Defn. 
31), and a classification (Defn. 10) for each service. 
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Defn. 35: A global resource, iG  represents a set of global services that are intended to map 
to services from different Clients/Systems. 
Defn. 36: For a global resource, iG , a global service permission,  iID
i
ID
i
gp jk
r  , , binds 
a j
th  
global
 
service 
i
j of 
i
APIG  by identifier, 
i
ID j
 ,  to a role  iR
i
k G
Gr   by identifier, iID jr .  
Defn. 37: For a global resource, iG , and a role  iR
i
k G
Gr  , a role permissions set, i
kr
RPS = 
},...,,{
21
i
gp
i
gp
i
gp n
 contains all of the n global service permissions igp j  associated with a 
role.  
Defn. 38: For a global resource, iG , the resource role permissions set, iRRPS GG ={ ir
RPS
1
, 
ir
RPS
2
, …, i
mr
RPS } contains all of the role permission sets for the m roles in iRGG . 
Defn. 39: A global resource, iG  can be represented as 
 iDS
i
RRPS
i
URAS
i
U
i
R
i
API
i
NAME
i
ID
i
GGGGG
GGGGGGGGG ,,,,,,, , is identified by a unique identifier, 
name, and  cloud API, respectively, where a given 
i
APIG  is comprised of a set of ij API 
services },...,,,{
321 jiiii
i
APIG   with each j  as given in Defn. 34 along with sets of 
roles iRGG , users 
i
U G
G , user-role assignment sets iURAS GG (Definitions 9v2, 15v2, and 17v2 
respectively), a resource role permission set, iRRPS GG (Defn. 38), and a resource delegation 
set 
i
DSG
G (Defn. 30v2).   
Example 4.6: Figure 4.6 defines the Global Resource G
1
 with the signature σSIG as a placeholder 
for readability.  The global services (see Table 4.1) are organized into one Global Resource G
1 
with global roles (Table 4.2).  
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Figure 4.6. Global Resource G
1
 Notation for Example 4.6. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.  FSICC Global Services for Global Resource G
1
 
Gid Service Name 
gs1 PUT /FSICC/Observation/id    obINFO 
gs2 GET /FSICC/Observation/id    
gs3 PUT /FSICC/Patient/id    ptINFO 
gs4 GET /FSICC/Patient/id    
gs5 PUT /FSICC/User/id    usINFO, Token  
gs6 PUT /FSICC/Encounter/id    enINFO 
gs7 GET /FSICC/Encounter/id    
gs8 PUT /FSICC/Condition/id    cnINFO 
gs9 GET /FSICC/Condition/id    
 
 
Table 4.2.  FSICC Global Roles for Global Resource G
1
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Rid Role FSICC Services 
GR1 GPhysician gs2, gs4, gs5 
GR2 GPatient gs1
 – gs5 
GR3 GCoach gs2,
 gs3, gs7
 – gs9 
GR4 GNurse gs1
 – gs4, gs6
 – gs9 
GR5 GParent gs2
 – gs4, gs7
 – gs9 
GR6 GTrainer gs2
 – gs4, gs6
 – gs9 
GR7 GCT
2
 gs1
 – gs4, gs6
 – gs9 
GR8 GMyGoogle gs1,
 gs2 
GR9 GSMH gs1
 – gs5 
 
 
 
4.6 Advanced Definitions on FSICC 
 
After presenting a set of definitions that describes the unified set of global services of FCISS, 
this section continues and provides a set of Definitions 40 to 48 that explains the way that 
services and security policies of different systems are mapped to generate global services and 
global security policy for FSICC.  Specifically, this section defines the main components of the 
FSICC and the way that such components are generated from the separate mapping involving 
clients and systems.  The first mapping is from clients (which have services to register) and 
Systems to Global resources. The second mapping is from Client/System roles to Global roles 
which is FSICC’s cloud computing capability 2 in Section 3.2 and the Security Policies and 
Services Registration and Global Security Policy Generation boxes of the GSP Generation and 
GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3. The third mapping is from Clients/Systems API 
services to Global API services which is FSICC’s cloud computing capability 1 in Section 3.2 
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and the Security Policies and Services Registration and Global Services Generation boxes of the 
GSP Generation and GAPI Generation horizontal box in Figure 1.3. 
 
Defn. 40: The Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) can 
be represented as FSICC= <G, R, U, URAS, RRPS> where G = {Gi | all i 
resources} is a set of all of the global resources in which each 
iG  as given in Defn. 39, R 
= }{ iall
i
RG
G   of all role sets from all i global resources, U = }{ ialliUGG of all user sets from 
all i global resources, URAS = }{ ialliURASGG  of all user role assignment sets from i the 
global resources, and RRPS = }{ ialliRRPS GG of all resource role permission sets from all i 
global resources. 
Defn. 41: Client/System to Global Mapping 
iF
CSGM
SICC
 
IDIDID GSC ,/  where each 
iC / iS  is mapped to one iG  G.  
Defn. 42: Client/System to Global Mapping Set:

j21 FFF
F CSGM,...,CSGM,CSGMCSGMS SICCSICCSICCSICC , where jF
CSGM
SICC
is as defined 
in Defn. 41.  
Defn. 43: Client/System API to Global API Mapping  IDAPI
ID
API
ID
APISICC
GSC ,/
iF
CSAGAM  
where each i
API
i
API SC /  is mapped to 
i
APIG . 
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Defn. 44: Client/System API to Global API Mapping Set 

j21 FFF
F CSAGAM,...,CSAGAM,CSAGAMCSAGAMS SICCSICCSICCSICC , where 
jF
CSAGAM
SICC
is as 
defined in Defn. 43. 
Defn. 45: Client/System Roles to Global Roles Mapping  IDR
ID
R
ID
RSICC GSC
GSC ,/
iF
CSRGRM
where i
R
i
R SC
SC /  are mapped to 
i
RG
G . 
Defn. 46: Client/System Roles to Global Roles Mapping Set 

j21 FFF
F CSRGRM,...,CSRGRM,CSRGRMCSRGRMS SICCSICCSICCSICC , where jF
CSRGRM
SICC
is as 
defined in Defn. 45. 
Defn. 47: Client/System Users to Global Users Mapping  IDU
ID
U
ID
USICC GSC
GSC ,/
iF
CSUGUM  
where iU
i
U SC
SC /  are mapped to 
i
U G
G .  
Defn. 48: Client/System Users to Global Users Mapping Set 

j21 FFF
F CSUGUM,...,CSUGUM,CSUGUMCSUGUMS SICCSICCSICCSICC , where jF
CSUGUM
SICC
is as 
defined in Defn. 47. 
 
Note that the mappings in Definitions 41-48 are performed by a FSICC security engineer in 
regards to reconciling roles and APIs as part of the mapping process. Part of this process is 
performed utilizing a set of algorithms for global RBAC policy generation, global MAC policy 
generation and global DAC policy generation; this will be explored in detail in Section 6.3 of 
Chapter 6.  
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Example 4.7: Table 4.3 contains the mappings of services and roles of MyGoogle, OpenEMR, 
CT
2, and ShareMyHealth (see Section 2.4). This is basically, the result of utilizing FSICC’s 
cloud computing capability 1: local service registration and mapping to global services; and 
cloud computing capability 2: local security policies registration to yield global security policy 
(see Section 3.2). Table 4.3a is for the role mapping where the client role and system role could 
map to the same global role, as shown for the first six rows, e.g., SMHR1 and OEMRR2 rows are 
the Patient role for Client/System, respectively, that maps to the global Patient role GR2. Tables 
4.3b to 4.3e map CT
2
, ShareMyHealth, MyGoogle, and OpenEMR services, respectively, to 
global services. 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Mapping Tables to Global Services. 
 
a. Mapping Client/System to Global Roles. 
Client 
Rid 
Client 
Role Name 
System Rid System Role Name Global Rid Global Role 
Name 
CTR1 Coach OEMRR3 Coach GR3 GCoach 
CTR2 Nurse OEMRR4 Nurse GR4 GNurse 
CTR3 Parent OEMRR5 Parent GR5 GParent 
CTR4 Trainer OEMRR6 Trainer GR6 GTrainer 
SMHR1 Patient OEMRR2 Patient GR2 GPatient 
SMHR2 Physician OEMRR1 Physician GR1 GPhysician 
  OEMRR7 CT
2 GR7 GCT
2 
  OEMRR8 MyGoogle GR8 GMyGoogle 
  MGR1 SMH GR9 GSMH 
 
b. Mapping of CT
2
 Services to Global Services. 
Sid Service Name Gid FHIR  
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CRUD/Resource 
CT1 PUT /CT2/concussion/status    statusINFO G1 PUT Observation 
CT2 GET /CT2/concussion/status    statusID G2 GET Observation 
CT3 GET /CT2/student    studentID G4 GET Patient 
CT4 PUT /CT2/student/add    studentINFO G3 PUT Patient 
CT5 PUT /CT2/followup/add    followupINFO G7 PUT Encounter 
CT6 GET /CT2/followups    followupID G8 GET Encounter 
CT7 GET /CT2/concussion/student studentID G10 GET Condition 
CT8 PUT /CT2/concussions/add    concussionsINFO G9 PUT Condition 
 
c. Mapping of ShareMyHealth Services to Global Services. 
Sid Service Name Gid FHIR  
CRUD/Resource 
SMH1 PUT /SMH/newMeasure/mID    mINFO G1 PUT Observation 
SMH2 GET /SMH/Measures/mID     G2 GET Observation 
SMH3 PUT /SMH/newPatient/pID    pINFO G4 GET Patient 
SMH4 GET /SMH/Patients/pID     G3 PUT Patient 
SMH5 PUT /SMH/Users/uID    Token G5 PUT User 
 
d. Mapping of MyGoogle Services to Global Services. 
Sid Service Name Gid FHIR  
CRUD/Resource 
MG1 PUT /MyGoogle/fitness/dataSources/dsID    dsINFO G1 PUT Observation 
MG2 GET /MyGoogle/fitness/dataSources/dsID     G2 GET Observation 
MG3 PUT /MyGoogle/newPatient/pID    pINFO G4 GET Patient 
MG4 GET /MyGoogle/Patients/pID     G3 PUT Patient 
MG5 PUT /MyGoogle/Users/uID    Token G5 PUT User 
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e. Mapping of OpenEMR Services to Global Services. 
Sid Service Name Gid FHIR  
CRUD/Resource 
OEMR1 PUT /OpenEMR/updatepatientnotes    noteINFO G1 PUT Observation 
OEMR2 GET /OpenEMR/getnotes    noteID G2 GET Observation 
OEMR3 GET /OpenEMR/getallpatients    patientID G4 GET Patient 
OEMR4 PUT /OpenEMR/addpatient    patientINFO G3 PUT Patient 
OEMR5 PUT /OpenEMR/addvisit    visitINFO G7 PUT Encounter 
OEMR6 GET /OpenEMR/getvisits    visitID G8 GET Encounter 
OEMR7 GET /OpenEMR/getlist    conditionID G10 GET Condition 
OEMR8 PUT /OpenEMR/addlist    conditionINFO G9 PUT Condition 
 
 
4.7 Core Definitions on Interceptors 
 
As we described earlier in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, the global security policy of FSICC is 
generated by the cloud computing capability 2 of FSICC, i.e., local security policies registration 
to yield global security policy, that utilizes two components of FSICC:  Security Policy Mapping 
box of FSICC in Figure 1.1 and Global Security Policy box of FSICC in Figure 1.1. To enforce 
the FSICC’s global policy defined on global resources with the allowed API service calls 
controlled by RBAC (FSICC’s security requirement 2), MAC (FSICC’s security requirement 
4), and DAC (FSICC’s security requirement 3) permissions, this section introduces a set of 
definitions for security Interceptor that is able to intercept API calls to global services in order 
to perform appropriate RBAC, MAC, and DAC security enforcement checks.  To begin, we 
define an interceptor as follows: 
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Defn. 49:  A Security Interceptor is defined as a programmatic mechanism that is able to 
intercept a service call from a client application to an API in order to perform appropriate 
security enforcement checks.   
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and DAC. Section 4.7.1 
provides a set of definitions that explains the way that the global RBAC policy are enforced 
using the RBAC interceptor. Section 4.7.2 discusses a set of definitions that explains the way 
that the global MAC policy is enforced using the MAC interceptor. Section 4.7.3 provides a set 
of definitions explains the way that the global DAC policy are enforced using the DAC 
interceptor. Note that at the end of each subsection, we provide an example for the respective 
definitions.   
 
4.7.1 Definitions on RBAC Interceptor 
In support of the FSICC’s security requirement 2 (see Section 3.1), this section presents 
definitions for the RBAC interceptor. Definitions 50 to 52 provide two enforcement checks that 
the RBAC interceptor utilizes to enforce the global RBAC policy.  
Defn. 50: User-Role Enforcement Check: For a global resource, G
i
, a user u
ID
 ϵ G
i
UG can 
utilize a role r
ID
 ϵ G
i
RG iff the entry <u
ID
, r
ID
> exists in the User-Role set G
i
URASG.   
Defn. 51: Role-Service Enforcement Check: For a global resource, G
i
, a user with a role r
ID
 
ϵ G
i
RG can access a global service σ
i
ID ϵ G
i
API iff the entry <r
ID
, σiID> exists in the role 
permissions set RPSrid ϵ G
i
RRPSG. 
Defn. 52: The RBAC Interceptor of FSICC is a programmatic security enforcement check 
utilizing Definitions 50 and 51 that is able to determine at runtime if the requested API 
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call on a global service can be executed for a user u
ID 
(Defn. 15v2) with a role r
ID
 
(Defn. 9v2). 
 
Example 4.8: Consider a Global Resource G1 that has: a user ,John>=<uG 1
1
1 ; and a role 
 n,GPhysiciarG 1
1
1  in which 
1
1
Gr is authorized to access global services },,{
1
3
1
2
1
1
GGG  ; and 
suppose that the user-role assignment  
1
1
Gura =<
1
1
Gu ,
1
1
Gr > is established, then the user 
1
1
Gu  can 
invoke all the three global services },,{
1
3
1
2
1
1
GGG  . 
 
4.7.2 Definitions on MAC Interceptor 
In order to support the FSICC’s security requirement 4 (see Section 3.1) and the MAC 
Interceptor, we first define the level of security enforcement checks that are required for 
MAC.  The MAC model (Bell & La Padula, 1976) has a set of properties, namely, Simple 
Security (SS), Simple Integrity (SI), Liberal* (L*), and Strict* (S*) that has both Read and Write 
capabilities. Such properties are defined to determine under which conditions a user with a CLR 
level can read or write a given data item with a CLS level.  For the purposes of FSICC, this is 
focused on whether a user with a CLR level can invoke a write service (i.e., Create, Update, or 
Delete) or a read service (i.e., Read) with a CLS level that is part of a global service permission. 
Now we explain the way that MAC properties are used in FSICC. First, SS property (or read-
down, no read-up) is the permission to invoke a read service that has an equal or lower CLS 
level. That is, a user is allowed to invoke a Read service with a CLS level equal to or lower than 
their CLR level, but not those Read services with a higher CLS level. Second, SI property (or 
write-down, no write-up) is the permission to invoke a write service that has an equal or lower 
CLS levels.  
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That is, a user can invoke a Create, Update, or Delete service of equal or lower CLS level 
when compared to their CLR level, but not to those Create, Update, or Delete services with a 
higher CLS levels. Third, L* property (or write-up, no write-down) is the permission to invoke a 
write service that has an equal or greater CLS level (the opposite of SI). Forth, S* Write property 
(or write equal) is the permission to invoke a write service that only has an equal CLS level. 
Finally, S* Read property (or read equal) is the permission to invoke a read service that only has 
an equal CLS level. From a definition and management perspective, an Security engineer of 
FSICC would set the CLR level of users following the predefined sensitivity levels (e.g., TS, S, 
C, and U - see Defn. 10) to establish the levels for both users and services. These levels are then 
augmented on a user-by-user basis by assigning the ability to invoke a read service (via SS or S* 
Read properties) and the ability to invoke a write service (via SI, L*, or S* Write properties).   
 
In support of the FSICC’s security requirement 4 (see Section 3.1), this section presents 
definitions for the MAC interceptor.  Definitions 53 to 56 introduce concepts on MAC read/write 
properties and an enforcement check that the MAC interceptor utilizes to enforce the global 
MAC policy.  
Defn. 53: Available MAC properties: There are four properties: Simple Security (SS), 
Simple Integrity (SI), Liberal* (L*), Strict* (S*) that has both Read and Write 
capabilities. The SS property allows a user to invoke a read service iff the user’s CLR is 
equal or higher than the CLS of the read service. The SI property allows a user to invoke 
a write service iff the user’s CLR is equal or higher than the CLS of such a service. The 
L* property allows a user to invoke a write service iff the user’s CLR is equal or below 
the CLS of such a service. The S* Write property allows a user to invoke a write service 
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iff the user’s CLR is equal to the CLS of such a service. The S* Read property allows a 
user to invoke a read service iff the user’s CLR is equal to the CLS of such a service. 
Defn. 54: User Assigned MAC Properties: The Security engineer is responsible for 
assigning each user one read property (SS or S* Read) and one write property (SI, L*, or 
S* Write).  
Defn. 55: MAC Enforcement Check: For a global resource, iG , a user i
UG
Gu can invoke a 
Read, Create, Update, or Delete global service 
iG
i  iff the CLR of u satisfies established 
MAC properties (Definitions 53 and 54).  
 
Given Definitions 53 and 54, we revise Defn. 15v2 as below: 
Defn. 15: (v3) A user, u, is defined as five-tuple  MACWRMACRDCLRNAMEID uuuuuu ,,,, , where 
MACRDu  is SS or S* Read and MACWRu  is SI, L*, or S* Write (Defn. 53). 
 
Example 4.9: Consider a Global Resource G1 that has a user ,John,TS>=<uG 1
1
1  and three 
global services: a Create service 
1
1
G =< SNewRxgs gsSIG ,,,
1111  >, a Read service 
1
2
G =< 
SAllRxgs gsSIG ,,,
1212  >, and a Read service 
1
3
G =< CfillCangs gsSIG ,,Re,
1313  >, and suppose that 
the Security engineer established two MAC properties (SS, SI) on 
1
1
Gu , then the user 
1
1
Gu  can 
invoke all the three global services, since the CLR level (TS) of 
1
1
Gu  is greater than all CLS 
levels (S, S, and C) of services (
1
1
G , 
1
2
G , and
1
3
G ), respectively. 
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Defn. 56: The MAC Interceptor of FSICC is a programmatic security enforcement check 
utilizing Definitions (53, 54 and 55) that is able to determine at runtime if the 
requested API call on a global service can be executed for a user with a CLR (Defn. 
15v3) and limited by a Read/Write properties combination (Defn. 54). 
  
 
4.7.3 Definitions on DAC Interceptor 
In support of the FSICC’s security requirement 3 (see Section 3.1), this section presents 
definitions for the DAC interceptor. Definitions 57 to 60 provide three enforcement checks that 
the DAC interceptor utilizes to enforce the global DAC policy.  
Defn. 57: Delegated User-Delegated Role Enforcement Check: For a global resource, G
i
, a 
delegated user du
ID
 ϵ G
i
UG can utilize a delegated role dr
ID
 ϵ G
i
RG iff the entry < ou
ID
, 
du
ID
, dr
ID
> exists in the Delegation Set G
i
DSG.   
Defn. 58: Delegated User-Delegated Role Permission Enforcement Check: For a global 
resource, G
i
, a delegated user du
ID
 ϵ G
i
UG can utilize a delegated role permission drp
ID
 iff 
the entry < ou
ID
, du
ID
, drp
ID
> exists in the Delegation Set G
i
DSG. 
Defn. 59: Delegated User- Delegated Clearance Enforcement Check: For a global resource, 
G
i
, a delegated user du
ID
 ϵ G
i
UG can utilize a delegated clearance dc
ID
 ϵ G
i
RG along with 
the associated read/write properties iff the entry < ou
ID
, du
ID
, dc
ID
> exists in the 
Delegation Set G
i
DSG. 
Defn. 60: The DAC Interceptor of FSICC is a programmatic security enforcement check 
utilizing Definitions 57-59 that is able to determine at runtime if the requested API call 
on a global service can be executed for a delegated user du
ID
. 
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Example 4.10: Consider a Global Resource G1 that has: two users ,John>=<uG 1
1
1  and 
,Ali>=<uG 2
1
2 ; and a role  n,GPhysiciar
G 1
1
1  in which the resource delegation set 
1
CDS
G  has 
an entry {
1
1
Gd } with 
1111
1211 ,,
GGGG ruud , then the user 
1
2
Gu can utilized all the global 
permissions that are authorized to 
1
1
Gr . 
 
 
 
4.8 Related Work on Access Control for Cloud Computing 
 
In this section, we review a number of related works on access control for cloud computing, 
comparing and contrasting their work to our approach in this chapter. We classify these related 
efforts into two main groups: the first group of three efforts involves data-based RBAC in a 
cloud setting while the second group of three efforts involves RBAC in a cloud setting at an API 
level.  
The first effort (Tang, Wei, Sallam, Li, & Li, 2012)  proposed an RBAC model with an owner 
role to enable the data owner to grant a user access to their data and to update the owner data in 
cloud, with a user role. Our work on UCCACM is similar to this effort since both works involve 
definitions for RBAC and DAC that can be utilized to restrict users access in the cloud. 
However, while our UCCACM provides MAC based capabilities to secure sensitive services, 
their effort does not consider the need for controlling users access based on sensitivity levels 
(MAC).  
The second effort (Wang Z. , 2011) proposed a cloud-based RBAC that authorizes 
permissions to data in cloud with roles that assigned to cloud users. This is accomplished by two 
main algorithms: the User Role Assignment and the Role Permissions Assignment. To further 
control sensitive data, this effort enables a cloud user to disable/enable roles that are authorized 
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to such sensitive data. The main common aspect between this effort and our work on UCCACM 
is that both works utilize RBAC to control user access in the cloud. However, regarding more 
sensitive data/services, their effort utilizes it approach that disable/enable roles while in 
UCCACM we utilize a more advanced technique with sensitivity levels (MAC).  
The third effort (Takabi, Joshi, & Ahn, 2010) proposed a security framework for cloud 
computing environments that has an access control module that protects a provider’s data in 
cloud using classic RBAC. Our work on UCCACM is similar to this effort since both works 
involve definitions for RBAC that can be used to restrict users access in the cloud. However, 
while our UCCACM provides MAC and DAC based capabilities to secure sensitive services, 
their effort does not consider the need for controlling users access based on sensitivity levels 
(MAC) and delegation (DAC).  
The fourth effort (Sirisha & Kumari, 2010) proposed an API-based RBAC model for cloud 
services that defines permissions against cloud services where permissions are authorized to 
roles that are assigned to users. This effort is similar to our work on UCCACM since both works 
define permissions against cloud API (cloud services). However, our UCCACM is more fine-
grained since permissions are assigned to different CRUD methods of cloud services, while their 
effort allows/denies access to all CRUD methods.   
The fifth effort (Wonohoesodo & Tari, 2004) proposed a Web Service (SOAP)-based RBAC 
model in which a role assigned to a service consumer is authorized to both a SOAP service and a 
parameter of a SOAP service with an access mode (e.g., read, write, execute, modify, and 
delete). The main common aspect between this effort and our work on UCCACM is that both 
works utilize RBAC to restrict the way that users can access services. However, while their 
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effort is dedicated to SOAP-based services, the permissions in UCCACM can be defined and 
enforced on any type of cloud or web services such as SOAP and REST. 
The last effort (Feng, Guoyan, Hao, & Li, 2004) also proposed a Service (SOAP)-Oriented 
RBAC model that authorizes SOAP services to roles that can be assigned to users, where when a 
user activates a role, an Actor is created that enables the user to access SOAP services authorized 
to the role. Although this effort introduced the role activation by users, this effort basically is 
similar to our work on UCCACM since both works utilize RBAC to restrict access to services. 
However, their effort is more focused on SOAP-based services, while in UCCACM the 
permissions can be defined and enforced on any type of cloud or web services such as SOAP and 
REST. 
Overall, our work on UCCACM contrasts with the three first efforts by focusing on defining 
permissions against cloud services as opposed to data. Regarding the last three efforts, their work 
differs from UCCACM since none of these efforts utilizes sensitivity levels (MAC) or 
delegations (DAC) to restrict access to the services. 
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Chapter 5 
Architectural Blueprints to Facilitate Interoperability and 
Information Exchange of Clients and Systems 
 
As presented in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1, an integration layer was defined as a standard API 
that converts data from a system or client into a common data format to facilitate information 
exchange. Such a common data format can be utilized by other systems and clients, within a 
framework like FSICC, to easily exchange data. An integration layer exists with an 
integration framework (IFMWK) which is a set of standards and associated technologies that 
allow different systems to interact with one another utilizing one common data format. The 
associated technologies allow integration servers to be designed and implemented to facilitate the 
exchange of information using the common data format via a set of shared services via an 
integration layer. The integration framework facilitates the interactions of clients and systems 
with one another in FSICC by providing a common layer to allow clients and systems to interact 
with one another. The common layer of IFMWK can be used to map to and from cloud, 
programming, or web services. To accomplish this mapping, we assume that the integration 
framework IFMWK has an available implementation that can be utilized to generate dedicated 
IFMWK servers for two-way mapping and exchange as needed. The FHIR standard presented in 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 and its HAPI FHIR reference implementation, which has a set of 
resources in XML, JSON, RDF, and Turtle that are a common data representation with 
associated services for CRUD and searching, is an example of an integration framework (FHIR) 
and its implementation (HAPI). 
As described in Chapter 1, the interactions and integration of clients and systems with the 
Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC), as shown in Figure 1.1, can 
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be defined from a client perspective and from a system perspective.  From a system perspective, 
each system, which corresponds to the Systems box in the Involved Parties component at the 
topmost of Figure 1.2 from Chapter 1, needs to create an integration layer API in front of their 
API, and modifies their security policy to be defined against the integration layer API. This 
integration layer corresponds to the Architectural Blueprints in Figure 1.3. Architectural 
Blueprints, the main focus of this chapter, are guidelines that define the way of placing and 
creating an integration layer for a systems or client to allow such them to exchange data with 
other systems and clients in one common data format. There are three Architectural Blueprints 
options as shown in Figure 1.2: a Basic Architecture option that includes a IFMWK server that 
works directly with the App repository and IFMWK servers of other systems; an Alternative 
Architecture option that includes a IFMWK server that works directly with the App RESTful 
API and IFMWK servers of other systems; and, a Radical Architecture option that removes the 
repository and has IFMWK servers for the App API and the other systems.  Once a blueprint 
option has been chosen and applied, each system is able to register: the system’s name, the 
integration layer API, and the security policy into FSICC. This is done using the Systems 
Registry box in the middle of Figure 1.1, which corresponds to the Registration and Services 
Mapping box of the Generation of Global Policy and Services component in Figure 1.2.  Based 
on the integration layer of registered systems, the security engineer of the FSICC creates a global 
API.  This corresponds to the Global Services box of the Generation of Global Policy and 
Services component in Figure 1.2, which is an integration layer in which clients may utilize such 
a global API via FSICC. Each of the different alternatives of the architectural blueprints process 
the means to integrate the services of a system so that can easily map to/from the global services.  
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From a client perspective, each client, which corresponds to the Clients box in the Involved 
Parties component at the topmost of Figure 1.2, creates an integration layer API at the top of 
Figure 1.1 in front of its API. Clients, like systems, may require an architectural blueprint option 
to integrate with FSICC, particularly in the case where it is a mixed client, see Defn. 6 in Section 
4.2 of Chapter 4.  With or without a blueprint, each client is able to register: the client’s name 
into the FSICC, using the Clients Registry box, and reconfigure the client integration layer API 
to call the global API of FSICC, see Figure 1.1.  The integration layer that can be created by 
systems, clients, and FSICC is the technology that facilitates the bi-directional mapping and 
exchange of information: between clients’ applications and global services of FSICC; and, 
between systems’ services and global services of FSICC.  
The architectural blueprints presented in this chapter have a strong interaction with 
UCCACM as was shown in the top portion of Figure 1.3 from Chapter 1. UCCACM has four 
definitions that are directly related to architectural blueprints. Definitions 41 to 44 involve, 
respectively: the mapping of clients and systems that provide services to global resources in 
FSICC in Defn. 41; the set of all of the global resources that were mapped from clients and 
systems in Defn. 42; the mapping of the services of the APIs from clients and systems to the 
global services APIs of FSICC in Defn. 43; and, the set of all of the global APIs for all clients 
and systems in Defn. 44. The architectural blueprints that enable clients and systems to provide 
an API that is conducive to being integrated via UCCACM into FSICC which is facilitated using 
the mappings of Definitions 41 to 44. This chapter explores and examines three architectural 
blueprints options, Basic Architecture, Alternative Architecture, and Radical Architecture, for 
design and development processes that can be followed to integrate an mHealth, web, or 
desktop application utilizing FHIR to multiple HIT systems via FSICC. The work in this 
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chapter supports expected contribution EC-A: Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC 
from Section 1.5, this is represented by the Architectural Blueprints box at the top of Figure 
1.3.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into a five-part discussion. In Section 5.1, we 
explore four issues that must be understood for an application of FSICC to support a 
discussion of the architectural blueprint options: the overall architecture of the application; the 
involved technologies that can be used to develop the application; the source code availability of 
the application, APIs, server code, or database; and, the allowable access to system sources.  In 
Section 5.2, we examine the three different Architectural Blueprint options, namely, Basic, 
Alternative, and Radical, for integrating an application to multiple HIT systems via FSICC, 
utilizing an integration framework, IFMWK, with examples provided using FHIR.  In Section 
5.3, we present Architectural Blueprints for each of the three options that illustrates the way 
that the options can be realized using IFMWK, including the various phases and steps that are 
required. In Section 5.4, we explore a complex example that utilizes the Alternative and 
Radical Architectural Blueprint options prototype applied to the healthcare scenario from 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 via FHIR as an IFMWK and HAPI as a server. In Section 5.5, we 
discuss two related works in the literature that explain alternative ways that FHIR can be 
implemented to integrate healthcare systems and/or applications in different settings. Note 
that the work in this chapter has been published in (Baihan, M., et al., 2018) (Ziminski, T., 
Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M., & Agresta, T., 2017). 
 
5.1 Issues that Impact Interoperability 
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In this section, we explore the different characteristics and components of an application and 
its interaction with multiple mixed clients and pure or mixed systems via FSICC and as a result 
define for issues that impact interoperability. The four issues  are: the overall architecture of the 
application with respect to tiers of functionality of mixed clients and pure or mixed systems such 
as one-tier, two-tier, and three-tier architectures, etc.; the involved technologies that are utilized 
by different mixed clients and pure or mixed systems such as RESTful APIs, programmatic 
APIs, database API, etc.; the source code availability of the mixed clients and pure or mixed 
systems such as the app, APIs, server code, or database; and, the allowable access to the mixed 
clients and pure or mixed systems via RESTful APIs, programmatic APIs, etc.  Each is discussed 
in turn.  
The first issue that impacts interoperability choices is the overall architecture of the 
application with respect to tiers of functionality of mixed clients and pure or mixed systems such 
as one-tier, two-tier, and three-tier architecture, etc. That is, in order to integrate a mixed client 
or pure or mixed system, via FSICC, one must understand its architecture. In general, there are 
three different architectures: one-tier, two-tier, and three-tier. In a one-tier architecture, 
the client/system would contain all of the components of the client/system including: user 
interface (the presentation layer); user request processing (the business layer); and the repository 
(the data layer). In a two-tier architecture, the client/system would have the user interface (the 
presentation layer) while user request processing (the business layer) and the repository (the data 
layer) are hosted in a separate server. In a three-tier architecture, the client/system would only 
have the user interface (the presentation layer) with the user request processing (the business 
layer) hosted by a separate server through an API and the repository (the data layer) hosted in 
another separate (third) server.  Note that the repository in all three cases may in turn interact 
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with another layer but from the perspective of the architectural blueprints options, this will be 
hidden. Also note that for the two and three tier architectures, the middle request processing 
layer might involve access to multiple separate APIs. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
mixed clients and pure or mixed systems are client mHealth apps or system HITs. The second 
issue that impacts the choice of an integration option is the involved technologies that are utilized 
by different mixed clients and pure or mixed systems such as RESTful APIs, programmatic 
APIs, database API, etc. These technologies can be utilized by a mixed client or pure or mixed 
system to make external integration with FSICC possible. The programmatic API of a 
client/system is a set of definitions for functions or methods of that application, where an 
external application may call an API to perform an application’s method without the knowledge 
of the actual code of such a method. A repository API is similar to the programmatic API, 
however, the functions or methods of such API perform operations over repository items that 
may be in a database or some other option. A RESTful API is a set of definitions for methods of 
an application. Such an API is designed based on the REST architecture (Fielding, 2000) which 
utilizes Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests to interact with the data of a client/system.  
Cloud services are the APIs that define the way that cloud consumers can access and utilize 
cloud computing resources such as software. These cloud services can be designed using web 
services such as Representational State Transfer (REST), Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP), etc. 
The third issue that impacts the choice of an integration option is the source code availability 
of the mixed clients and pure or mixed systems such as the app, APIs, server code, or database. 
Since a client/system can be developed based on different architectures (as described in issue 1), 
it is crucial to consider the availability of source code of components such as the app, APIs, 
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server, or repository. Specifically, the source code of the client/system is the code that is used to 
implement: the user interface component and the methods that interacting with any external 
servers. The API’s source code is the code that is utilized to map the application’s methods to an 
abstract set of calls that an external source can invoke. The server code is the code that is used to 
implement the business logic of the application. The repository source code is the source file or 
database schema and any code that is used to access data in such a repository. Some of the 
architectural blueprint options require access to source code in order to make limited 
programmatic changes to support the integration. The intent is to try to minimize these changes 
when attempting to integrate an app with multiple mixed clients and pure or mixed systems via 
FSICC, in order to have little or no impact on existing code. 
The fourth and final issue that impacts the choice of an integration option is the allowable 
access to the mixed clients and pure or mixed systems via RESTful APIs, programmatic APIs, 
etc. This enables external applications to be integrated with such mixed clients and pure or mixed 
systems. The ability to integrate these various API and services seamlessly with an integration 
framework such as HAPI FHIR is critical to support the different integrations options presented 
in this chapter. Recall in the introduction to this chapter, we defined an integration framework, 
IFMWK, as a set of standards and associated technologies that allow different systems to interact 
with one another utilizing one common data representation. The associated technologies allow 
integration servers to be designed and implemented to facilitate the exchange of information 
using the common data representation via a set of shared unified services.  The FHIR standard is 
one example of an integration framework which has a set of resources in XML, JSON, RDF, and 
Turtle that are a common data representation with associated services for CRUD and 
searching.  The HAPI FHIR reference implementation is the associated technology that 
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implements the FHIR framework that uses CRUD services; as a result, it is possible to develop a 
FHIR server as a means to support integration. In summary, the exact configuration of each of 
the four aforementioned issues (overall architecture, involved technologies, source code 
availability, and allowable access to mixed clients and pure or mixed systems) has a direct 
impact on the different available options that can be utilized via an integration framework such 
as HAPI FHIR to integrate a particular application architecture and multiple mixed clients and 
pure or mixed systems via FSICC. 
 
5.2 Application Integration Options 
 
 
In this section, we enumerate a number of different Application Integration Options to allow 
an application to send/receive data with multiple mixed clients and pure or mixed systems, via 
FSICC, by the creation of integration servers.  To begin, Figure 5.1 contains an architecture of an 
App (a client/system), its RESTful API, and its repository along with three systems (OpenEMR, 
OpenMRS, and a PHR such as MTBC (MTBC, 2016)). Note that while we use health 
information technology (HIT) in the example, the integration options and blueprints work for any 
IT system from any domain. The different components in Figure 5.1 define three architectural 
blueprint options that illustrate the alternate ways that the App can be integrated with the 
systems, via FSICC, based on the four issues previously discussed in Section 5.1 (overall 
architecture, involved technologies, source code availability, and allowable access to 
client/system).  In order to facilitate the integration of multiple systems with one another, we 
utilize the previously integration framework, IFMWK, to accomplish this mapping, we assume 
that the integration framework IFMWK has an available implementation that can be utilized to 
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generate dedicated IFMWK servers as needed. Note that the aforementioned FHIR standard and 
its HAPI FHIR reference implementation correspond to the sample of an integration framework 
and its implementation. Using this discussion as a basis, in this section, we present three 
architectural blueprint options: a Basic Architecture option that includes an IFMWK server that 
works directly with the App repository and IFMWK servers for OpenEMR, OpenMRS, and 
PHR; an Alternative Architecture option that includes an IFMWK server that works directly with 
the App RESTful API and IFMWK servers for OpenEMR, OpenMRS, and PHR; and, a Radical 
Architecture option that removes the repository and has IFMWK servers for the App API, 
OpenEMR, OpenMRS, and PHR. Note that the HITs that are shown (OpenEMR, OpenMRS, and 
PHR) are illustrative and in practice, a generalized version could have one or more systems via 
FSICC,  but for explanation purposes we utilize   three HIT systems. Note that in the rest of this 
chapter, we use the term HIT systems as follows. HIT is referring to health information 
technology such as EMRs and PHRs, and systems is referring to pure or mixed systems as 
discussed in Defn. 7 of Section 4.2. 
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Figure 5.1. App and HIT Systems. 
 
 
The Basic Architecture option is shown in Figure 5.2a, where the assumption is made that:  
direct access to the app repository is available; and, the source codes of app, RESTful API, 
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OpenEMR and OpenMRS HIT systems and their APIs are available.  In Figure 5.2a, at the 
bottom, there are IFMWK servers, see the ovals in Figure 5.2a, to load/store data from 
OpenEMR, OpenMRS and PHR (named OpenEMR.IFMWK, OpenMRS.IFMWK, and 
PHR.IFMWK) using their APIs (a third tier) into selected IFMWK resources; and an 
App.IFMWK server to load/store data from the App repository, at the top of Figure 5.2a.  
Basically, each HIT systems requires an IFMWK server (e.g., OpenEMR.IFMWK) to extract 
data to/from HIT via IFMWK resources that in turn interacts with the App.IFMWK server of the 
App repository.  Interactions from the App via its RESTful API are not impacted; also, the App 
RESTful API to the App repository. However, to enable the App to take advantage of the HIT 
systems, two new IFMWK services App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE are defined. 
The App.IFMWK.LOAD service  retrieves all of the data from either OpenEMR, OpenMRS, or 
the PHR in the IFMWK format.  This App.IFMWK.LOAD service  takes the JSON IFMWK 
from the HIT.IFMWK (e.g., OpenEMR.IFMWK) server and add them into the App repository 
via an App IFMWK service, which converts the IFMWK format into App repository format.  
This allows all of the App RESTful API calls to use this temporary data. The 
App.IFMWK.STORE service  extracts   data from the App repository, via an App IFMWK 
service, which coverts App repository format into IFMWK format and adds them into the 
OpenEMR, OpenMRS, or the PHR repository. The App.IFMWK.LOAD and 
App.IFMWK.STORE services require source code availability of the repository in order to make 
the needed calls to stage data back and forth from HIT sources.  Note that the 
App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE services may also be periodically called to 
ensure that the repositories at both sides are updated. In this way, the App, API, and repository 
are not modified. Figure 5.2b presents a customized Basic Architecture applied to the healthcare 
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domain where the FHIR framework is used as an example of an integration framework for 
healthcare, where all IFMWKs in Figure 5.2a is replaced by FHIR in Figure 5.2b. 
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Figure 5.2a. Basic Architecture with Direct Database Access using IFMWK. 
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Figure 5.2b. Basic Architecture customized with FHIR for IFMWK. 
 
In the second option, shown in Figure 5.3a, the situation is similar to the basic option in 
Figure 5.2a, except that there is no direct access to the app repository. Thus, the App.IFMWK 
server on the App side is moved in order to directly interact with the App RESTful API. There 
are still the HIT.IFMWK servers for OpenEMR/OpenMRS/PHR as in Figure 5.3a. In this option, 
the App continues to use the App RESTful API without change. However, the 
App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE services transition to become part of the App 
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RESTful API. That is, each App.IFMWK.READ service of the App RESTful API first calls the 
App.IFMWK.LOAD service, which takes an id of the queried instance and: retrieves the related 
data from OpenEMR, OpenMRS, or PHR via their IFMWK server.  The second call adds 
retrieved data into the App repository via another App IFMWK API service using the 
App.IFMWK.CREATE service. This requires slight programmatic changes and source code 
availability (third issue of Section 5.1).  The next step in the process calls the 
App.IFMWK.READ service of the App RESTful API which retrieves the related data from the 
App repository (which is updated with the new data from the HIT system). Similarly, each 
App.IFMWK.CREATE service of the App RESTful API first adds the related data into the App 
repository.  Then, the App.IFMWK.CREATE service of the App RESTful API calls the STORE 
service, which takes the newly added data from the App repository via another App.IFMWK API 
service (i.e., a App.IFMWK.READ service) and adds them into the OpenEMR, OpenMRS, or 
the PHR database, via their IFMWK service. Note that, in this way, while the App and its calls to 
the App.IFMWK.RESTful API are not modified, there is a single call is added to either the 
App.IFMWK.LOAD or App.IFMWK.STORE services RESTful API. This requires source code 
availability of the RESTful API. Figure 5.3b presents a customized Alternative Architecture 
applied to the healthcare domain where the FHIR framework is used as an example of an 
integration framework for healthcare, with all of the IFMWKs in Figure 5.3a is replaced by 
FHIR in Figure 5.3b. 
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Figure 5.3a. Alternative Architecture with App RESTful API Access using IFMWK. 
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Figure 5.3b. Alternative Architecture customized with FHIR for IFMWK. 
 
In the Radical Architecture, shown in Figure 5.4a, the situation is the same as the alternative 
option of Figure 5.3a, but alters the tiers by removing the repository (database). As a result, this 
option is a more drastic and involves replacing the App repository and so that it now   totally 
relies on the HIT systems.   This option would move and reconfigure all of the App data under 
the control of the HIT system to store and manage all data. This requires a total rewrite of the 
code for the App RESTful API with the strong requirement that all service signatures remain 
unchanged so as not to impact the App.  In this case, every rewritten App RESTful API service 
implements a App.IFMWK service to directly call OpenEMR.IFMWK, OpenMRS.IFMWK, or 
PHR.IFMWK as required to load/store data as needed. In the Radical Architecture, the services 
defined are: App.IFMWK.CREATE, App.IFMWK.READ,  App.IFMWK.UPDATE,  and 
App.IFMWK.DELETE.  Source code availability and changing the APIs may be required. This 
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approach is clearly time and effort prohibitive. Figure 5.4b presents a customized Radical 
Architecture applied to the healthcare domain, where the FHIR framework is used as an example 
of an integration framework for healthcare, with all of the IFMWKs in Figure 5.4a is replaced by 
FHIR in Figure 5.4b. 
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Figure 5.4a. Radical Architecture without a Database using IFMWK. 
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Figure 5.4b. Radical Architecture customized with FHIR for IFMWK. 
 
5.3 Integration Steps and Processes of Architectural Blueprints 
 
This section presents a discussion of the steps and processes that are necessary to develop the 
various IFMWK servers illustrated in Figures 5.2a, 5.3a, and 5.4a for the Basic, Alternative, and 
Radical options.   The end result is set of guidelines for the architectural blueprints for the 
integration of an App application, via a App.IFMWK server that integrates with the App 
RESTful API, with multiple HIT systems, via FSICC, and a HIT.IFMWK server that integrates 
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with the APIs of OpenEMR, OpenMRS, and PHR.  The   guidelines presented in this section 
provides   stakeholders with a process to integrate an App with multiple HIT systems via FSICC 
using IFMWK servers.  This section details the blueprints for the Basic, Figure 5.2.a, 
Alternative, Figure 5.3.a, and Radical, Figure 5.4.a, architectures. All three of these architectures 
blueprints share the common HIT.IFMWK blueprint which involves defining the HIT system 
data items to be sent/received and designing a HIT.IFMWK server to facilitate the exchange. The 
three architectures have their own specific needs, namely, the App.IFMWK server required at the 
App side Repository in Figure 5.2.a, the App.IFMWK server in Figure 5.3.a, and rewriting the 
App RESTful API in Figure 5.4.a with a App.IFMWK server. Note that while we are using an 
HIT system and the health care domain, this is generalizable to any IT system and associated 
domain. 
To begin, the common HIT IFMWK Blueprint involves defining the HIT system data items to 
be sent/received back and forth via a set of Identified IFMWK Resources to another IFMWK 
server or client, and designing a HIT IFMWK server (HIT.IFMWK) with a RESTful API to 
facilitate the exchange. The processes of each step that are the guidelines are as:  
1. Define the HIT system data items (i.e., for the HIT repositories in Figures 5.2.a, 5.3.a, and 
5.4.a) that are needed to be exchanged to/from the App. This step consists of four sub-steps:    
a. Identify each single candidate data item (e.g., “patient name” table field) in the HIT 
repository that are accessible via an HIT API.  
b. For each candidate data item: 
 Provide a short and clear item name: by reviewing the IFMWK resources, identify 
a IFMWK resource, and mapping the candidate data item to the most comparable 
data item of the identified IFMWK Resource.  
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 For the candidate data item, if there is no similar item’s name for the identified 
IFMWK resource, identify an item of a IFMWK resource that has the same 
datatype as the candidate data item. 
 Provide a brief description that explains the mapping for the case where there is a 
comparable IFMWK data item and more importantly, the case where there is only 
a comparable IFMWK data type.  
c. Group multiple related HIT system data items (e.g., patient name and patient gender) into 
a separate and distinct data abstraction (e.g., patient entity). This would make mapping to 
an Identified IFMWK Resource clearer by finding the most similar IFMWK resource’s 
name. 
d. End Result: A set of Identified IFMWK Resources that map to the HIT data entities and 
items. 
2. Design an HIT.IFMWK server in front of the HIT system API in two sub-steps:  
a. A HIT.IFMWK server is designed for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources in Step 1d 
that defines a IFMWK API that has CRUD operations for all of the Identified IFMWK 
Resources and interacts with the HIT API.  
b. Create Classes and CRUD services for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources for the 
HIT. 
 Create an HIT.IFMWK.Controller class that receives requests from the App (or 
any other system) and forwards each request to the appropriate Identified IFMWK 
Resource class based on the universally unique identifier (UUID) of an Identified 
IFMWK Resource.  
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 Create a class for each Identified IFMWK Resource that receives requests from 
the IFMWK controller class and performs the requested CRUD service. This class 
is defined for each Identified IFMWK Resource as HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName 
where IFCRName is the Identified IFMWK Resource Class name.  This class 
implements four main CRUD services: 
 A HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create service that stores an instance of a 
IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server to 
create and store new data into the HIT repository. This service takes the 
data in as a IFMWK Resource and then converts the data into a format that 
can be stored in the HIT repository via a call to one or more HIT API 
services. This effectively stores IFMWK Resource data into the HIT 
repository. For example, OpenEMR.IFMWK.Patient (the Patient IFMWK 
Resource) would call the service of an OpenEMR API that stores the data 
into the Patient_data table of OpenEMR’s MySQL database. 
 A HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Read service that is a request for an instance 
of a IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server 
that to read existing data from the HIT repository.  This service takes the 
request for a IFMWK Resource that requires a call to one or more HIT 
API services to retrieve the data from the HIT and create an instance of an 
Identified IFMWK Resource to send back. For example, 
OpenEMR.IFMWK.Patient (the Patient IFMWK Resource) would call the 
service of an OpenEMR API that reads the data from the Patient_data 
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table and perhaps other tables of OpenEMR’s MySQL database and 
creates a FHIR Patient instance. 
 An HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update service that receives an instance of a 
IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server to 
update existing data into the HIT repository. This service takes the data in 
as a IFMWK Resource and then converts the data into a format that can be 
stored in the HIT repository via a call to one or more HIT API services 
that update an existing instance.   
 A HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete service that receives a request to 
remove one or more instances (based on the parameters in the request) of a 
IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server to  
delete existing data from the HIT repository. This service takes the request 
for a IFMWK Resource and interprets the request to call one or more HIT 
API services to delete instance(s).   
 
Note that for healthcare and similar domains in practice, there may be a desire to not implement 
either HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update or HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete services since in 
electronical medical records, incorrect data is not deleted, but is marked as incorrect.  For 
example, an incorrect laboratory test result assigned to the wrong patient can be marked as not 
valid. 
The Basic Architecture Blueprint, Figure 5.2.a, allows information from the App repository to 
be sent/received back and forth via a set of Identified IFMWK Resources to another IFMWK 
server or client by designing an App IFMWK server (App.IFMWK) with a RESTful API to 
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facilitate the exchange. There are three main steps to the guideline: define the App data items, 
design the App IFMWK server with the LOAD and STORE services, and reuse the HIT IFMWK 
guideline:  
1. Define the App data items (i.e., App repository tables’ fields in Figure 5.2.a)   needed to be 
exchanged with an HIT system. This step consists of four sub-steps in which the first three 
processes are identical to the processes of Step 1 of the HIT IFMWK Blueprint with the data 
items now referring to the App data items as opposed to the HIT data items.  
End Result: A set of Identified IFMWK Resources that map to the App data items. 
2. Design the App IFMWK server which consists of the App.IFMWK.LOAD and 
App.IFMWK.STORE services.  This step has two sub-steps.   
a. A App.IFMWK.LOAD service that calls “read” services of an HIT.IFMWK to 
retrieve (in IFMWK format) all of the new added data from the  HIT repository. 
Then, the App.IFMWK.LOAD service converts the retrieved IFMWK resources into 
a format that can be stored into App repository via App repository API. This read 
occurs upon startup to initialize the App repository with information from HITs. 
b. A App.IFMWK.STORE service that calls App repository API to retrieve all of the 
new added data in App repository and converts  into the IFMWK format. Then, the 
App.IFMWK.STORE service simply forwards the converted data to appropriate 
HIT.IFMWK.CREATE services which add the new data into the HIT repository. This 
store occurs when the mobile app closes to update the HIT repository with 
information from App repository. 
3. Employ the HIT IFMWK Blueprint. 
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Recall that the Basic Architecture has access to the source code of the repository. There may be 
more than one way to access the repository via Web/cloud services, an API (as with OpenEMR), 
or by direct programmatic access to the repository (e.g., a MySQL database). As a result, 
App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE services would utilize one of these access modes 
in conjunction with calls to HIT.IFMWK CRUD services (e.g., 
OpenEMR.IFMWK.Patient.Read) and take the result of these calls for the identified IFMWK 
resources, and parse and put this information to/from App repository.   
The Alternative Architecture Blueprint, Figure 5.3.a, also communicates with the common 
HIT IFMWK Blueprint as previously described in the last step of the Alternative Architecture 
blueprint. There are four main steps to the Alternative Architecture guideline: define the App 
data items and design the App IFMWK server (similar to the one in the Basic Architecture 
Blueprint), design the LOAD and STORE services, and reuse the HIT IFMWK Blueprint. The 
processes of each step are similar to the ones of the Basic Architecture guideline of Figure 5.2.a:  
1. Define the App data items (i.e., App repository tables’ fields in Figure 5.3.a) that are needed 
to be exchanged with an HIT system. This step consists of four main processes in which the 
first three processes are identical to the processes of Step 1 of the HIT IFMWK Blueprint 
with the data items now referring to the App data items as opposed to the HIT data items.  
End Result: A set of Identified IFMWK Resources that map to the App data items. 
2. Design an App.IFMWK server in front of the App RESTful API in two sub-steps:  
a. A App.IFMWK server is designed for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources in Step 
1d that defines a IFMWK API that has CRUD operations for all of the Identified 
IFMWK Resources and interacts with the HIT.IFMWK server.  
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b. Create Classes and CRUD services for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources for the 
App repository. 
 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create service that stores an instance of a IFMWK 
resource from an external call from another IFMWK server to create and store 
new data into the App repository. This takes the data in as a IFMWK Resource 
and then converts the data into a format that can be stored in the App repository 
via a call to one or more App RESTful API services. This effectively stores 
IFMWK Resource data into the App repository. This would be similar to the 
OpenEMR example for the HIT.IFMWK server. 
 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Read service that is a request for an instance of a 
IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server that to read 
existing data from the App  repository.  This takes the request for a IFMWK 
Resource that requires a call to one or more App RESTful API services to retrieve 
the data from the App repository and create an instance of an Identified IFMWK 
Resource to send back. This would be similar to the OpenEMR example for the 
HIT.IFMWK server. 
 An App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update service that receives an instance of a 
IFMWK resource from an external call from another IFMWK server to update 
existing data into the App  repository. This takes the data in as a IFMWK 
Resource and then converts the data into a format that can be stored in the App 
repository via a call to one or more App RESTful API services, updating an 
existing instance.   
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 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete service that receives a request to remove one 
or more instances (based on the parameters in the request) of a IFMWK resource 
from an external call from another IFMWK server to delete existing data from the 
App  repository. This takes the request for a IFMWK Resource and interprets the 
request to call one or more App RESTful API services to delete instance(s).   
These App.IFMWK CRUD services are called by the App API in order to send 
information back and forth in a IFMWK format that can then be shifted to the HITs via 
the App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE operations defined in Step 3. 
3. Design the App.IFMWK.LOAD and App.IFMWK.STORE services. These two services are 
located between the App.IFMWK server and any HIT system IFMWK server and have sub-
steps.  The HIT.IFMWK CRUD services are used to support these functions. 
a. A App.IFMWK.LOAD service that calls “read” services of an HIT.IFMWK to 
retrieve (in IFMWK format) the new added data into HIT system. Then, the 
App.IFMWK.LOAD service simply forwards the retrieved data to “create” 
services of App.IFMWK which adds the new data into the App repository. This 
read occurs when the App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Read is called to update the App 
repository with information from HITs. 
b. A App.IFMWK.STORE service that calls “read” services of the App.IFMWK to 
retrieve (in IFMWK format) the new added data in App repository. Then, the 
App.IFMWK.STORE service simply forwards the retrieved data to “create” 
services of HIT.IFMWK which adds the new data into the HIT repository . This 
store occurs after the App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create is called to update the HIT 
repository with information from App repository. 
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4. Employ the HIT IFMWK Blueprint. 
Note that in practice, there may be a desire to not implement either 
App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update or App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete since in electronical 
medical records, incorrect data is not deleted, but is marked as incorrect.  In this case, we may 
not want the App to propagate incorrect data into the HIT systems. 
Finally, the Radical Architecture Blueprint, Figure 5.4.a, has three main steps: define the App 
data items, redesign the App RESTful API, and communicate the IFMWK HIT Blueprint. The 
processes of these steps in this guideline are: 
1. Define the App data items, see Figure 5.4.a, that are needed to be exchanged with an HIT 
system. This step consists of four main processes in which the first three processes are 
identical to the processes of Step 1 of the HIT IFMWK guideline with the data items now 
referring to the App data items as opposed to the HIT data items.  
End Result: A set of Identified IFMWK Resources that map to the App data items. 
2. Redesign the App RESTful API to implement App.IFMWK server in two sub-steps:  
a. App.IFMWK server is designed for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources in Step 1d 
that defines a IFMWK API that has CRUD operations for all of the Identified IFMWK 
Resources and interacts with the HIT.IFMWK.  
b. Create Classes and CRUD services for all of the Identified IFMWK Resources for the 
App. 
 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create service that receives the new data from the 
App, converts it into a format that can be assigned to a IFMWK resource, creates 
an instance of the IFMWK resource, and populates the IFMWK resource with the 
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converted data. After that, this service calls the HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create 
service with the IFMWK resource as a parameter. 
 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Read service that receives the id of a IFMWK 
resource from the App,  invokes the HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Read service with 
the id as a parameter. After receiving the result in IFMWK format, this service 
converts the result into a format that can be used by the App and sends it to the 
App. 
 An App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update service that is similar to the 
App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Create service, however, this service updates the 
existing data.   
 A App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete service that receives the id of a IFMWK 
resource from the App, calls the HIT.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete service.   
3. Employ the HIT IFMWK Blueprint. 
Note that for healthcare and similar domains in practice, there may be a desire to not invoke 
either App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Update or App.IFMWK.IFRCName.Delete services for the 
same issue discussed above.  Also note that there is no need for LOAD and STORE in this 
Radical option since there is no repository remaining on the App side of Figure 5.4.a. 
In summary, there are a number of observations to make regarding the IFMWK CRUD, 
LOAD, and STORE services.  The CRUD services are defined to manipulate a single IFMWK 
resource that interacts with either the App Repository or the HIT system in order to take 
information in IFMWK format and convert it back and forth into the format of the data items in 
the Repository/HIT.  This requires creating, reading, updating or deleting to/from the 
Repository/HIT using the respective API.  For the read service on a particular resource, the 
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information is retrieved using services of the API in the native format of the Repository/HIT and 
converted to the common format of the IFMWK resource so that it can be delivered through the 
IFMWK.READ service.   For the update service on a particular resource, the resource comes in 
the common format and the update service would extract out the data items so that they can be 
assembled to call the appropriate Repository/HIT API services.  The create and delete services 
would work in a similar fashion. The LOAD and STORE services differ in that they deal with 
multiple IFMWK resources.  For STORE, a set of IFMWK resources is passed in via a common 
format and these resources are extracted and assembled to allow multiple API services to be 
called to store the information in the destination format of the Repository or HIT system.  For 
LOAD, multiple API services from the repository/HIT are called to gather information that is 
then converted and assembled into the appropriate IFMWK resources.  The resource concept of 
IFMWK facilitates information exchange.  However, there is still extraction/conversion required 
to transition the data from the source to the sharable IFMWK format. 
 
5.4 Blueprint Prototype Applied to the Healthcare Scenario 
 
This section presents a proof-of-concept prototype that demonstrates the ability of a select 
subset of the Blueprints from Sections 5.2 and the usage of the corresponding guidelines in 
Section 5.3, that can be applied to the healthcare scenario from Section 2.4. This is by applying 
the blueprint process on two integration cases: (case 1) integrate the CT
2
 mHelth app into the 
OpenEMR HIT system via FSICC (Chapter 3); and (case 2) integrate the ShareMyHealth 
mHelth app into the MyGoogle HIT system via FSICC (Chapter 3). In the process, we fully 
illustrate the application of two of the three architectures blueprints (Basic, Alternative, Radical) 
and the HIT IFMWK blueprint to the two integration cases above. The end result of this process 
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is that the CT
2
 and ShareMyHealth client Apps are able to utilize the services of the 
OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, respectively, via the global services of the FSICC. The 
remainder of this section is organized into two parts. In Section 5.4.1, we detail the rational of 
the chosen architectural options for integrating the two mHelth apps into the two HIT systems 
(cases 1 and 2) using: the Alternative architecture to integrate CT
2
 app into OpenEMR, see 
Figure 5.3b in Section 5.2; and the Basic architecture to integrate ShareMyHealth app into 
MyGoogle, see Figure 5.2b in Section 5.2. Then, in Section 5.4.2, we apply the three 
architectural options and associated guidelines of Section 5.3 to describe the integration steps 
and processes for integration cases 1 and 2. 
 
5.4.1 Integrating Architectural Options for CT
2
 and ShareMyHealth 
 
This section explains the rationale that influenced the selection of the most suitable 
integration option for the two mHealth apps/clients CT
2
 and ShareMyHealth and two HIT 
systems OpenEMR and MyGoogle for the three architecture options, Basic Figure 5.2, 
Alternative Figure 5.3, Radical Figure 5.4, discussed in Section 5.2. Note that we made an 
assumption that the FSICC has already been built and published its own IFMWK server 
(FSICC.FHIR) so that different apps and systems can integrate via the FSICC FHIR server. To 
begin, for the CT
2 
mHealth app (case 1), the Alternative architecture was chosen and 
reconfigured, as shown in Figure 5.5, based on a number of reasons. First, we had significant 
human knowledge of the CT
2 
mHealth app and RESTful API and maintain the MySQL database. 
Second, we had the source code available for: the App, the RESTful API, and the MySQL 
database. This meant that we had the ability to do any of the three architectural options, but we 
chose the Alternative architecture we were able to maintain the processing and flow of the CT
2 
app through the RESTful API to the database. To apply the Alternative architecture, two FHIR 
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servers, as shown in Figure 5.5, are created: one for the CT
2 
RESTful API (CT
2
.FHIR) and 
another one for the OpenEMR API (OpenEMR.FHIR). These two FHIR servers are utilized for 
exchanging data between CT
2
 and OpenEMR via FSICC. Moreover, from the CT
2 
App’s 
perspective, the signatures of the services of the CT
2 
RESTful APIs remained unchanged, while 
from the CT
2 API’s perspective, the interaction with the app and the database remained 
unchanged. For example, when a user interacts with the CT
2 
App to view and modify a 
concussion incident for a student, the process transitions from the user request to an API call to a 
database access to a returned concussion incident. The only change in the process is at the start 
when a user requests a concussion incident for the student and at the end when a user stores the 
modified concussion incident for a student. In both situations, the FHIR server of the CT
2
 
RESTful API intercepts and retrieves/stores the concussion incident to OpenEMR via FSICC. 
When the incident is loaded from OpenEMR.FHIR via FSICC.FHIR, a temporary copy is made 
in the CT
2
 database and all of the changes that occur via the RESTful API are made to the 
database on that temporary copy. The final store sends the temporary copy through the 
CT
2
.FHIR and FSICC.FHIR servers to OpenEMR.FHIR. We decided against the Radical 
Architecture since we didn’t want to make the substantial changes that would be required to 
migrate all of the information in the CT
2
 database to OpenEMR. This would have included 
registration information, permissions (who can see/modify which concussion incidents), etc., that 
would have been difficult to directly store in OpenEMR.   
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Figure 5.5. Alternative Architecture for Integrating CT
2
 into OpenEMR via FSICC. 
 
For case 2, the Basic architecture was chosen and reconfigured for the ShareMyHealth (SMH) 
mHealth app as shown in Figure 5.6. For the SMH app, the source code is available for: the app, 
the RESTful API, and the repository. Based on this, we are able to utilize any of the three 
architectural options. However, we decide to apply the Basic architecture since we want to keep 
the SMH’s architecture unchanged as much as we can. To apply the Basic architecture two FHIR 
servers as shown in Figure 5.6 are created: one for the SMH
 
repository (SMH.FHIR) and another 
one for the MyGoogle API (MyGoogle.FHIR). These two FHIR servers, in addition to 
FSICC.FHIR server, are utilized for exchanging data between SMH and MyGoogle via FSICC. 
The Basic architecture also requires SMH to create two services into FHIR: SMH.FHIR.LOAD 
which retrieves related data from MyGoogle, via FSICC.FHIR, in the FHIR format; and, 
SMH.FHIR.STORE which grabs the data from the SMH repository, via an SMH FHIR service, 
and sends them to MyGoogle via FSICC.FHIR. These two services are meant to be periodically 
called to ensure that the repositories at both sides are updated. Note that interactions from both 
the SMH via its RESTful API and the SMH RESTful API to the SMH repository are not 
changed   The Alternative and Radical architectures are not suitable for the same reason stated 
for case 1.   
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Figure 5.6. Basic Architecture for Integrating SMH into MyGoogle via FSICC. 
 
 
5.4.2 Applying Integration Steps and Processes 
 
In this section, we apply the guidelines of the Blueprint of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 to enumerate 
the integration steps and processes for integration cases 1 and 2 from Section 5.4.1. For case 1 in 
Section 5.4.1, we know that we need to integrate the CT
2
 mHelth app into the OpenEMR HIT 
system via FSICC, see Figure 5.5, using two blueprints: the Alternative architecture to create 
the CT
2
.FHIR server, and the HIT FHIR blueprint to create OpenEMR.FHIR server. First, the 
steps of the Alternative architecture from Section 5.3 can be reformulated as: 
1. Define the CT2 mHealth data items from the CT2 that need to be exchanged with 
OpenEMR via FHIR to yield the Identified FHIR resources for CT
2
. 
2. Design a CT2.FHIR server in front of the CT2 RESTful API. 
3. Design  CT2.FHIR CRUD services (CT2.FHIR.IFRCName.Create, 
CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read, CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Update, and 
CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Delete) in addition to CT
2
.FHIR.LOAD and 
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CT
2
.FHIR.STORE services that extend the CT
2
 RESTful API so that the exchange 
via FHIR can occur with OpenEMR.  
4. Employ the HIT FHIR Blueprint. 
Then for the HIT FHIR blueprint, the two steps can be reformulated as: 
1. Define the OpenEMR system data items that are needed to be exchanged to/from the 
CT
2 
mHealth app via FHIR to yield the Identified FHIR resources for OpenEMR. 
2. Design an OpenEMR.FHIR server in front of the OpenEMR system API. 
The main focus for both of these blueprints is in Step 1 of each which focuses on the way to 
identify the data items that need to be exchanged from each side via FHIR.  This requires a 
designer to understand the correspondence between two sets of information: 
 The data items of the CT2 concussion MySQL database and the relevant FHIR resources 
that can be chosen to store them. 
 The data items of the OpenEMR MySQL database and the relevant FHIR resources that 
can be chosen to store them. 
The challenge is to consider these correspondences simultaneously to understand the way that 
the data items of the concussion app can be mapped via FHIR resources to the data items of 
OpenEMR.  The end result is a set of Identified FHIR resources that serves as the common layer 
to facilitate the exchange of data between CT
2
 and OpenEMR via FHIR services.  
To begin this analysis process, in Step 1 of the Alternative Architecture Blueprint from 
Section 5.3, we start by identifying the four key data items of CT
2
 mHealth that are in four tables 
of the MySQL Concussion database, namely: the Students table that tracks basic information on 
students (e.g., demographics, school, etc.); the  Incidents table that tracks information on the 
concussion incident (e.g., when concussion happened, initial symptoms, etc.); the 
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Incident_Locations table that tracks where the concussion occurred (e.g., at school, at sports 
field, at home, etc.); and, the Incident_Lingering_Symptoms table that tracks concussion 
symptoms observed in the days following the concussion (e.g., dizzy, nauseous, etc.). These four 
tables are shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7. CT
2
 Data Items of Interest. 
 
Given the understanding of this information, we can continue the analysis process with Step 2 
of the Alternative Architecture Blueprint in Section 5.3 to determine the Identified FHIR 
Resources that can be utilized to capture the information from Figure 5.7.  To track concussion 
data on a student, we can use the FHIR resources (Health Level 7, Fast Health Interoperable 
Resources, 2016) as shown in Figure 5.8. The Identified FHIR Resources are: Patient, Condition, 
Encounter, and Observation. Specifically: Patient to track demographic and other basic 
information on patients (students that suffer concussions); Condition to track a medical 
condition, in our case a concussion; Encounter to track the different times that changes are made, 
in our case, as the concussion incident is tracked over time such as lingering symptoms; and 
Observation to track symptoms and lingering symptoms of patients (students).  Examining the 
Students
student_id
first_name
middle_name
last_name
suffix
Email
student_number
school_id
incidents
incident_id
incident_reference_id
student_id
incident_location_id
incident_location_details
sport_id
contact_mechanism_id
impact_location_id
Removed
removed_by_user_id
tool_id
symptom_comments
Date
school_id
reporting_user_id
head_gear_usage
parents_notified
loss_conciousness
incident_locations
location_id
title
description
incident_lingering_symptoms
record_id
symptom_id
134 
 
MySQL tables of the CT
2 
database in comparison to the aforementioned FHIR resources, we can 
establish a correspondence or mapping between them as shown in Figure 5.9.  In this mapping of 
CT
2 
database MySQL tables  FHIR resources we have: students  Patient; incidents  
Condition; incident_lingering_symptoms  Observations; and incident_locations Encounter. 
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Figure 5.8. FHIR Resources of Interest. 
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Figure 5.9. Mapping from CT
2
 to/from FHIR. 
 
Now, let’s turn the discussion to Steps 1 and 2 of the HIT FHIR Blueprint from Section 5.3 
that involves an analogous process to Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, with the data items of OpenEMR.  
Since we have already arrived at the FHIR resources needed for mapping, Figure 5.8, we can 
reuse the aforementioned Identified FHIR Resources to assist in the identification of the 
135 
 
appropriate four data items in OpenEMR in Figure 5.10, namely: the Patient_Data table that 
tracks patient (student) demographic data; the Lists table that tracks issues related to medical 
problems, etc. (concussion medical problem);  the Form_Encourter table that tracks the event 
involved with the patient visiting (student seeing nurse); and, the Procedure_Order_Code table 
that tracks different codes associated with procedures. These four items correspond to the FHIR 
Resources as shown in Figure 5.11. This mapping has: Patient_data  Patient; Lists  
Condition; procedure_order_code  Observations;  and form_encounter Encounter. 
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Figure 5.10. The OpenEMR Data Items of Interest. 
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Figure 5.11. Mapping from OpenEMR to/from FHIR. 
 
The last step of the HIT FHIR Blueprint is the creation of the OpenEMR.FHIR server. As 
described in the HIT FHIR Blueprint and based on the selected FHIR resources in the provisos 
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steps, we created a FHIR controller class which receives requests from the CT
2
 mHealth app, or 
a third-party such as FSICC, and sends the request to the appropriate OpenEMR FHIR resource 
class along with any parameters. We also created four OpenEMR Identified FHIR resources 
classes (i.e., Patient, Condition, Observation, and Encounter) as shown in the bottom right of 
Figure 5.12. For each OpenEMR FHIR resources classes, we defined: 
OpenEMR.FHIR.IFRCName.Create and OpenEMR.FHIR.IFRCName.Read). The 
OpenEMR.FHIR.IFRCName.Create service receives an instance of a FHIR resource that 
involves new data, of a specific class, converts the data into a format that can be stored in the 
OpenEMR system, and sends the converted data to a create service of the OpenEMR system API 
that  stores the data into the OpenEMR database. The OpenEMR.FHIR.IFRCName.Read service 
retrieves data from the OpenEMR database via a read service of the OpenEMR system API, 
creates a new instance of the specific FHIR resource class, and converts the retrieved data into a 
format that can be assigned to the identified OpenEMR FHIR resource instance. Following that, 
this service populates the corresponding OpenEMR FHIR resource instance with the converted 
data, and sends this FHIR resource instance to the CT
2
 mHealth app, or a third-part such as 
FSICC. This service is also designed to retrieve all of the related data on the specific data item if 
there are no passed parameters.   
Finally, the remaining step of the Alternative Architecture Blueprint in Section 5.3 is to 
implement the CT
2
.FHIR server. As described in the Alternative Architecture Blueprint and 
based on the selected FHIR resources, we created a FHIR controller class which receives 
requests from the CT
2
.FHIR.LOAD and CT
2
.FHIR.STORE services; and sends the request to the 
appropriate CT
2
 FHIR resource class along with any parameters. We also created four CT
2
 
Identified FHIR resources classes (i.e., Patient, Condition, Observation, and Encounter) at the 
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top right of Figure 5.12 shows. For each of these CT
2
 FHIR resources classes, we created two 
main CRUD service, CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Create and CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read and 
CT
2
.FHIR.LOAD and CT
2
.FHIR.STORE services. The CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Create service 
receives an instance of a FHIR resource with new data, converts the data into a format that can 
be stored in the CT
2
 database, and sends the converted data to the CT
2
 RESTful API (a create 
service) which stores the data into the CT
2
 database. The CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read service 
retrieves data from the CT
2
 database via a CT
2
 RESTful API (a read service), creates a new 
instance of related CT
2
 FHIR resource class, and converts the retrieved data into a format that 
can be assigned to the CT
2
 FHIR resource instance. After that, the CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read  
populates the CT
2
 FHIR resource instance with the converted data, and finally sends this FHIR 
resource instance to the request source. The CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read  service also retrieves 
all of the related data about specific data item if there are no passed parameters. The 
CT
2
.FHIR.LOAD service takes an id of the queried CT
2
.FHIR resource instance, retrieves the 
related data from the OpenEMR system via OpenEMR.FHIR and FSICC.FHIR servers, and adds 
retrieved data into the CT
2
 database via another CT
2
 FHIR service (i.e., the 
CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Create service). Finally, the CT
2
.FHIR.STORE service calls the 
CT
2
.FHIR.IFRCName.Read service to retrieve (in FHIR format) all of the new added data in 
CT
2
 database. Then, the CT
2.FHIR.STORE service simply sends the retrieved data to “create” 
services of OpenEMR.FHIR, via the FSICC.FHIR server, which adds the new data into the 
OpenEMR system. 
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Figure 5.12. Combined Result of the Two Blueprints. 
 
 
From Section 5.4.1, we know that, for case 2, we need to integrate the SMH mHelth app into 
the MyGoogle HIT system via FSICC, see Figure 5.6, using: the Basic architecture blueprint to 
create the SMH.FHIR server, and the HIT FHIR blueprint to create MyGoogle.FHIR server. 
First, the steps of the Basic architecture can be reformulated as: 
1. Define the SMH mHealth data items from the SMH’s repository that need to be 
exchanged with MyGoogle via FHIR to yield the Identified FHIR resources for SMH. 
2. Design a SMH.FHIR server in front of the SMH repository that includes the two 
service SMH.FHIR.LOAD and SMH.FHIR.STORE  so that the exchange via FHIR 
can occur with MyGoogle.  
3. Employ the HIT FHIR Blueprint. 
Then, for the HIT FHIR blueprint, the two steps can be reformulated as: 
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1. Define the MyGoogle system data items that are needed to be exchanged to/from the 
SMH
 
mHealth app via FHIR to yield the Identified FHIR resources for MyGoogle. 
2. Design an MyGoogle.FHIR server in front of the MyGoogle system API. 
Similar to case 1, we start by performing Step 1 of the Basic Architecture Blueprint. Specifically, 
we identify the three key data items of SMH mHealth that are in three tables of the SMH 
repository, namely: the Measurements table that tracks fitness data of each patient (e.g., height, 
weight, steps, etc.); the Patients table that tracks basic information on patients (e.g., 
demographics, gender, etc.); and, the Users table that holds information on SMH’s users (e.g., 
user_id, user_name, etc.). These three tables are shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13. SMH Data Items of Interest. 
 
Given the understanding of this information, we can continue the analysis process with Step 2 
of the Basic Architecture Blueprint to determine the Identified FHIR Resources that can be 
utilized to capture the information from Figure 5.13. To track measurement data on a patient we 
can use the FHIR resources as shown in Figure 5.14: Observation, Patient, and User. 
Specifically: Observation to track measurement of patients; Patient to track demographic and 
other basic information on patients; and, User to maintain users’ data.  Examining the tables of 
the SMH
 
repository in comparison to the aforementioned FHIR resources, we can establish a 
correspondence or mapping between them as shown in Figure 5.15. In this mapping of SMH 
repository tables  FHIR resources, we have: Measurements  Observation; Patients  
Patient; and Users  User. 
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Figure 5.14. FHIR Resources of Interest. 
 
Patient
Id
Name.given
Name.given
Name.family
Telecom
Observation
Id
Note
Type
Value
Issued
User
Id
Name
Note
Patients
patient_id
first_name
middle_name
last_name
Email
Measurements
measure_id
measure_name
measure_type
value
date
Users
user_id
user_name
Password_hash
 
Figure 5.15. Mapping from SMH to FHIR. 
 
For the HIT FHIR Blueprint, we now discuss Steps 1 and 2 that are similar to the processes in 
Figures 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15, with the data items of MyGoogle.  Since we have already arrived at 
the FHIR resources needed for mapping, Figure 5.14, we can reuse the aforementioned Identified 
FHIR Resources to assist in the identification of the appropriate three data items in MyGoogle in 
Figure 5.16, namely: the DataSources table that tracks fitness data of each patient (e.g., height, 
weight, steps, etc.); the Patients table that tracks patient demographic data; and, the Users table 
that holds about MyGoogle users. These three items correspond to the FHIR Resources as shown 
in Figure 5.17. In the mapping of MyGoogle data items  FHIR resources we have: 
DataSources  Observation; Patients  Patient; and Users  User. 
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Figure 5.16. MyGoogle Data Items of Interest. 
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Figure 5.17. Mapping from MyGoogle to FHIR. 
 
The last step of the HIT FHIR Blueprint is the creation of the MyGoogle.FHIR server. As 
described in the HIT FHIR Blueprint and based on the selected FHIR resources in the provisos 
steps, we created a FHIR controller class which receives requests from the SMH mHealth app, or 
a third-party such as FSICC, and sends the request to the appropriate MyGoogle FHIR resource 
class along with any parameters. We also created three MyGoogle Identified FHIR resources 
classes (i.e., Patient, Observation, and User) as shown in the bottom left of Figure 5.12. For each 
of these MyGoogle FHIR resources classes, we defined: MyGoogle.FHIR.IFRCName.Create 
and MyGoogle.FHIR.IFRCName.Read). The MyGoogle.FHIR.IFRCName.Create service 
receives an instance of a FHIR resource that involves new data, of a specific class, converts the 
data into a format that can be stored in MyGoogle system, and sends the converted data to a 
create service of the MyGoogle system API that  stores the data into the MyGoogle database. 
The MyGoogle.FHIR.IFRCName.Read service retrieves data from the MyGoogle database via a 
read service of MyGoogle system API, creates a new instance of the specific FHIR resource 
class, and converts the retrieved data into a format that can be assigned to the identified 
MyGoogle FHIR resource instance. Following that, this service populates the corresponding 
MyGoogle FHIR resource instance with the converted data, and sends this FHIR resource 
instance to the SMH mHealth app, or a third-part such as FSICC. This service is also designed to 
retrieve all of the related data on the specific data item if there are no passed parameters.   
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Finally, the remaining step of the Basic Architecture Blueprint is to implement the 
SMH.FHIR server. As described in the Basic Architecture Blueprint and based on the selected 
FHIR resources, we created a FHIR controller class which receives requests from the 
SMH.FHIR.LOAD and SMH.FHIR.STORE services and sends the request to the appropriate 
SMH FHIR resource class along with any parameters. We also created three SMH Identified 
FHIR resources classes (i.e., Patient, Observation, and User) at the top left of Figure 5.12 shows. 
Then, we created the two services: SMH.FHIR.LOAD and SMH.FHIR.STORE. The 
SMH.FHIR.LOAD service retrieves all related data from the MyGoogle system via 
MyGoogle.FHIR and FSICC.FHIR servers, and adds retrieved data into the SMH repository. 
Finally, the SMH.FHIR.STORE service retrieves, in FHIR format, all of the new added data in 
SMH repository. Then, the SMH.FHIR.STORE service simply sends the retrieved data to 
“create” services of MyGoogle.FHIR, via the FSICC.FHIR server, which adds the new data into 
the MyGoogle system. 
Note that the FSICC.FHIR, middle of Figure 5.12, has five resources: Observation, Patient, 
Encounter, Condition, and User. These resources were selected as a result of FHIR resources 
selection of both sides: CT
2
 and OpenEMR require Observation, Patient, Encounter, and 
Condition FHIR resources on the right side of Figure 5.12; and, SMH and MyGoolge require 
Observation, Patient, and User FHIR resources on the left side of Figure 5.12. Also note that the 
role of FSICC.FHIR server simply is to send the FHIR instances back and forth between the 
associated clients and systems. That is, between CT
2
 and OpenEMR FHIR servers on one side; 
and between SMH and MyGoogle FHIR servers on the other side. 
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5.5 Related Work 
 
This section reviews two efforts that illustrate FHIR design and implementation: enabling 
better interoperability for healthcare (Kasthurirathne, Mamlin, Kumara, Grieve, & Biondich, 
2015) and applying FHIR in an integrated health monitoring system (Franz, Schuler, & Kraus, 
2015).  The work in (Kasthurirathne, Mamlin, Kumara, Grieve, & Biondich, 2015) provided a 
new API module for OpenMRS system that has been built using FHIR. The processes of 
designing and developing the OpenMRS FHIR API included: design a framework that assists in 
adding FHIR-based API for OpenMRS; select a third party FHIR library to implement FHIR 
resources creation and validation; develop a FHIR-based API for the OpenMRS system; and, 
implement the search service of a number of FHIR resources that are capable of retrieve data 
from the OpenMRS system. The architecture of the presented FHIR module consists of two 
layers: the FHIR web layer which mainly retrieves FHIR resources from the FHIR API layer and 
the FHIR API layer that basically models and validates FHIR resources. The initial prototype of 
the FHIR controller interacted with the Patient and Observation resources with a middle layer 
that transitions information to/from OpenMRS. This effort is similar to our work on architectural 
blueprints guidelines as both works presented steps to design and develop an integration 
framework in front of systems that facilitates system interoperability. However, their effort 
was focus on the FHIR standard, and as a result is limited to the healthcare domain and only 
highlighted the main steps of implementing a HAPI FHIR API without providing a detailed 
discussion on such steps. Furthermore, their effort presented an integration option, similar to our 
Radical Architecture Blueprint, that   extended OpenMRS system with FHIR API. In contrast to 
this effort, our approach provided detailed steps and process of designing and implementing 
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an integration framework that can be applied to any integration framework of any domain 
including FHIR and HAPI FHIR.  
The work of (Franz, Schuler, & Kraus, 2015) presented an extension to a health monitoring 
system using FHIR to enable interoperability between medical devices and HIT systems. The 
health monitoring system consists of an aggregation manager module which is a mobile device 
and a telehealth service center module which is a server. These two modules were extended by 
adding components, which are implemented using FHIR, to enable their integration. The 
aggregation manager module was extended with two services: FHIROBSMessageSender which 
sends the measured data as Observation FHIR resource to the telehealth service center module; 
and, FHIRDORMessageSender that sends DeviceObservationReport FHIR resource to the 
telehealth service center module. The telehealth service center module was extended with two 
services: OBSController and DORController which receive Observation and 
DeviceObservationReport FHIR resources respectively from the aggregation manager module. 
This effort is similar to our work on architectural blueprints guidelines as both works 
successfully applied and implemented an integration framework to extend different systems and 
make such systems more interoperable. However, this effort discussed only one integration 
option, similar to our Alternative Architecture Blueprint, that was specific to the reported effort. 
In contrast, our approach provided a generalizable integration framework that can be applied 
to any integration framework of any domain including FHIR and HAPI FHIR.  
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Chapter 6 
Global Security Policy Generation and Dynamic Enforcement for 
FSICC 
 
In this chapter, we discuss GSP (Global Security Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) 
Generation and Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and Security Enforcement 
which was shown in the 4
th
 and 5
th
  horizontal  boxes, respectively, in Figure 1.3 of Chapter 1.  As 
described earlier in Chapter 3, the global security policy of FSICC is generated by cloud 
computing capability two, Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy, 
of FSICC, that utilizes two components of FSICC: Security Policy Mapping, see the Security 
Policy Mapping box of FSICC in Figure 1.1 form Chapter 1; and Global Security Policy, see the 
Global Security Policy box of FSICC in Figure 1.1. Specifically,  capability two of FSICC 
enables any system, which corresponds to the Systems box in the Involved Parties component 
at the top of Figure 1.2, to register the system’s security policy that can be any combination of 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC, which corresponds to the Access Control Models component in Figure 
1.2. For RBAC, the system registers to provide: the defined roles, the defined services, the 
role-services authorization list, the role hierarchy, the defined users, the user-role assignment 
list. For MAC, the system registers  to provide: the defined services along with a 
classification for each service; and the defined users in which each user has a clearance, a read 
property and a write property. Finally, for DAC, the system registers to provide: the role 
delegation list and the clearance delegation list. In further support of this chapter, we utilize 
the Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model (UCCACM), from Chapter 4, which has 
a set of definitions for global security policy generation and utilization (see Defns. 41-48 in 
Section 4.6). These definitions ensure that such global security policy can control access to a set 
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of global services that are generated using one or more of integration architecture blueprints: 
Basic Architecture, Alternative Architecture, or Radical Architecture from Chapter 5. In 
addition, from the enforcement perspective to check whether applications are allowed to call 
particular services, UCCACM has definitions for RBAC interceptors (see Defns. 50-52 in 
Section 4.7.1), MAC interceptors (see Defns. 53-56 in Section 4.7.2), and DAC interceptors (see 
Defns. 57-60 in Section 4.7.3). 
Based on this, this chapter has two main parts. The first part presents a set of algorithms for 
generating the global security policy of FSICC; this partially addresses Contribution EC-C: 
Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP, from Section 1.5, by focusing on Security 
Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms, this is represented by the Global Security Policy Generation 
box of the GSP (Global Security Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation 
horizontal box in Figure 1.3 from Chapter 1. To support this, we present a set of algorithms to 
implement the concepts of global security policy definition and mapping of services to/from 
mixed clients and pure and mixed systems.  These algorithms support: global RBAC 
generation, global MAC generation, global DAC generation, and global policies combination. 
The second part introduces and discusses three security interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and 
DAC (which are the implementation of the UCCACM for the FSICC) via a number of checks 
and an algorithmic approach for each interceptor; this addresses Contribution EC-D: Dynamic 
Enforcement via Intercepting Process from Section 1.5, this is represented by the Security 
Enforcement via Interceptors box of the GSP (Global Security Policy) and GAPI (Global API) 
Utilization and Security Enforcement horizontal box in Figure 1.3. This is accomplished by 
presenting a set of programmatic RBAC, MAC, and DAC interceptors, which are the 
implementation of the definitions in Section 4.7 for UCCACM, that intercept any request to 
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access FSICC’s global services, that are generated using one or more of integration 
architecture blueprints from Chapter 5. To support this, a number of security interceptors (i.e., 
RBAC Interceptor, MAC Interceptor, and DAC Interceptor) are presented to enforce such 
global security policy on the users’ access requests.  
     In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss Global Security Policy Generation and Dynamic 
Enforcement for FSICC in three sections. In Section 6.1, a set of security policy integration 
algorithms are presented and discussed for: global RBAC generation, global MAC generation, 
global DAC generation, and global policies combination.  In Section 6.2, we demonstrate the 
realization of UCCACM of FSICC in HAPI FHIR utilizing the healthcare scenario of Section 2.4 
of Chapter 2 that involves the implementation of HAPI FHIR APIs and its server interceptor to 
support UCCACM checks with three different algorithms to support three different HAPI FHIR 
interceptors: RBAC interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor. Moreover, the 
interceptor discussions are supported by two access scenarios. Section 6.3 presents and discusses 
related work in both security policy integration and enforcing security policies on FHIR API. 
Note that the work in this chapter has been published in (Baihan, M., et al., 2017).  
 
6.1. Security Policy Integration Algorithms 
 
To start this discussion, Figure 6.1 shows architecture for global security policy generation and 
utilization (see Defns. 37-44 of Section 4.6). The global security policy generation process 
consists of four main phases: generating global RBAC, see the RBAC Integration and Review & 
Correct Role Names boxes in the middle of Figure 6.1, generating global MAC, see the MAC 
Integration and Building Global MAC boxes in the middle of Figure 6.1, generating global DAC, 
see the DAC Integration box in the middle of Figure 6.1, and global policies combination. Pure 
and mixed systems (see Defn. 7 of Section 4.2) at the bottom of Figure 6.1 and mixed clients (see 
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Defn. 6 of Section 4.2) at the top left of Figure 6.1 use the global security policy generation 
process to add their security policies and services into the FSICC as indicated by the dash lines in 
the figure. Pure clients and mixed servers are free to utilize the global security policy to call 
authorized services as indicated by the solid lines in Figure 6.1.  The generating global RBAC 
phase has two tasks.  First, RBAC integration takes all of the RBAC policies from pure and mixed 
systems and mixed clients (dashed lines) and through the RBAC Integration box combines them 
into one RBAC policy. Second, review and correct role names, which corrects and updates the 
name of a number of global roles through the RBAC Integration box to the Review and Correct 
Role Names box. Using input from the FSICC’s security engineer in conjunction with the two 
tasks, then the global RBAC instance, the Global RBAC Instance cylinder in the middle of Figure 
6.1 is generated. 
The generating global MAC phase also has two tasks.  First, MAC Integration requires human 
interaction to map sensitivity levels of pure and mixed systems and mixed clients (dashed lines) 
via the MAC Integration box in Figure 6.1 to the sensitivity levels of the global MAC. Second, 
global MAC is designed and constructed, in which users and services of the system are utilized to 
generate the global MAC in which users’ clearances and services’ classifications are assigned 
based on the global sensitivity levels (solid line) from the MAC Integration box to the Building 
Global MAC box.  Using input from the FSICC’s security engineer, the global MAC instance via 
the Global MAC Instance cylinder in the middle of Figure 6.1 is generated. The generating global 
DAC phase has one main task. DAC integration takes all of the DAC policies from pure and 
mixed systems and mixed clients (dashed lines) to the DAC Integration box in Figure 6.1 and 
combines them into one DAC policy and then generates the global DAC instance via the Global 
DAC Instance cylinder in the middle of Figure 6.1. Finally, in the last phase, the Combine Global 
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Security Policies Instances box in the middle of Figure 6.1 combines the generated global RBAC 
instance, global MAC instance, and global DAC instance into one global security policy model 
instance, in which the data updating and retrieving actions are also controlled.  To complete the 
process, the security engineer of FSICC insures that all of the policy requirements are define that 
are capable of controlling the services of pure and mixed clients and mixed systems via the solid 
lines to the Global Security Policy Model Instance cylinder in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. An Architecture for Global Security Policy Generation & Utilization 
The remainder of this section presents and discusses a set of algorithms and human process for 
the Global Security Policy Generation in four parts.  In Section 6.1.1, we discuss the way that the 
global RBAC generation phase processes each RBAC policy from each pure or mixed system or 
mixed client, and generates the global RBAC policy. In Section 6.1.2, the global MAC generation 
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phase is presented to show the way that each MAC policy from each pure or mixed system or 
mixed client is processed to generate the global MAC policy. Section 6.1.3 explains the way that 
the global DAC generation phase uses to process each DAC policy from each pure or mixed 
system or mixed client and to generate the global DAC policy. Finally, in Section 6.1.4, we 
describe the way that the global policies combination phase uses the global RBAC policy, global 
MAC policy, and global DAC policy to build the global security policy. Note that in the rest of 
this section we  use the term “system” to indicate pure systems, mixed systems (services 
registering part) and mixed clients (services registering part), and the term “client” to indicate 
pure clients, mixed clients (services utilization part) and mixed systems (services utilization part). 
 
6.1.1 Global RBAC Generation 
The Global RBAC (GRBAC) Generation phase is divided into two tasks, each of which 
consists of one or more algorithms:  RBAC Integration in Figure 6.1; and, Review and Correct 
Role Names in Figure 6.1. First, the RBAC Integration task, integrates any number of systems’ 
RBAC policies into one global RBAC policy that can be utilized to restrict access to services of 
all of the participated systems, where the presented approach makes policy integration decisions 
based on permissions similarity. Since each system may define an RBAC policy against a 
common set of services (the integration layer e.g., FHIR in HITs case), the similarity between 
two systems’ RBAC policies, or between a system’s RBAC policy and a global RBAC policy, 
can be determined based on the similarity of the permissions. For the purposes of our examples, 
assume that we have two roles Srs and Grg where  Srs ϵ {
S
i
RS , C
i
RC }  is a role of  a pure or mixed 
system or a mixed client and Grg ϵ 
G
i
RG  is a global role. Further, assume that there are two 
corresponding role permission sets Srpss ϵ { 
i
RPS S
S , iRPS CC }  and Grpsg  ϵ 
i
RRPS G
G .  For example, 
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say Srs authorized to permissions Srpss ={(Patient, READ),  (Patient, CREATE)}, and Grg 
authorized to permissions  Grpss={(Patient, READ),  (Patient, CREATE),  (Patient, UPDATE)}.  
    When comparing Srs and Grg , our focus is on comparing permissions their respective Srpss 
and Grpsg ; in this case, there  are common permission {(Patient, READ),  (Patient, CREATE)}. 
Note that, in permissions comparison, we omit the base URL from a service URI and focus only 
on the Endpoint (i.e., permission name) and Method (i.e., access method), since the permission 
name and access method of the service are the confidential part that need to be protected. Based 
on this, the comparison between any two role permission sets (Srpss and Grpsg) have one of the 
five results: (1) Srpss ⊃ Grpsg which means all of the permissions in Grpsg are in Srpss which in 
the above example  is false; (2) Grpsg ⊃ Srpss which means all of the permissions in Srpss are in 
Grpsg which in the above example is true; (3) Srpss ∩ Grpsg ≠ ∅ (or Srpss and Grpsg overlap) 
which means both role permission sets have common permissions but no role permission set 
contains the other; (4) Srpss = Grpsg (or Srpss and Grpsg are equivalent) which means both role 
permission sets have the same set of permissions; or (5) Srpss ∩ Grpsg = ∅ (Srpss and Grpsg are 
not related) which means there is no common permissions between Srpss and Grpsg. Based on 
the assumptions above, the RBAC Integration task utilizes four algorithms: Global-RBAC, 
Initialize_GRBAC, IntegrateRBAC, and AddBasicParents. These algorithms utilize a set of 
primitive functions in Table 6.1 that simplify the explanation of the aforementioned four 
algorithms. Table 6.1 has two columns: Function Signature, that has a name and a set of 
parameters for each function; and Description, that briefly explains each function. We highlight 
key functions. The first three functions: returns the parent roles of a given role, sets a parent role, 
and returns permissions of a role (i.e., Srpss or Grpsg).  The next function, compareRolesPerm, 
does the comparison between a system role (Srs) and a global role (Grg) using two factors of each 
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role: role permission sets (Srpss and Grpsg), and inherited role permission sets from all of the 
parent roles (inhSrpss and inhGrpsg).  The mapRoles function creates new entries in the global 
policy regarding the mapping of system roles to global roles.  
Table 6.1. Primitive Functions Utilized by the Algorithms for Global RBAC Generation 
Function signature  Description 
getParents(RH, r) Returns all of the parent roles of the role r according to the given role hierarchy RH 
addParent(RH, pr , r) Defines the role pr as a parent role of the role r in the given role hierarchy RH 
dirPset(r) Returns a list of permissions directly authorized to the role r 
compareRolesPerm(Grpsg , 
Srpss , inhGrpsg , inhSrpss) 
Returns one of the following:  
- not related (if simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) is 0) 
- equivalent (if simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) equals both Grpsg.size & Srpss.size and 
simCount(inhGrpsg, inhSrpss) equals both inhGrpsg.size & inhSrpss.size)  
-  contains GR (if simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) equals Grpsg.size but less than Srpss.size and 
inhGrpsg.size is 0) 
- GR contains  (if simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) equals Srpss.size but less than Grpsg.size and 
inhSrpss.size is 0) 
- overlap (if simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) is less than both Grpsg.size & Srpss.size but > 0 or 
simCount(Grpsg , Srpss) equals both Grpsg.size and Srpss.size and both inhGrpsg.size and 
inhSrpss.size > 0) 
mapRoles(Grg, Srs) Adds all of the users in users(Srs) into users(Grg), and 
adds a new entry (Grg, Srs , Srs.system name) to the role mapping list 
users(r) Returns all of the users assigned to role r 
createGlobalRole(roleName) Creates a new global role s.t. the role name = roleName; if roleName exists use roleName_X 
(where X= number of Roles with same name +1)  
comPset(r1, r2) Returns a list of common permissions between Pset(r1) and Pset(r2) 
uncomPset(r1, r2) Returns a list of permissions exist in Pset(r1) but not in Pset(r2) 
removePer(perList , r) Removes all of the permissions in perList from Pset(r) 
addPer(perList , r) Adds all of the permissions in perList into Pset(r) 
getMappedGRole(global RH, 
Srs) 
Returns the global role associated with the given system role Srs  
AllPset(r) Returns a list of all of the permissions (directly and by inheritance) authorized to the role r 
inherPset(RH, r) Returns a list of by inheritance permissions authorized to the role r according to the given role 
hierarchy RH 
exist(Srs) Returns true if the role mapping list contains the entry (*, Srs , Srs.system name), where * 
means for any Grg 
notRelatedList.add(Grg , Srs) Add an entry (Grg , Srs) that means these two roles are unrelated 
notRelatedList.cleare () Removes all of the Entries 
 
The Global-RBAC algorithm in Figure 6.2 is for generating the entire GRBAC policy for all of 
the systems in FSICC, and takes as input a set of m systems’ RBAC policies (SRBAC1, SRBAC2, 
.. SRBACm), where m is the number of the participated systems, and initializes the global RBAC 
policy (GRBAC) using SRBAC1, line 1 in Figure 6.2. Note that, SRBAC1 is arbitrarily chosen 
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from the set of systems RBAC policies. The Global-RBAC algorithm then iterates (lines 2-3) 
through RBAC policies of the remaining systems, SRBAC2 to SRBACm, by integrating one 
system’s RBAC policy at a time with the previously computed GRBAC. Finally, the Global-
RBAC algorithm returns the final GRBAC, combined Global RBAC policy constructed from all 
of the constituent systems of FSICC, line 4 in Figure 6.2. Moreover, as Figure 6.2 shows, the 
Global-RBAC algorithm utilizes the Initialize_GRBAC and IntegrateRBAC algorithms.  
Global-RBAC 
Input: set of m Systems RBAC (SRBAC1, SRBAC2, .. , SRBACm) 
Output: Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
1. GRBAC ← Initialize_GRBAC(SRBAC1) 
2. for i ← 2 to m 
3.     GRBAC ← IntegrateRBAC(GRBAC , SRBACi)  
4. return(GRBAC) 
 
Figure 6.2. The Global-RBAC Algorithm 
The Initialize_GRBAC algorithm in Figure 6.3 is for initializing the GRBAC policy to generate 
the initial state of a global-system role mapping list, and receives SRBAC1 and performs three 
main steps.  Step 1 (line 1) copies roles (Srs), users (Sus), permissions (Sscs), role-permission 
authorizations (Srpss), user-role assignments (Surass), and role hierarchy (Srhs), see Defn. 19 of 
Section 4.3, from SRBAC1 to the GRBAC. Step 2 (lines 2-3) generates a global-system role 
mapping list by mapping each global role with the original system role.  Step 3 (lines 4-6) creates 
a new global role that has no permissions or users (i.e., RootRole) to be the parent role for each 
global role with no parents. Finally, the initialized GRBAC is returned in line 7. 
 
Initialize_GRBAC 
Input: System RBAC (SRBAC) 
Output: Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
1. GRBAC ← {SRBAC[Srs, Sus, Sscs, Srpss, Surass, Srhs]} 
2. for each Grg ∈ GRBAC and each Srs ∈ SRBAC  
3.     mapRoles(Grg, Srs) 
4. RootRole ← createGlobalRole(RootRole) 
5. for each Grg ∈ GRBAC that has no parents 
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6.     addParent(global RH , RootRole , Grg) 
7. return(GRBAC) 
 
Figure 6.3. The Initialize_GRBAC Algorithm 
 
The IntegrateRBAC algorithm in Figure 6.4 is for combining the current GRBAC policy with a 
new system’s RBAC (SRBAC) policy, and receives SRBAC and the current GRBAC and 
performs two nested loops. The first loop in line 1 iterates through each system role (Srs) in 
SRBAC, starting with each Srs with no parents, then with one parent, and so on, until each Srs 
reaches the bottom of the system role hierarchy. The second loop in line 4 iterates through each 
global role (Grg) in GRBAC, except the RootRole, starting with each Grg that only has the 
RootRole as its parent, then with one parent other than the RootRole, and so on, until each Grg 
reaches the bottom of the global role hierarchy. Then, in line 7, each Srs and Grg are compared 
based on two factors of each role: role permission sets (Srpss and Grpsg), and inherited role 
permission sets from all of the parent roles (inhSrpss and inhGrpsg), utilizing the 
compareRolesPerm primitive function in Table 6.1 that returns: equivalent, Grpsg ⊃ Srpss, Srpss ⊃ 
Grpsg, overlap, or not related as explained by the compareRolesPerm function in Table 6.1. Note 
that simCount, which is utilized in the description of the compareRolesPerm function in Table 
6.1, is the similarity counter that is initiated to 0 and is incremented each time a global permission 
and system permission are equal. There are five comparison possibilities: 
 If the comparison result is “equivalent”, one step is performed: mapping Grg with Srs, 
lines 8-9 in Figure 6.4.  
 If the comparison result is “Grpsg ⊃ Srpss”, six steps are performed: creating a new 
global role (Grg_New); the common permissions between Grpsg and Srpss are removed 
from Grg and  added to Grg_New; adding Grg_New as a parent of Grg; adding one or 
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more parents to Grg_New utilizing the AddBasicParents algorithm in Figure 6.5; and, 
mapping Grg_New with Srs, lines 10-16 in Figure 6.4.  
 
IntegrateRBAC 
Input: System RBAC (SRBAC) & current Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
Output: Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
1. for each Srs ∈ SRBAC 
2.     Srpss ← dirPset(Srs)   
3.     inhSrpss ← inherPset(system RH, Srs)   
4.     for each Grg ∈ GRBAC except RootRole  
5.         Grpsg ← dirPset(Grg)   
6.         inhGrpsg ← inherPset(global RH, Grg)                
7.         res ← compareRolesPerm(Grpss , Srpss, inhGrpsg, inhSrpss)  
8.         If(res==equivalent) 
9.             mapRoles(Grg, Srs) 
10.         Else If(res== Grpsg ⊃ Srpss) 
11.             Grg_new= createGlobalRole(Srs.name) 
12.             removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg) 
13.             addPer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg_new) 
14.             addParent(global RH , Grg_new , Grg) 
15.             AddBasicParents(Srs , Grg_new) 
16.             mapRoles(Grg_new, Srs) 
17.         Else If(res== Srpss ⊃ Grpsg) 
18.             If(!exist(Srs)) 
19.                 Grg_new= createGlobalRole(Srs.name) 
20.                 addPer(uncomPset(Srs, Grg) , Grg_new) 
21.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Srs) 
22.                 addParent(global RH , Grg , Grg_new) 
23.                 AddBasicParents(Srs , Grg_new) 
24.                 mapRoles(Grg_new, Srs) 
25.             Else 
26.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg_new) 
27.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Srs) 
28.                 addParent(global RH , Grg , Grg_new) 
29.         Else If(res==overlap) 
30.             Grg_new_2= createGlobalRole(NEW_ROLE) 
31.             addPer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg_new_2) 
32.             removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg) 
33.             addParent(global RH , Grg_new_2 , Grg) 
34.             addParent(global RH , RootRole , Grg_new_2) 
35.             If(!exist(Srs)) 
36.                 Grg_new= createGlobalRole(Srs.name) 
37.                 addPer(uncomPset(Srs, Grg) , Grg_new) 
38.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Srs) 
39.                 addParent(global RH , Grg_new_2 , Grg_new) 
40.                 AddBasicParents(Srs , Grg_new) 
41.                 mapRoles(Grg_new, Srs) 
42.             Else 
43.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Grg_new) 
44.                 removePer(comPset(Grg, Srs) , Srs) 
45.                 addParent(global RH , Grg_new_2 , Grg_new) 
46.         Else If(res==not related) 
47.             notRelatedList.add(Grg , Srs) 
48.     If(Srs is not related to any Grg)     
49.         Grg_new = createGlobalRole(Srs.name) 
50.         addPer(Pset(Srs) , Grg_new) 
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51.         AddBasicParents(Srs , Grg_new) 
52.         mapRoles(Grg_new, Srs) 
53. return(GRBAC) 
Figure 6.4. The IntegrateRBAC Algorithm 
 If the comparison result is “Srpss ⊃ Grpsg”, there are two cases. In the first case, Srs is 
not already added to the global role hierarchy, so six steps are performed: creating a 
new global role (Grg_New); the common permissions between Grpsg and Srpss are 
removed from Srs; the uncommon permissions between Grpsg and Srpss are added to 
Grg_New; adding Grg as a parent of Grg_New; adding one or more parents to Grg_New 
utilizing the AddBasicParents algorithm in Figure 6.5; and mapping Grg_New with Srs, 
lines 18-24 in Figure 6.4. In the second case, Srs is already added to the global role 
hierarchy, so three steps are performed: the common permissions between Grpsg and 
Srpss are removed from Srs and Grg_New; and adding Grg as a parent of Grg_New, lines 
25-28 in Figure 6.4.  
 If the comparison result is “overlap”, the algorithm starts with five steps: creating a 
new global role (Grg_New_2); the common permissions between Grpsg and Srpss are 
removed from Grg and added to Grg_New_2; adding RootRole as a parent of 
Grg_New_2; and adding Grg_New_2 as a parent of Grg, lines 29-34 in Figure 6.4. Then 
the algorithm applies similar steps as in the “Srpss ⊃ Grpsg” case, except that 
Grg_New_2 (instead of Grg) is added as a parent of Grg_New, lines 35-45 in Figure 6.4.  
 If the result of all of the comparisons between Srpss and all of the Grpsg is “not 
related”, four steps are performed: creating a new global role (Grg_New); adding the 
permission set of Srs to Grg_New; adding one or more parents to Grg_New utilizing the 
AddBasicParents algorithm in Figure 6.5; and mapping Grg_New with Srs, lines 48-52 
in Figure 6.4.  
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Finally, the IntegrateRBAC algorithm returns the resulted GRBAC, line 53 in Figure 6.4. 
Moreover, the AddBasicParents algorithm in Figure 6.5, that is utilized extensively by the 
IntegrateRBAC algorithm, is for adding a set of parent roles to a specific role, and receives a 
system role (Srs) and a new global role (Grg_New). Then, if Srs has no parents, the RootRole is 
added as a parent of Grg_New. However, if Srs has one or more parents, for each parent of Srs, the 
associated Grg is retrieved and added as a parent of Grg_New.  The Global-RBAC algorithm runs 
in polynomial time and has a worst-case complexity of O(m|P|), where m is the number of the 
participated systems and |P| is the total number of permissions from all of the systems RBAC’ 
policies. That is, the Global-RBAC algorithm visits each RBAC of each system once in which 
each permission is compared once.   
 
AddBasicParents 
Input: a system role (Srs), and a new global role (Grg_new) 
1. parentList=getParents(system RH, Srs) 
2. If(parentList==Null) 
3.     addParent(global RH , RootRole , Grg_new) 
4. Else  
5.     for each prnt ∈ parentList  
6.         gPrnt=getMappedGRole(global RH, prnt) 
7.         addParent(global RH , gPrnt, Grg_new) 
 
Figure 6.5. The AddBasicParents Algorithm 
     The second task of the global RBAC generation phase is Review and Correct Role Names. 
The main purpose of this task is to address two issues that the generated global RBAC policy may 
have as a result of using the algorithms in Figures 6.2 to 6.5. Issue 1 can arise when a system role 
and global role comparison is “overlap” can the automatically created new role name is not real. 
Issue 2 can arise when two different Global roles are generated with very similar names but with 
dramatically different permissions. Specifically, when the IntegrateRBAC algorithm compares 
each global role Grg to each system role Srs, in which the comparison result is “overlap”, a new 
global role named “NEW_ROLE” is created, clearly this is not a real role name (issue 1). 
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Moreover, when the IntegrateRBAC algorithm processes all of the comparison cases, except the 
“equivalent” case,  a new global role is created in which its name is copied from a system role Srs 
followed by a number X, where X is 1 plus the number of global roles that share a similar role 
name with Srs. Based on this, the IntegrateRBAC algorithm may generate a GRBAC that has two 
global roles that have a similar role name but are authorized to different sets of permissions;  this 
is not a desirable situation (issue 2). For example, assume that the GRBAC had a global role 
named “Patient” that is authorized to {(Patient, READ), (Patient, CREATE)}, and the 
IntegrateRBAC algorithm is about to create a new global role named “Patient” that is authorized 
to {(Observation, READ), (Observation, CREATE)}. In this case, the IntegrateRBAC algorithm 
will create a new global role named “Patient_2”, note that the number 2 here came from 1+ 
number of global roles that share a similar role name with “Patient” which is 1, and hence the 
GRBAC now has two global roles: “Patient” with permissions {(Patient, READ), (Patient, 
CREATE)}, and “Patient_2” with permissions {(Observation, READ), (Observation, CREATE)}. 
Our approach to solve not a real role name (issue 1) and two global roles with similar role name 
and radically different permissions (issue 2) is through the Review and Correct Role Names task, 
which has two steps. In the first step, the security engineer of FSICC reviews and suggests a name 
for each of two conflicting global roles, based on the authorized permission.   The two new roles 
are generated as described in issue 1 or 2 and a name list of corrected global roles in the form of 
(global role ID, corrected name) is also generated.   In the second step, the security engineer of 
FSICC sends the name list of corrected global roles to the Update Global Roles algorithm, as 
shown in Figure 6.6. The Update Global Roles algorithm iterates through the name list of 
corrected global roles and for each global role Grg_U in the list, the algorithm finds a global role 
Grg in GRBAC in which the id of both entries is equal. Then, the algorithm updates the name of 
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the global role Grg to be the name of the corrected global role Grg_U and finally returns the 
updated global RBAC policy GRBAC, see lines 1-4 of Figure 6.6.    
 
Update Global Roles 
Input: Global Roles List (GRL) & current Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
Output: Global RBAC (GRBAC) 
1. for each Grg_U ∈ GRL 
2.     find Grg ∈ GRBAC s.t. Grg.id = Grg_U.id 
3.     Grg.name = Grg_U.name  
4. return(GRBAC) 
 
Figure 6.6. The Update Global Roles Algorithm 
   
6.1.2 Global MAC Generation 
The Global MAC (GMAC) Generation phase is divided into two tasks in Figure 6.1: MAC 
Integration and Building Global MAC. The MAC Integration task is conducted based on the 
assumption that the five sensitivity levels, introduced in Section 4.4, (0-Public Information, 1-
Basic Sensitive Information, 2-Sensitive Information Summary, 3-Sensitive Information Details, 
and 4-Very Sensitive Information), are available to each system to classify their data and to assign 
each user a clearance. This can be useful in a complex domain such as healthcare all of the five 
levels are expected to be utilized due to the fact that healthcare data is complex, while in other 
domain such as education only a subset of the five sensitivity levels may be needed to classify 
data in that domain. However, although all of the participating systems are using the same set of 
sensitivity levels, two systems may have different semantic and usages of each sensitivity level. 
To overcome this issue, the presented sensitivity levels mapping step can be utilized. That is, this 
step is a human interaction between the security engineer of FSICC and the security engineers of 
participating systems to map each system sensitivity levels to the global sensitivity levels so that 
one set of sensitivity levels (the global sensitivity levels) can be utilized to: assign each service 
from each system a classification; and assign each user from each system a clearance, as we 
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explain in the second task below. Note that the semantics of the global sensitivity levels is based 
on the sensitivity levels of the first participating system. The output of this task is a sensitivity 
levels mapping list in which each entry in the list has the following format {a global sensitivity 
level, a system sensitivity level, system name}.   
Second, based on the sensitivity levels mapping list that is generated in the MAC Integration 
task, in the Building Global MAC task, the global MAC, GMAC, is generated utilizing users and 
services from each participating system in which users’ clearances and services’ classifications 
are assigned based on the global sensitivity levels in which the read/write properties of each user 
are remain unchanged. To perform this task, the security engineer of FSICC needs to send the 
sensitivity levels mapping list to the global MAC algorithm, see Figure 6.7, that utilizes a set of 
primitive functions in Table 6.2 to generate the global MAC policy. These primitive functions 
simplify the explanation of the global MAC algorithm. Table 6.2 has two columns: Function 
Signature, that has a name and a set of parameters for each function; and Description, that briefly 
explains each function. The global MAC algorithm takes as input: the sensitivity levels mapping 
list (SLML) and a set of m MAC policies from each participating system. The algorithm goes 
through each MAC policy of each system to add users and services of that MAC policy. First, in 
lines 2-6, the first loop iterates through each user of each system MAC policy to: find the global 
clearance that is associated with the user system’s clearance; retrieve the read and write 
properties; and, add the user into the global MAC policy as a global user. Second, in lines 7-9, the 
second loop iterates through each service of each system MAC policy to: find the global 
classification that is associated with the service system’s clearance; and, add the service into the 
global MAC policy as a global service. Third, the algorithm returns the GMAC. The global MAC 
algorithm runs in linear time and has a worst-case complexity of O(m), where m is the number of 
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the participated systems. That is, the global MAC algorithm visits each MAC of each system 
once. 
 
Global-MAC  
Input: set of m Systems MAC (SMAC1, SMAC2, .. , SMACm) and  
           sensitivity levels mapping list (SLML) 
Output: Global MAC (GMAC) 
1. for i ← 1 to m 
2.     for each user u in SMACi[Sus] 
3.         u.gCLR=globalClearance(SLML, u.CLR, SMACi.Name) 
4.         u.gRP= u.RP 
5.         u.gWP= u.WP 
6.         addUser(GMAC, u) 
7.     for each service s in SMACi[Sscs] 
8.         s.gCLS=globalClassification(SLML, s.CLS, SMACi.Name) 
9.         addService(GMAC, s) 
10. return(GMAC) 
 
Figure 6.7. The Global-MAC Algorithm 
 
Table 6.2. Primitive Functions Utilized by the Algorithms for Global MAC Generation 
Function signature Description 
globalClearance(SLML, u.CLR, SMACi.Name) Returns a global sensitivity level in SLML that is mapped to u.CLR of 
the SMACi.Name system 
globalClassification(SLML, s.CLS, SMACi.Name) Returns a global sensitivity level in SLML that is mapped to s.CLS of the 
SMACi.Name system 
addUser(GMAC, u) Adds the user u to the global MAC 
addService(GMAC, s) Adds the service s to the global MAC 
 
6.1.3 Global DAC Generation 
 The Global DAC (GDAC) Generation phase has one main task and one algorithm, DAC 
Integration in Figure 6.1. This task takes all of the DAC policies from each system and combines 
them into one global DAC policy. The DAC Integration task is performed through the global 
DAC algorithm, see Figure 6.8, that utilizes a set of primitive functions in Table 6.3 to generate 
the global DAC policy. These primitive functions simplify the explanation of the global DAC 
algorithm. Table 6.3 has two columns: Function Signature, that has a name and a set of 
parameters for each function; and Description, that briefly explains each function. The global 
DAC algorithm takes as input: the global RBAC, the global MAC, and a set of m DAC policies 
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from each participating system. The algorithm iterates through each DAC policy of each system 
to retrieve and add role and/or clearance delegations into the global DAC policy. First, in lines 2-
4, the first loop iterates through each role delegation rd of each system DAC policy to: find the 
global IDs of delegator user, delegated user, and delegated role using the getGobalIDs primitive 
function in Table 6.3; and, add a new role delegation into the global DAC policy using the 
retrieved global IDs. Next, in lines 5-7, the second loop iterates through each clearance delegation 
cd of each system DAC policy to: find the global IDs of delegator user, delegated user, and 
delegated clearance using the getGobalIDs primitive function; and, add a new clearance 
delegation into the global DAC policy using the retrieved global IDs. Finally, the algorithm 
returns the global DAC policy. The global DAC algorithm runs in polynomial time and has a 
worst-case complexity of O(m|d|), where m is the number of the participated systems and |d| is the 
total number of all of the role and clearance delegations from all of the systems DAC’s policies. 
That is, the global DAC algorithm visits each DAC of each system once. 
 
Global-DAC  
Input: set of m Systems DAC (SDAC1, SDAC2, .. , SDACm), 
           GMAC, and GRBAC 
Output: Global DAC (GDAC) 
1. for i ← 1 to m 
2.     for each role delegation rd in SDACi[Sdss] 
3.         global_rd =getGlobalIDs(rd) 
4.         addGlobalDel(GDAC, global_rd) 
5.     for each clearance delegation cd in SDACi[Sdss] 
6.         global_cd =getGlobalIDs(cd) 
7.         addGlobalDel (GDAC, global_cd) 
8. return(GDAC) 
 
Figure 6.8. The Global-DAC Algorithm 
 
Table 6.3. Primitive Functions Utilized by the Algorithms for Global DAC Generation 
Function signature Description 
getGlobalIDs(rd/cd) Returns global IDs of delegator, delegated, and role/sensitivity level 
addGlobalDel(GDAC, global_rd/cd) Adds a global role/clearance delegation to global DAC 
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6.1.4 Global Policies Combination 
 The results from the algorithms in Sections 6.1.1-6.1.3 serve as input to the combine global 
security policies instances phase that is divided into two tasks: combining the generated global 
RBAC instance, global MAC instance, and global DAC instance into one global security policy 
model instance which can be utilized by any interested clients to control their own services; and, 
controlling the way that data that global services can access are read and/or writtenn. The first 
task generates one policy document that concatenates all of the separate policies (i.e., GRBAC, 
GMAC, and GDAC) into one Global policy. The second task is intended to restrict clients at the 
data level. That is, while the global RBAC, MAC and DAC policies control who can access what 
set of global services, the controlling data task is intended to control what set of data, that global 
services can access and what each user can read/write. To control reading data actions, there are 
three read data access types that the security engineer of FSICC needs to choose from: 
1. Open to All (default): This read data access type is for the case where two or more 
users, from different systems, who are assigned to the same global role can read any data 
that the global role can retrieve. 
2. Open to Same System Users:   This read data access type is for the case where a user from 
system X who is assigned to a global role can only read a subset of data (only data 
from system X) that the global role can retrieve. 
3. Customize Data Read:  This read data access type is for the case in which for each global 
service, the security engineer of FSICC needs to specify which systems that their users can 
read the retrieved data.    
 Moreover, to control writing data actions, there is one write data access type:  
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1. Open to Same System Users: This write data access type is for the case where a user from 
system X who is assigned to a global role can only write data (only data from system X) 
that the global role can write. 
The output of the global policies combination step is a single unified security policy document 
that has global RBAC, global MAC, and global DAC coupled with one read data access type and 
one write data access type.  
 
6.2 HAPI FHIR Implementation and RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptors 
 
In this section, we demonstrate the realization of UCCACM of FSICC via a HAPI FHIR 
Implementation and the underlying RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptors. These are represented by the 
Security Enforcement via the Interceptors box of the GSP and GAPI Utilization and the Security 
Enforcement horizontal box in Figure 1.3 from Chapter 1, utilizing the healthcare scenario of 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. This leads to that the implementation of HAPI FHIR APIs and its 
server interceptor to support UCCACM checks with three different algorithms to support three 
different HAPI FHIR interceptors: RBAC interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor. 
This section involves the implementation of FHIR APIs and the customization and adaptation of 
the HAPI server interceptor to support UCCACM checks: Defns. 50 and 51 that determine if a 
service is authorized by a user/role pair; Defn. 55 that determines if a service is authorized by a 
user/clearance pair; and Defns. 57, 58, and 59 that determine if a service is authorized by a 
user/(delegated_role/delegated_service /delegated_clearance) pair (see Section 4.7). Three 
integration layers were implemented utilizing the HAPI FHIR reference library (HAPI 
community, 2016), namely: Clients, top of Figure 1.1  and Involved Parties component  of 
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Figure 1.2; Systems, bottom of Figure 1.1 and Involved Parties component  of Figure 1.2; and 
FSICC, the Global Services in the middle of Figure 1.1.  
The remainder of this section has five subsections. Section 6.2.1 provides a more detailed 
discussion than Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 on HAPI-FHIR Concepts and Background.  Using this 
as a basis, Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, and 6.2.4 review and explain, respectively, the RBAC 
interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor. Finally, Section 6.2.5 presents two usage 
scenarios utilizing the global security policy sample from Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, and 6.2.4.  
 
 
6.2.1 HAPI-FHIR Concepts and Background  
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the HAPI-FHIR library provides a general HAPI server 
interceptor (University Health Network, 2016) which is a programmatic approach that allows a 
developer to examine each incoming HTTP request to add useful features to the HAPI 
ResfulServer such as authentication, authorization, auditing, logging, etc. This is accomplished 
by implementing a number of methods: incomingRequestPreProcessed that is invoked before 
performing any action to the request; incomingRequestPostProcessed that is invoked after 
determining the request type by classifying the request; incomingRequestPreHandled which is 
invoked before sending the request to the Resource Provider; and, outgoingResponse which is 
invoked after the request is handled by the appropriate Resource Provider.  To implement each of 
these HAPI FHIR APIs, the HAPI RestfulServer and HAPI IResourceProvider classes were 
utilized. 
To support cloud computing capability 3 (Global Registration, Authentication, Authorization, 
and Service Discover for Consumers) of FSICC (see Section 3.2), the Clients Registry, Systems 
Registry, and Global Security Policy components in Figure 1.1 are developed as simple RESTful 
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APIs, which were implemented using the JAX-RS Java library (Hadley & Sandoz, 2009). The 
Clients Registry and Systems Registry components supports adding systems/clients HAPI-FHIR 
APIs and discovering corresponding FHIR APIs, while the Global Security Policy component 
enables the security engineer of FSICC to add/modify the global policy in Section 4.6 of Chapter 
4 (see Defn. 39 of UCCACM). In addition, the RBAC, MAC, and DAC interceptors presented in 
Section 4.7 of Chapter 4 (see Defns. 52, 56, and 60 of UCCACM respectively - middle of Figure 
1.1), were implemented by extending the HAPI InterceptorAdapter class to retrieve the global 
security policy from the Global Security Policy component and then extract the appropriate part 
(i.e., global RBAC for the RBAC Interceptor, global MAC for the MAC Interceptor, and global 
DAC for the DAC Interceptor) in order to performing enforcement check  on each access request 
at runtime. Although each of the RBAC interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor is 
designed to enforce the appropriate global security policy separately, the handleRequest method 
of the RestfulServer class works as a monitor that makes sure each part of the global security 
policy (RBAC, MAC, and DAC) is checked and enforced, via the three interceptors, before 
allowing any access request. 
 
6.2.2 RBAC Interceptor 
 
To support security requirement 2 of FSICC, Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, 
in this section, we present and explain the pseudo-code of the RBAC interceptor (see Defn. 52 of 
UCCACM) that is utilized at runtime to check security permissions (see Defns. 50 and 51 of 
UCCACM) of all of the calls to global services. To facilitate our explanation on the RBAC 
interceptor, Figure 6.9 presents a global RBAC policy example in JSON format that consists of: 
USERS, ROLES, RESOURCES, USER_ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS, 
ROLE_RESOURCE_AUTHORIZATIONS, ROLE_HIERARCHY, & ROLES_MAPPINGS. 
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Each user is represented by three fields: id, name, and system_name. Each role is represented by 
two fields: id and name. Each resource is represented by three fields: id, name, and method. Each 
user_role_assignment is represented by two fields: user_id and role_id. Each 
role_resource_authorization is represented by two fields: role_id and resource_id. Each 
role_hierarchy relationship is represented by two fields: role_id and parent_id. Finally, each 
role_mapping is represented by three fields: global_role_id, system_role_id, and system_name. 
As shown in Figure 6.9, the global SECURITY_POLICY is based on the healthcare scenario 
example from Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.  Notice that there are users, Defn. 14, defined for the 
systems OpenEMR and MyGoogle and the client app SMH.  Likewise, there are roles, Defn. 8, 
that include roles from OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, roles form the SMH client app, and 
new roles generated as during combining roles of OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, and SMH 
client app. The Global RBAC example, Figure 6.9, also has a set of resources, Defn. 2, that are 
created from OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, and SMH client app. The user role assignment 
set, Defn. 16, in the Global RBAC example is generated based on user role assignment sets from 
OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, and SMH client app. Similarly, the role resource 
authorization set, Defn. 13, in the Global RBAC example is compiled based on role resource 
authorization sets from OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, and SMH client app. The role 
hierarchy, Defn. 19, in the figure describes how roles in the Global RBAC example relate to each 
other using the parent-child relationship. Finally, the role mapping, Defn. 45, in the figure shows 
how each role in the Global RBAC example is mapped to the original role in OpenEMR or 
MyGoogle systems, or SMH client app.    
In the Global RBAC example, 5 different global users are shown, three from systems (John, 
Sara, ShareMyHealth) and two from clients (Sarah and Nasser). There have been 11 global roles 
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created, that have different origins: Physician with role id 1 was an original role of OpenEMR, 
Patient_2 with role id 4 was an original role of CT
2
, and RootRole with role id 3 was created as a 
parent role for all of the root roles from each system and client. Note that a root role in a system 
or client is the role that has no parents but has at least one child. The Global RBAC example also 
has 5 global resources: Observation with resource id 1 and GET method name; Patient with 
resource id 2 and PUT method name; Observation with resource id 3 and PUT method name; 
Patient with resource id 4 and GET method name; and Person with resource id 5 and PUT 
method name. Each user is assigned a role based on their ids. For example, the user with id 1 is 
assigned the role with id 1, the user with id 3 is assigned the role with id 4, and the user with id 5 
is assigned the role with id 10. Likewise, some roles are authorized to access some resources 
based on their id. For example, the role with id 6 is authorized to access the resource with id 1, 
the role with id 8 is authorized to access the resource with id 2, and the role with id 11 is 
authorized to access the resource with id 5. Based on the role hierarchy presented in Figure 6.9: 
the role with id 3 is a parent of roles with id 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11; the role with id 9 is a parent of 
roles with id 2, 4, and 10; and, the role with id 11 is a parent of roles with id 4, and 10. Finally, 
the role mapping in the Figure 6.9 shows that: the global role with id 1 is originated from the 
OpenEMR’s system role with id 1; the global role with id 4 is originated from the SMH’s client 
role with id 1; and, the global role with id 10 is originated from the MyGoogle’s system role with 
id 1.  
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Figure 6.9. A Global RBAC Policy Example in JSON 
 
Figure 6.10 presents the RBAC enforcement code realized within the 
incomingRequestPostProcessed method of the RBAC Interceptor as introduced in Section 6.2.1, 
which is an extension of the HAPI InterceptorAdapter class, which is registered in the 
RestfulServer class. This method starts by retrieving a secure Token (line 3) from a HTTP header 
(Authorization) of the request parameter, that is then passed to the extractUser function that can 
obtain the user credentials (user Id, see Defn. 15v2, and role Id, Defn. 9v2) from the Token (line 
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5). Next, the Global Policy (see Defn. 39), which is in JSON format, is retrieved by calling the 
Global Policy URL (line 7). The global RBAC policy example in Figure 6.9, is then extracted 
from the Global Policy through the extract_RBAC function (line 8). Then, the details of the 
requested resource (resource name, see Defn. 2, and HTTP method, see Defn. 4) are obtained 
from the requestDetails and request parameters, respectively, and passed along with the RBAC 
policy to the getResourceId function that returns the Id of the requested resource (lines 9 to 11). 
In line 14, the user credentials and the RBAC policy are passed to the checkCredentials function 
(see Defn. 50) to determine whether the user has the claimed role (see Defn. 9v2). If the check 
fails, the value of the accessDecision variable becomes false (lines 27-30). If the user passes the 
check, the associated role Id, the resource Id, and the RBAC policy are passed to the checkPerm 
function (see Defn. 51 - line 19) that returns true if the user with such a role can access the 
requested resource or false otherwise. Note that the checkPerm function works by retrieving a 
list of parent roles of the user role (passed) based on the global role hierarchy, part of RBAC 
policy, in which the user can access all of the resources that are authorized to the user role of any 
of its parents. Based on the result of the checkPerm function, the variable accessDecision is 
assigned (true or false) and returned as the result of the incomingRequestPostProcessed method 
(lines 20-25 and 31).  
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1  //Serves as Access Control Interceptor function
2  public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(requestDetails, request, response){
3 secToken = request.getHeader(“Authorization”);
4 // Retrieves the user id and role id of the current user
5 [userId,roleId] = extractUser(secToken);
6 // Retrieves the RBAC policy from the Global Policy URL
7 Global_Policy= HttpGet(Global_Policy_URL);
8 RBAC_Policy= extract_RBAC(Global_Policy);
9 resourceName = requestDetails.getResourceName();
10 httpMethod = request.getMethod();
11 resourceId = getResourceId(httpMethod, resourceName, RBAC_Policy);
12 // check if the user has the claimed role
13 verifiedUser=false;
14 verifiedUser=checkCredintals(userId, roleId, RBAC_Policy); // true or false
15 // check if the user (role) can access the requested resource and method
16 verifiedPerm=false;
17 accessDecision=false;
18 if(verifiedUser==true){
19 verifiedPerm=checkPerm(roleId, resourceId, RBAC_Policy); // true or false
20 if(verifiedPerm==true){
21 accessDecision=true; // allow user request
22 }
23 else {
24 accessDecision=false; // deny user request
25 }
26 }
27 else{
28 // Error Message: User could not be verified
29 accessDecision=false; // deny user request
30 }
31 Return accessDecision; 
32 }
 
Figure 6.10. RBAC Interceptor Pseudo Code. 
 
6.2.3 MAC Interceptor 
 
To support security requirement 4 of FSICC, Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC, 
in this section we present and explain the pseudo-code of the MAC interceptor (see Defn. 56 of 
UCCACM) that is utilized at runtime to check security permissions (see Defn. 55 of UCCACM) 
of all of the calls to global services. To facilitate our explanation, Figure 6.11 presents a global 
MAC policy example in JSON format that consists of three parts: USERS, RESOURCES, and 
SENSITIVITY_LEVELS_MAPPING_LIST. Each user is represented by six fields: id, name, 
clearance, read property, write property, and system_name. Each resource is represented by four 
fields: id, name, method, and classification. Finally, each sensitivity level mapping is represented 
by four fields: id, global_level, system_level, and system_name.  Notice that there are users, 
Defn. 10, defined for the systems OpenEMR and MyGoogle and the client app SMH. The Global 
MAC example, Figure 6.11, also has a set of resources, Defn. 2, that are created from OpenEMR 
and MyGoogle systems, and SMH client app. Finally, the sensitivity levels, Defn. 10, mapping 
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list in the figure shows how each sensitivity level in the Global MAC example is mapped to the 
original sensitivity level in OpenEMR or MyGoogle systems, or SMH client app.  
In the Global MAC example, 5 different global users are shown, three from systems (John, 
Sara, ShareMyHealth) and two from clients (Sarah and Nasser). Moreover, the user John has: 
level 3 or Sensitive Information Details clearance; SS read property; and SI write property. The 
user Sara has level 2 or Sensitive Information Summary clearance; SS read property; and SI 
write property. The user Sarah has level 4 or Very Sensitive Information clearance; SS read 
property; and SI write property. In addition, each of users Nasser and ShareMyHealth has level 3 
or Sensitive Information Details clearance; SS read property; and L* write property. There are 5 
global resources: Observation with resource id 1 and GET method name; Patient with resource id 
2 and PUT method name; Observation with resource id 3 and PUT method name; Patient with 
resource id 4 and GET method name; and Person with resource id 5 and PUT method name. 
Note that all resources have level 1 or Basic Sensitive Information clearance. Finally, the 
sensitivity levels mapping list in the Figure 6.11 shows that: global level 0 (Public Information) 
is mapped to level 0 (Public Information) of OpenEMR; SMH; and MyGoogle. Global level 3 
(Sensitive Information Details) is mapped to: level 3 (Sensitive Information Details) of 
OpenEMR; level 2 (Sensitive Information Summary) of SMH and level 4 (Very Sensitive 
Information) of MyGoogle. Global level 4 (Very Sensitive Information) is mapped to level 4 
(Very Sensitive Information) of OpenEMR and SMH but is not mapped to any level of 
MyGoogle. 
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Figure 6.11. A Global MAC Policy Example in JSON 
 
Figure 6.12 has the MAC enforcement code realized within the 
incomingRequestPostProcessed method of the MAC Interceptor, which is an extension of the 
HAPI InterceptorAdapter class, which is registered in the RestfulServer class. This method starts 
by retrieving a secure Token (line 3) from a HTTP header (Authorization) of the request 
parameter, that is passed to the extractUser function that can obtain the user credentials (user Id, 
see Defn. 15v3) from the Token (line 5). Then, the Global Policy (see Defn. 39), which is in the 
JSON format, is retrieved by calling the Global Policy URL (line 7). The MAC policy, see the 
global MAC policy example in Figure 6.11, is then extracted from the Global Policy through the 
extract_MAC function (line 8).  Next, in line 10, the user Id and MAC policy are passed to the 
getUserDetails function that returns the user details (i.e., user clearance, Read property, and 
Write property). Then, the details of the requested resource (resource name, see Defn. 2, and 
HTTP method, see Defn. 4) are obtained from the requestDetails and request parameters, 
respectively, and passes along with the MAC policy to the getResourceId function that returns 
174 
 
the Id of the requested resource (lines 11 to 13). In line 15, the resource Id and MAC policy are 
passed to the getResourceCLS function to find the resource classification level. Then, using the 
user details and the requested resource details, the accessDecision variable is set to true, if the 
user clearance satisfies the user’s predefined read or write properties on the requested resource 
and method, or false, otherwise (lines 17 to 41). Finally, in line 42, the value of the 
accessDecision variable is returned as the result of the incomingRequestPostProcessed method.  
1  //Serves as Access Control Interceptor function
2  public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(requestDetails, request, response){
3 secToken = request.getHeader(“Authorization”);
4 // Retrieves the user id of the current user
5 userId = extractUser(secToken);
6 // Retrieves the MAC policy from the Global Policy URL
7 Global_Policy= HttpGet(Global_Policy_URL);
8 MAC_Policy= extract_MAC(Global_Policy);
9 // Retrieves the Clearance level, Read, and Write properties of the current user
10 [UserCLR, RP, WP] = getUserDetails(userId , MAC_Policy);
11 resourceName = requestDetails.getResourceName();
12 httpMethod = request.getMethod();
13 resourceId = getResourceId(httpMethod, resourceName, MAC_Policy);
14 // Retrieves the classification level of the requested resource
15 ResourceCLS = getResourceCLS(resourceId , MAC_Policy);
16 // check if user with a CLR, Read, & Write properties can access requested resource and method
17 accessDecision=false;
18 if(httpMethod==“GET”){
19 if(RP==“SS”){
20 if(UserCLR < ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false; }
21 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
22 }
23 else if(RP==“SSR”) {
24 if(UserCLR != ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
25 else{   accessDecision=true;   }   
26 }
27 }
28 elseif(httpMethod==“POST” || httpMethod==“PUT” || httpMethod==“DELETE”){
29 if(RP==“SI”){
30 if(UserCLR < ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
31 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
32 }
33 else if(RP==“LS”) {
34 if(UserCLR > ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
35 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
36 }
37 else if(RP==“SSW”) {
38 if(UserCLR != ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
39 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
40 }
41 }
42 Return accessDecision; 
43 }
 
Figure 6.12. MAC Interceptor Pseudo Code. 
 
6.2.4 DAC Interceptor 
 
To support security requirement 3 of FSICC, Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using 
DAC, in this section, we present and explain the pseudo-code of the DAC interceptor (see Defn. 
60 of UCCACM) that is utilized at runtime to check security permissions (see Defns. 57, 58, and 
59 of UCCACM) of all of the calls to global services. To facilitate the explanation, Figure 6.13 
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presents a global DAC policy example in JSON format that consists of one main part, 
PERMISSION_DELEGATION, that can have role delegation, or clearance delegation. Each role 
delegation is represented by three fields: delegator_id, delegated_id, and role_id. Each clearance 
delegation is represented by three fields: delegator_id, delegated_id, and clearance. Notice that 
the role delegation set, Defn. 25, in Figure 6.13 is based on a set of role delegations from 
OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems, and SMH client app. Likewise, the clearance delegation set, 
Defn. 24, in the figure is based on a set of clearance delegations from OpenEMR and MyGoogle 
systems, and SMH client app. For example, the first permission delegation in the Global DAC 
example, is a role delegation in which the user with id 2, see Figure 6.9, passed on the 
authorization of the role (Patient) with id 2 to the user with id 1. 
  
 
Figure 6.13. A Global DAC Policy Example in JSON 
 
Figure 6.14 has the DAC enforcement code realized within the 
incomingRequestPostProcessed method of the DAC Interceptor, which is an extension of the 
HAPI InterceptorAdapter class, which is registered in the RestfulServer class. Basically, the 
DAC enforcement code is a combination of both the RBAC enforcement code, lines 3-11 and 
line 19, and the MAC enforcement code, lines 21-22, 24-25, and 27-50, with role delegation and 
clearance delegation checks. This method starts by retrieving a secure Token from a HTTP 
header (Authorization) of the request parameter, that is passed to the extractUser function that 
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can obtain the user credentials (i.e., user Id, see Defn. 15v2, and role Id, see Defn. 9v2) from the 
Token (line 4).  Then, the Global Policy (see Defn. 39), which is in JSON format, is retrieved by 
calling the Global Policy URL (line 5). The global RBAC policy example in Figure 6.9 is then 
extracted from the Global Policy through the extract_RBAC function (line 6). Next, the details of 
the requested resource (resource name, see Defn. 2, and HTTP method, see Defn. 4) are obtained 
from the requestDetails and request parameters, respectively, and are passed along with the 
RBAC policy to the getResourceId function that returns the Id of the requested resource (lines 7 
to 9). In line 11, the user credentials and the RBAC policy are passed to the checkCredentials 
function (see Defn. 50) to determine whether the user has the claimed role (see Defn. 9v2). Then, 
the global DAC policy example in Figure 6.13 is extracted from the Global Policy through the 
extract_DAC function (line 12). If the checkCredentials check fails, another check (lines 13-15) 
is performed to determine whether such a role is delegated to the current user by another user. 
This is done by passing the user Id, the claimed role Id, and the DAC policy to the 
checkRoleDelegation function that returns true if the entry delegated_id(user Id)/claimed role 
exists or false otherwise to the verifiedRoleDelegation variable.  
If both checks fail (line 18), the value of the accessDecision variable becomes false (lines 57-
59). However, if the user passed at least one of these checks, the associated role Id, the resource 
Id, and the RBAC policy are passed to the checkPerm function (see Defn. 51 - line 19) that 
returns true if the user with such role (or delegated role) can access the requested resource or 
false otherwise. Note that the checkPerm function first retrieves a list of parent roles of the user 
role (passed) based on the global role hierarchy, part of RBAC policy, in which the user can 
access all of the resources that are authorized to the user role of any of its parents. If the 
checkPerm function returns false, then the variable accessDecision is set to false (lines 53-54). 
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However, if the checkPerm function returns true, then the global MAC policy example in Figure 
6.11 is extracted from the Global Policy through the extract_MAC function (line 21). Then, in 
line 22, the user Id and MAC policy are passed to the getUserDetails function that returns the 
user details (i.e., user clearance, Read property, and Write property). Next, a user clearances list 
is created to include the user clearance, from the previous step, and a set of delegated clearances 
to the current user that is obtained from the getUserDelegatedCLR function that takes as inputs 
the user id and the DAC policy (line 23). Then, in line 24, the resource Id and MAC policy are 
passed to the getResourceCLS function to find the resource classification level. After that, for 
each user clearance in the user clearances list, the following procedure is performed: utilizing the 
user details and the requested resource details the accessDecision variable is set to true if the user 
clearance satisfies the user’s predefined read or write properties on the requested resource and 
method, or false, otherwise (lines 26 to 51). Finally, in line 61, the value of the accessDecision 
variable is returned as the result of the incomingRequestPostProcessed method.  
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1  //Serves as Access Control Interceptor function
2  public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(requestDetails, request, response){
3 secToken = request.getHeader(“Authorization”);
4 [userId,roleId] = extractUser(secToken);
5 Global_Policy= HttpGet(Global_Policy_URL);
6 RBAC_Policy= extract_RBAC(Global_Policy);
7 resourceName = requestDetails.getResourceName();
8 httpMethod = request.getMethod();
9 resourceId = getResourceId(httpMethod, resourceName, RBAC_Policy);
10 verifiedUser=false;
11 verifiedUser=checkCredintals(userId, roleId, RBAC_Policy); // true or false
12 DAC_Policy= extract_DAC(Global_Policy);
13 if(verifiedUser==false){
14 verifiedRoleDelegation=checkRoleDelegation (userId, roleId, DAC_Policy); // true or false
15 }
16 verifiedPerm=false;
17 accessDecision=false;
18 if(verifiedUser==true || verifiedRoleDelegation==true){
19 verifiedPerm=checkPerm(roleId, resourceId, RBAC_Policy); // true or false
20 if(verifiedPerm==true){
21 MAC_Policy= extract_MAC(Global_Policy);
22 [UserCLR, RP, WP] = getUserDetails(userId , MAC_Policy);
23 UserCLRList = getUserDelegatedCLR(userId , DAC_Policy) + UserCLR;
24 ResourceCLS = getResourceCLS(resourceId , MAC_Policy);
25 accessDecision=false;
26 for each UserCLR in UserCLRList {
27 if(httpMethod==“GET”){
28 if(RP==“SS”){
29 if(UserCLR < ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
30 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
31 }
32 else if(RP==“SSR”) {
33 if(UserCLR != ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
34 else{   accessDecision=true;   }   
35 }
36 }
37 else if(httpMethod==“POST” || httpMethod==“PUT” || httpMethod==“DELETE”){
38 if(RP==“SI”){
39 if(UserCLR < ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
40 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
41 }
42 else if(RP==“LS”) {
43 if(UserCLR > ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
44 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
45 }
46 else if(RP==“SSW”) {
47 if(UserCLR != ResourceCLS ){   accessDecision=false;   }
48 else{   accessDecision=true;   }
49 }
50 }
51 }
52 }
53 else {
54 accessDecision=false; // deny user request
55 }
56 }
57 else{
58 // Error Message: User could not be verified
59 accessDecision=false; // deny user request
60 }
61 Return accessDecision; 
62 }
 
Figure 6.14. DAC Interceptor Pseudo Code. 
 
6.2.5 Two Usage Scenarios 
 
This section presents two access scenarios, to access global services of FSICC, of usage that 
can be initiated by ShareMyHealth and MyGoogle, from Section 2.4, in order to demonstrate the 
way that the three interceptors operate. The FSICC allows or rejects requests from 
ShareMyHealth and MyGoogle to access the global services based on the enforcement codes that 
are generated by: the RBAC Interceptor (Figure 6.10), the MAC Interceptor (Figure 6.12), and 
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the DAC Interceptor (Figure 6.14) that use the defined global security policy (see Defn. 39 - 
Figures 6.9 with global RBAC, 6.11 with global MAC, and 6.13 with global DAC). That is, 
FSICC receives each request which is forwarded to all three interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and 
DAC in which each interceptor retrieves the appropriate security policy and returns a reject or 
allow decision to FSICC based on that security policy. Note that the two requests were made 
with the Postman tool (Postman, 2013) instead of directly made them from ShareMyHealth and 
MyGoogle in order to present a clear view of the response the requests can have in different 
scenarios. In the first scenario, Figure 6.15, FSICC rejects a request from the user (Sarah) via the 
ShareMyHealth (SMH) app to access the global service (PUT Encounter). This is since the user 
(SSincs) with user Id (3) is assigned a role (Patient_2) with role Id (4) that is authorized to access 
global services 1-5, see global RBAC in Figure 6.9 what does not have access to the global 
service (PUT Encounter). Also, the access will also fail since the user (Sarah) has no delegated 
roles, see global DAC in Figure 6.13. 
 
 
Figure 6.15. Access Scenario One (Rejected). 
 
In the second scenario, Figure 6.16, the request from the user (ShareMyHealth) with id (5) via 
MyGoogle to access the global service (GET Patient), would be allowed by FSICC. This is since 
the user (ShareMyHealth) with user Id (5) is assigned a role (SMH) with role Id (10) that is 
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authorized to access global services 1-5 that includes (GET Patient), as was shown in the global 
RBAC in Figure 6.9. in summary, the three interceptors are utilized in conjunction to 
dynamically check each time a user tries to invoke a global Service. All of the conditions must 
be satisfied in terms of permissions against the global RBAC, MAC or DAC in order for the 
service to be invoked.   
 
 
Figure 6.16. Access Scenario Two (Allowed). 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3. Related work in Security Policy Integration and Enforcement 
 
In this section, we present related work in two areas: security policy integration and security 
policies enforcement on FHIR API. For the first area, we review five related works on security 
policy integration comparing and contrasting their work to our security policy integration 
approach. The first effort (Shafiq, B, Joshi, B, Bertino, E, & Ghafoor, A, 2005) proposed a set of 
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mapping algorithms that can be utilized to combine RBAC policies from different sources into a 
conflict-free global policy. This work is similar to our RBAC integration approach by providing 
an RBAC integration solution.  However, this work assumes that all of the RBAC policies from 
different systems are defined and stored using the same format which is an unrealistic assumption, 
while in our approach we require each system to provide an RBAC policy using a specific format 
in JSON.  
The second effort (Gouglidis, A, Ioannis, M, & Vincent, C, 2014) extended NIST-RBAC 
to define a checking technique that can be utilized as a management service/tool for the 
verification of multi-domain cloud policies. This technique is capable of detecting whether a user 
with a role from one domain can access an object from another domain. This effort, unlike our 
approach, does not define a complete global RBAC policy for all of the integrated systems and 
performs an on-the-fly authorization query for every object access request that generates an 
undesirable overhead.  
The third effort (Bonatti, P, Maria, L, & Subrahmanian, V, 1997) focused on the issue of 
integrating sensitivity levels of different systems under the assumption that one sensitivity level in 
one system may have a different semantic interpretation of the same sensitivity level in another 
system. To solve this issue, this effort proposed to map each sensitivity level of each system with 
a sensitivity level that has similar semantics but not the same name in another system. This effort 
is similar to our MAC integration approach in the way they map a number of sensitivity levels of 
different systems which is similar to our mapping of classification levels. However, the way users 
and objects of each system assigned clearance and classification, respectively, in the presence of 
the global sensitivity levels, is not clearly articulated.  
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The fourth effort (Dawson, S, Shelly, Q, & Pierangela, S, 2000) proposed an approach for 
MAC-based polices integration by introducing two main concepts: the wrapper and the mediator. 
A wrapper is a mechanism that is associated with each system to provide a uniform data interface 
and a mapping between the system’s sensitivity levels and sensitivity levels of other systems in 
order to generate a global MAC policy. The mediator is an enforcement technique that processes 
global access requests based on the generated global MAC policy. This work is similar to our 
MAC integration approach as they provide a MAC integration solution and also provide a 
technique to enforce the global MAC policy. However, their work assumes that each user of each 
system can only be assigned to one specific read property (SS) and one specific write property 
(SI), unlike our approach where any user may be assigned to any of the read properties (SS, S* 
read) and to any of the write properties (SI, L*, S* write). 
The last effort (Joshi, BD & Elisa, B, 2006) proposed a solution for defining RBAC-based 
delegation in an integrated environment. Specifically, in this work a delegation framework is 
proposed that provides two types of delegation, role delegation and permissions (sub-set of 
permissions of a role) delegation, that can be user-to-user, user-to-role, role-to-role or role-to-user. 
This work is similar to our DAC integration approach as they also provide a DAC integration 
solution. However, their work is limited to a specific type of RBAC (i.e., GTRBAC), unlike our 
approach for RBAC-based delegation. Also, their work does not support the integration of MAC-
based delegation in which our approach provides it. Note that all of the above five efforts try to 
integrate policies that are defined against objects (traditional) and just target one access control 
model, while our security policy integration approach provides solutions to integrate policies 
which are defined against services that access objects in which such policies can be any 
combination of RBAC, MAC, and DAC.  
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    For the second area, we review four related works on the topic of security enforcement that 
utilizes FHIR. The first effort, SMART on FHIR (SMART on FHIR, 2015), proposed a standard 
for authentication and authorization that controls Apps access to FHIR resources based on the 
OAuth2 authentication protocol (Cook, 2012). Each App is given a cryptographic Token that has 
a number of claims. A claim can be a scope (each App may have one or more scopes) or patient 
ID, and the information in the Token is encrypted using the JWT library (JWT Team, 2012).  A 
scope, such as (scope=user/Patient.read), defines what type of FHIR API an App can access 
which allows  an App to retrieve all of the Patient data and  can be further restricted to only return 
the Patient record that matches the patient ID in the App's Token. This effort is similar to our 
approach for enforcing security policies since they support security interceptors that perform 
authentication and authorization against each request to access services. However, the 
authorization interceptor presented by this effort is different from our approach since the 
authorization interceptor cannot be used to enforce advanced security policies to control access to 
FHIR resources using roles (RBAC), sensitivity levels (MAC), and roles/sensitivity levels 
delegations (DAC). 
     The second effort, Vonk (Simplifier.net, 2018), is an extension of the access control approach 
of SMART on FHIR, an implementation of SMART on FHIR standard in which the default 
processes for Apps authentication and authorization is based on SMART on FHIR standard. 
However, in Vonk, the authentication implementation can be changed from the default OAuth2 
authentication protocol to any other authentication implementations and the authorization process 
of SMART on FHIR can be replaced with any other authorization implementations. This effort is 
similar to our approach for enforcing security policies as their approach provide authentication 
and authorization capabilities. However, the authorization process of this effort is different from 
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our approach as it does not support advanced security requirements to control access to FHIR 
resources using roles (RBAC), sensitivity levels (MAC), and roles/sensitivity levels delegations 
(DAC).    
The third effort, SecFHIR (Altamimi, 2016), proposed a security standard that may be adopted 
to extend the FHIR standard with access control specifications. Specifically, SecFHIR suggested 
to define permissions on FHIR resources as an XML schema so that the defined XML schema can 
be integrated into the XML schemas of different FHIR resources. In this way, the permissions 
defined in each FHIR resource’s XML schemas can be utilized by any access control mechanism 
to enforce such permissions. Clearly this approach is different from our approach since SecFHIR 
does not provide any authentication capabilities that can be utilized to verify the identity of Apps. 
Also, SecFHIR doesn’t provide any mechanisms to support enforcing security policies on Apps’ 
access requests for important access control models such as RBAC, MAC, and DAC.  
Finally, the fourth effort, HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI community, 2017), 
provides two security mechanisms: one to verify Apps identity using an authentication 
interceptor; and another one to enforce security policies using the rule-based access control model 
using the authorization interceptor. The authentication interceptor utilizes the HTTP Basic Auth 
protocol for Apps authentication purposes. In addition, the rule-based access control model 
defines a set of rules within the interceptor and utilizes if/else statements in order to 
whitelist/blacklist Apps access requests to FHIR resources. This approach is similar to our 
approach for enforcing security policies as their approach provides authentication and 
authorization capabilities, via the authentication and authorization interceptors. However, the 
authorization interceptor of their approach is different from our approach as they do not support 
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advanced security requirements to control access to FHIR resources using roles (RBAC), 
sensitivity levels (MAC), and roles/sensitivity levels delegations (DAC).    
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Chapter 7 
SOA-based Security Engineering for FSICC 
 
 
This chapter presents and explains an SOA-based security engineering and global security policy 
generation process for FSICC that involves all of the horizontal boxes in Figure 1.3 that contain 
the main research foci of this dissertation: Architectural Blueprints as reviewed in Chapter 5; 
Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model as presented in Chapter 4; Access Control 
Models in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 and Section 2.2 of Chapter 2; and, GSP  (Global Security 
Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation  and Global Security Policy and Global 
API Utilization and Security Enforcement in Chapter 6. GSP  (Global Security Policy) Generation 
and GAPI (Global API) Generation is for generating the security policy from multiple systems to 
make global APIs available to clients what’s showing in the lower portion of Figure 1.2 of 
Chapter 1. Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and Security Enforcement that 
utilizes security interceptors that was shown in the bottom of Figure 1.2 to allow/deny clients 
from access global services of FSICC.  A SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) for 
FSICC is intended to assist security engineers of systems and clients and security engineers of 
FSICC with a structured process to define and maintain secure interoperable services for 
RBAC, MAC, and DAC.  
     To support SSEP, the Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model (UCCACM), from 
Chapter 4, has a set of definitions for global security policy generation and utilization (see 
Defns. 41-48 of Section 4.6). This set of definitions ensure that such global security policy can 
control access to a set of global services that are generated using one or more of integration 
architecture blueprints: Basic Architecture, Alternative Architecture, or Radical Architecture 
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from Chapter 5. Based on this, this chapter introduces and discusses a SOA-based security 
engineering and global security policy generation process for FSICC; this addresses Contribution 
EC-C: Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP from Section 1.5, this is 
represented by the left vertical box SOA-BASED SECURITY ENGINEERING in Figure 1.3 from 
Chapter 1 that spans all of the five horizontal boxes: Architectural Blueprints, Unified Cloud 
Computing Access Control Model, Access Control Models, Global Security Policy and Global 
API Generation, and Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and Security 
Enforcement. 
In the remainder of this chapter, a SOA-based security engineering and global security policy 
generation process for FSICC is presented in three main sections. In Section 7.1,   a Pre-Process 
Step briefly describes what each system and client need to do before joining the FSICC. In 
Section 7.2, a SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) for FSICC is presented that is 
intended to assist security engineers of systems and clients and security engineers of FSICC with 
a structured process to define and maintain secure interoperable services for RBAC, MAC, and 
DAC. In Section 7.3, a complete and detailed example that illustrates the SOA-based security 
engineering process of Section 7.2 is provided to demonstrate the phases and tasks of SSEP 
coupled with security policy integration algorithms of Section 6.2 of Chapter 6 that can be utilized 
to establish and utilize security for interoperable services via FSICC.  
 
7.1. A Pre-Process Step for Joining FSICC 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one key feature of the FSICC is to enable multiple systems to 
provide their services, which can be web-based, cloud-based, or traditional API, via registering 
into FSICC. This was introduced in Section 3.2 as cloud computing capability 1: Local Service 
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Registration and Mapping to Global Services. These web-based, cloud-based, or traditional API 
that are provided by a system are transitioned to a set of equivalent and unified into a set of global 
services, via FSICC, by utilizing cloud computing capability 1. However, as discussed in Chapter 
5, each system that provides services needs to perform a pre-process step before joining the 
FSICC which is creating an integration layer utilizing a standard integration framework 
(IFMWK), such as FHIR API for the healthcare domain, which is a standard API that converts 
system’s data from/to the integration layer format. Such an integration layer is specified and 
utilized by the FCICC. To support this step, Section 5.3 provided a specific set of instructions 
using the HIT IFMWK Blueprint that a system may utilize to build its own integration layer.   
From a client perspective, FSICC   provides the unified Global Services so that clients can 
easily create application functionality without the need to consider heterogeneous types of 
systems’ services. This was introduced in Section 3.2 as cloud computing capability 3: Global 
registration, authentication, authorization, and service discover for Consumers. These mobile, 
web, or desktop client apps then can be developed using a subset of the available unified global 
services, via FSICC, by utilizing cloud computing capability 3. However, as discussed in Chapter 
5, each client that is interested in utilizing such global services may need to perform a pre-process 
step before joining the FSICC to   create an integration layer which is a standard API that converts 
a client’s data from/to the integration layer format. To support this step, Section 5.3 provided 
three sets of instructions via three architectural blueprint options that a client may utilize to build 
its own integration layer: the Basic Architecture Blueprint, the Alternative Architecture Blueprint, 
and the Radical Architecture Blueprint). 
 
7.2. An SOA-based Security Engineering Process (SSEP) for FSICC  
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The SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) is intended to help security engineers of 
systems and clients, on one side, and the security engineer of FSICC, on the other side, to 
establish and maintain secure interoperable services via RBAC, MAC, and DAC per security 
requirements 2, 4, and 3 of Section 3.1, respectively, as shown in Figure 7.1. This occurs via four 
main phases (i.e., 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b) in which the phases 2.a, and 2.b are further explained in 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. This allows SSEP to enable the security engineer: of each 
participating system to integrate its services into FSICC (see cloud computing capability 1 of 
Section 3.2) in which the system’s security policy is enforced; of each interested client to enable 
the client’s users to leverage a set of global services and global security policy (see cloud 
computing capability 3 of Section 3.2); and of the FSICC to integrate all of the security policies 
from all of systems that are to be defined against the global services (see cloud computing 
capability 2 of Section 3.2) and to control the way that interested clients utilize the services. In the 
remainder of this section, we explore SSEP in Figure 7.1, along with Figures 7.2 and 7.3, utilizing 
Figure 6.1 from Chapter 6 that showed the architecture for global security policy generation and 
utilization, and explaining the tasks for security engineers of systems, clients, and FSICC.  
To begin, the SSEP, in Figure 7.1, is divided into four phases. In Section 7.2.1, we present the 
Constructing Systems Requests phase, labeled (1.a) in the top left of Figure 7.1, that needs to be 
performed by security engineers of systems. In Section 7.2.2, we describe the Constructing 
Clients Requests phase, labeled (1.b) in the top right of Figure 7.1, that needs to be performed by 
security engineers of clients. In Section 7.2.3, we present the Registering Requests Processing 
phase, labeled (2.a) in the bottom left of Figure 7.1, that needs to be performed by the security 
engineers of FSICC in which the specific tasks of this phase are depicted in Figure 7.2. In Section 
7.2.4, we discuss the Usage Requests Processing phase, labeled (2.b) in the bottom right of Figure 
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7.1, that needs to be performed by the security engineers of FSICC in which the specific tasks of 
this phase are depicted in Figure 7.3. Note that in the rest of this section, the term “system” 
indicates a pure system, mixed system (services registering part) or mixed client (services 
registering part), and the term “client” indicates a pure client, mixed client (services utilization 
part) or mixed systems (services utilization part). 
     
7.2.1 Constructing Systems Requests Phase  
The Constructing Systems Requests phase labeled (1.a)   in Figure 7.1 allows security 
engineers of pure or mixed systems to provide their services via FSICC and for mixed systems to 
request services.  From a registering perspective, security engineers of both pure and mixed 
systems can select to Register System’s Integration Layer and Security Policy, labeled (1.a.1) 
which utilizes the cloud computing capabilities of FSICC to provide the system’s integration layer 
and security policy that enables FSICC to recognize and integrate: a system’s integration layer 
with the global services; and, a system’s security policy with the global security policy. This is 
indicated by the dashed line from the Constructing Systems Requests box to the Registering 
Requests Processing box labeled (2.a) at the bottom left of Figure 7.1. As part of this process, the 
system’s integration layer (e.g., FHIR for HITs) can be designed by utilizing the HIT IFMWK 
Blueprint from Section 5.3, as described in Section 7.1. In addition, the system’s security policy is 
defined by the system’s security engineer to control access to the system’s integration layer via 
one or more access control models such as RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC that specify which services 
(of the system’s integration layer) each user in that system may access. This is indicated by the 
RBAC Integration and Review & Correct Role Names, the MAC Integration and Building Global 
MAC, and the DAC Integration boxes of pure and mixed systems at the bottom of Figure 6.1 
from Chapter 6. 
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From a usage perspective, security engineers of mixed systems can select to Utilize GSP & 
GAPI labeled (1.a.3) and since they are interested in using the Global Services in order to 
accomplish some of the functionalities, they need to go through a number of tasks based on the 
answers to two questions: 
 Question 1: Does the mixed system need to utilize a subset of the global services (i.e., 
global API) and a subset of the global security policies, labeled (1.a.q1)? If yes, then 
ask Question 2. 
 Question 2: Does the mixed system need to customize a subset of the global security 
policies, labeled (1.a.q2)? That is, a security engineer of the system has found a global 
security policy that has too few/many permissions than needed, thereby needing a 
customization. 
 If the answer to Question 2 was yes, then the security engineer of the system 
would need to have human intervention with the security engineer of FSICC, 
labeled (1.a.2), to customize a subset of the global security policy in which 
both parties discuss and agree about adding a new customized security policy, 
the global security policy is updated after this task, or to use an existing 
security policy.  
 If the answer to Question 2 was no, the security engineer of the system would 
use some capabilities of FSICC to send a global security policy and global 
services utilization request to FSICC, labeled (1.a.3) as indicated by the solid 
line from the Constructing Systems Requests box to the Usage Requests 
Processing box at the bottom of Figure 7.1.   
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Figure 7.1. A High-Level View of SOA-Based Security Engineering Process for FSICC. 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Constructing Clients Requests Phase 
 
 
The Constructing Clients Requests phase labeled (1.b) in Figure 7.1 allows security engineers 
of mixed clients to provide their services via FSICC and for pure and mixed clients to request 
services. From a registering perspective, security engineers of mixed clients can select to Register 
System’s Integration Layer and Security Policy, labeled (1.b.1) which utilizes the cloud 
computing capabilities of FSICC to provide the client’s integration layer and security policy that 
enables FSICC to recognize and integrate: a system’s integration layer with the global services; 
and, a system’s security policy with the global security policy. This is indicated by the dashed line 
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from the Constructing Clients Requests box to the Registering Requests Processing box at the 
bottom of Figure 7.1. As part of this process, the client’s integration layer (e.g., FHIR for HITs) 
can be designed by utilizing the HIT IFMWK Blueprint from Section 5.3, as described in Section 
7.1.  Moreover, the client’s integration layer (e.g., FHIR for HITs) can be designed by utilizing 
one of the three integration options: Basic Architecture, Alternative Architecture, or Radical 
Architecture as discussed in Section 5.2, as described in Section 7.1. In addition, the client’s 
security policy is defined by the client’s security engineer to control access to the client’s 
integration layer via one or more access control models such as RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC that 
specify which services (of the client’s integration layer) each user in that client may access, this is 
indicated by the RBAC Integration and Review & Correct Role Names, the MAC Integration and 
Building Global MAC, and the DAC Integration boxes of mixed clients at the top of Figure 6.1.  
From a usage perspective, security engineers of pure and mixed clients that are interested in 
utilizing the FSICC’s global services and global security policy in order to accomplish some of 
the functionalities, need to go through a number of tasks based on the answers to three questions.  
 Question 1: Does the client have a defined security policy that the client’s security 
engineer prefers to use instead of the global security policy (1.b.q1)?  
 If the answer to Question 1 was yes, then the security engineer of the client has 
human intervention with the security engineer of FSICC to map the client’s 
security policy to the global security policy labeled (1.b.2) in which both parties 
discuss and agree about a way to map the client’s security policy to the global 
security policy which is updated after this task.  
 If the answer to Question 1 was no, the client’s security engineer needs to answer 
Question 2.  
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 Question 2: Does the client need to utilize a subset of the global services (i.e., global 
API) and a subset of the global security policies, labeled (1.b.q2)? If the answer to 
Question 2 was no, the client’s security engineer needs to answer Question 3.  
 Question 3: Does the client need to customize a subset of the global security policies, 
labeled (1.b.q3)? That is, a security engineer of a client has found a global security 
policy that has too few/many permissions than needed, thereby needing a 
customization. 
 If the answer to Question 3 was yes, then the security engineer of the client would 
need to have human intervention with the security engineer of FSICC to customize 
a subset of the global security policy, labeled (1.b.3), in which both parties discuss 
and agree about adding a new customized security policy, the global security 
policy is updated after this task, or to use an existing security policy. 
 If the answer to Question 3 was no, the security engineer of the client would use 
some capabilities of FSICC to send a global security policy and global services 
utilization request to FSICC, labeled (1.b.4) indicated by the solid line from the 
Constructing Clients Requests box to the Usage Requests Processing box at the 
bottom of Figure 7.1.  
 
7.2.3 Registering Requests Processing Phase 
 
The Registering Requests Processing phase labeled (2.a) in Figure 7.1 needs to be performed 
by the security engineers of FSICC to achieve two main objectives. First, to build the global 
services, which is primarily a human-based process, based on the integration layer of each system. 
Second, to construct the global security policy, which is mostly an algorithm-based process, based 
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on security policy of each system. The Registering Requests Processing phase has three tasks and 
executed for each system that is being integrated into the global policy:  
 Task 1: The first task is to configure the global services (global API), labeled (2.a.1) at 
the top of Figure 7.2, in which the FSICC’s security engineer is required to configure 
each global service of the FSICC so that CRUD methods of the services can send and 
receive data to/from each system’s integration layers. This is based on integration 
layers provided by different systems in the phases 1.a and 1.b of Figure 7.1.  
 Task 2:  In the second task, the FSICC’s security engineer has three task options to 
perform RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC integration on each system, which may have no 
access control, only one access control, any combination of two access controls, or all 
three access controls:  
 The first task option, labeled (2.a.2) in Figure 7.2, is to send each RBAC policy of 
each system to the RBAC integration algorithm. This task option is performed if 
there is a system’s RBAC policy that needs to be integrated with the global 
security policy. As part of this process, the generated RBAC policy is submitted to 
Review and Correct Role Names Algorithm labeled (2.a.2.a) with any other 
required input. 
 The second task option, labeled (2.a.3) in Figure 7.2, is to send each MAC policy 
of each system to the MAC integration algorithm. This task option is performed if 
there is a system’s MAC policy that needs to be integrated with the global security 
policy. As part of this process, the generated Sensitivity Levels Mapping List is 
submitted to the Building Global MAC Algorithm with any other required inputs, 
labeled (2.a.3.a). 
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 The third task option, labeled (2.a.4) in Figure 7.2, is to send each DAC policy of 
each system to the DAC integration algorithm. This task option is performed if 
there is a system’s DAC policy that needs to be integrated with the global security 
policy. 
 Task 3:  In third task, labeled (2.a.5) at the bottom of Figure 7.2, the FSICC’s security 
engineer needs to send the resulted global RBAC policy from (2.a.2), global MAC 
policy from (2.a.3), and global DAC policy from (2.a.4) to Combine Updated Global 
RBAC, Global MAC, and Global DAC and Control Data algorithm that concatenates 
all of the three global polices to generate one global security policy. The FSICC’s 
security engineer also needs to specify one read data access type, as described in 
Section 6.1.4 of Chapter 6, to control the way that data are read. Note that there is one 
write data access type that is used by default to control the way that data are written. 
The third task marks the final part of the Registering Requests Processing phase in 
which the global services and global security policy are ready to be utilized by 
FSICC’s clients. Moreover, at this point the complete details of the generated global 
security policy and global services, such as the way to utilize the global services and 
global security policy and what is the exact web location, will not be published to 
public.  
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Figure 7.2. A Detailed View of Phase 2.a of the SSEP 
 
7.2.4 Usage Requests Processing Phase 
 
The Usage Requests Processing phase labeled (2.b) in Figure 7.1 is performed by the security 
engineers of FSICC to enable clients to leverage available global services and the corresponding 
global security policy, which are built based on the tasks of the Registering Requests Processing 
phase and is a human-based process. The FSICC’s security engineer has four tasks to perform the 
Usage Requests Processing phase:  
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 Task 1:  In the first task, the FSICC’s security engineer has three task options to 
process clients’ requests:  
 The left task option, labeled (2.b.1) in Figure 7.3, is to check the Global Security 
Policy (GSP) to Find Permissions Similar to Client Security Policy (CSP). This 
task option is performed if there is a client that requests to map its security policy 
with the global security policy. 
 The center task option, labeled (2.b.2) in Figure 7.3, is to assign an ID and Token 
to a Client which is needed for authentication and authorization purposes. This 
task option is performed if there is a client (basically all of the clients) that requests 
to utilize a subset of the global security policy and global services.  
 The right task option, labeled (2.b.3) in Figure 7.3, is to Add needed Customized 
Policy to GSP as a New Policy. This task option is performed if there is a client 
that requests to customize a subset of the global security policy.  
 Task 2:  In the second task, the FSICC’s security engineer also has three task options: 
 The left task option, labeled (2.b.1.a) in Figure 7.3, is to map the Client Security 
Policy (CSP) and Global Security Policy (GSP). This task option is performed if 
the output of the task option (2.b.1) was yes, which means that the Global Security 
Policy (GSP) has permissions similar to Client Security Policy (CSP). 
 The center task option, labeled (2.b.1.b) in Figure 7.3, is to add the Client Security 
Policy (CSP) to Global Security Policy (GSP). This task option is performed if the 
output of the task option (2.b.1) was no, which means that the Global Security 
Policy (GSP) does not have permissions similar to Client Security Policy (CSP).  
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 The right task option, labeled (2.b.2.a) in Figure 7.3, is to Find One Suitable 
System for a Client as a Repository. This can be done by finding a registered 
system that provides services similar to the set of global services the client is 
interested in.  
 Task 3: In the third task, labeled (2.b.4) in Figure 7.3, the FSICC’s security engineer 
should update the Global Security Policy (GSP,) that may have been changed as a 
result of performing the tasks (2.b.1.a), (2.b.1.b) and/or (2.b.3). 
 Task 4: In the fourth task, labeled (2.b.5) in Figure 7.3, the FSICC’s security engineer 
can Send to the client: the Client’s ID, the Client’s Security Token, the available 
Global API (services), the available Global Security Policy (GSP), and instructions on 
the way to utilize such global services and global security policy. This allows the 
client to begin building an App utilizing the retrieved global services and global 
security policy. 
 
 
 
 
200 
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(2.b.1.b) Add CSP to GSP
(2.b.5) Send: Client ‘s ID & Token, 
the Available Global API, and the 
Available GSP to a Client [DONE]
[NOT DONE]
[NEEDS REVISION]
(2.b.1.a) Map CSP and 
GSP
Legend
CSP      Client Security Policy GSP   Global Security Policy
 
Figure 7.3. A Detailed View of Phase 2.b of the SSEP 
 
 
7.3. Demonstrating the SOA-based Security Engineering Process 
 
To provide a hands-on experiment on the SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP), this 
section presents a complete and detailed example that demonstrates: the way that each phase and 
task of SSEP from Section 7.2 in applied, as was shown in Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3; the usage of 
the  security policy integration algorithms from Section 6.1 from Chapter 6, see Figures 6.1-6.8; 
and,  the establishment  and utilization of security for interoperable services via FSICC. In the 
remainder of this section, our healthcare scenario from Section 2.4 is used for explaining all of the 
phases and tasks of SSEP, where we assume that the CT
2
 client does not provide services or a 
security policy. Based on this assumption, we can categorize: CT
2
  App as a pure client that only 
utilizes services from OpenEMR system; SMH  App as a mixed client that utilizes  services from 
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MyGoogle system and provides a number of services; OpenEMR  as a pure system that only 
provides services; and, MyGoogle  as a mixed system that provides services and utilizes services 
from OpenEMR.  
Using this setting, we apply the SSEP’s phases and tasks of Section 7.2 in the following order. 
First, the Constructing Systems Requests phase, labeled (1.a) in the top left of Figure 7.1, is 
applied to OpenEMR system, MyGoogle system, and SMH client App, since each of them has 
services and security policy to register. Second, the Registering Requests Processing phase, 
labeled (2.a) in the bottom left of Figure 7.1, is applied to OpenEMR system, MyGoogle system, 
and SMH client App, since each of them has sent services and security policy registering requests 
to FSICC. Third, the Constructing Clients Requests phase, labeled (1.b) in the top right of Figure 
7.1, is applied to MyGoogle system, SMH, and CT
2
 client Apps, since each of them is interested 
in utilizing the global services and the global security policy. Finally, the Usage Requests 
Processing phase, labeled (2.b) in the bottom right of Figure 7.1, is applied to MyGoogle system, 
SMH, and CT
2
 client Apps,  since each of them has sent global services and global security policy 
utilization requests to FSICC. Note that in the remainder of this section, only a subset of actual 
services and security policies of each system and client is used, since these subsets are enough for 
explaining all of the phases and tasks of SSEP.  
The remainder of this section is organized into four subsections. In Section 7.3.1, we explain 
the way that the three systems OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and SMH can utilize the Constructing 
Systems Requests phase from Section 7.2. In Section 7.3.2, we apply the Registering Requests 
Processing phase from Section 7.2 to the three requests from OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and SMH 
systems. In Section 7.3.3, we explain the way that three clients: MyGoogle, SMH, and CT
2
 can 
utilize the Constructing Clients Requests phase from Section 7.2. Finally, in Section 7.3.4, we 
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apply the Usage Requests Processing phase from Section 7.2 to the three requests from 
MyGoogle, SMH, and CT
2
 clients.   
 
7.3.1 Applying the Constructing Systems Requests Phase on OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and 
SMH 
In this section, we apply the Constructing Systems Requests phase, labeled (1.a) in Figure 7.1, 
to the OpenEMR and MyGoogle systems and the SMH client.  Since OpenEMR is a pure system, 
the security engineer of OpenEMR must register: OpenEMR’s integration layer  which are  
OpenEMR’s FHIR services in Table 2.5 of Section 2.4 and Example 4.4 with Figure 4.1 in 
Section 4.4;  and, OpenEMR’s security policy which are OpenEMR’s RBAC, MAC, and DAC in 
Table 2.6 of Section 2.4 and Example 4.4 with Figure 4.1 in Section 4.4. Note that the security 
engineer of the OpenEMR system designed the OpenEMR’s integration layer by utilizing the HIT 
IFMWK Blueprint in Section 5.4.1. This can be achieved by constructing three JSON documents, 
one for OpenEMR’s FHIR services from Figure 7.4, one for OpenEMR’s RBAC/DAC from 
Figure 7.5, and one for OpenEMR’s MAC/DAC from Figure 7.6, and then sending them to the 
System Registry component of FSICC in Figure 7.22.     
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. OpenEMR’s FHIR services in JSON 
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Figure 7.5. OpenEMR’s RBAC/DAC policy in JSON 
 
 
Figure 7.6. OpenEMR’s MAC/DAC policy in JSON 
 
Second, we apply the Constructing Systems Requests phase, labeled (1.a) in Figure 7.1, to the 
MyGoogle system. Since MyGoogle is a mixed system, the security engineer of MyGoogle, must 
register: MyGoogle’s integration layer which are the MyGoogle’s FHIR services in Table 2.7 of 
Section 2.4 and Example 4.4 with Figure 4.1 in Section 4.4; and MyGoogle’s security policy 
which are the MyGoogle’s RBAC and MAC in Table 2.8 of Section 2.4 and Example 4.4 with 
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Figure 4.1 in Section 4.4. Note that the security engineer of the MyGoogle system designed the 
MyGoogle’s integration layer by utilizing the HIT IFMWK Blueprint in Section 5.4.1. This can 
be achieved by constructing three JSON documents, one for MyGoogle’s FHIR services from 
Figure 7.7, one for MyGoogle’s RBAC from Figure 7.8, and one for MyGoogle’s MAC from 
Figure 7.9, and then sending them to System Registry component of FSICC see Figure 7.22. 
 
Figure 7.7. MyGoogle’s FHIR services in JSON 
 
Figure 7.8. MyGoogle’s RBAC policy in JSON 
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Figure 7.9. MyGoogle’s MAC policy in JSON 
 
Finally, we apply the Constructing Systems Requests phase, labeled (1.a) in Figure 7.1, to the 
SMH client App. Since SMH is a mixed client, the security engineer of SMH must register: 
SMH’s integration layer which are SMH’s FHIR services see Table 2.3 in Section 2.4 and 
Example 4.5 with Figure 4.2 in Section 4.4; and, SMH’s security policy which are SMH’s RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC see Table 2.4 in Section 2.4 and Example 4.5 with Figure 4.2 in Section 4.4. 
Note that the security engineer of the SMH designed the SMH’s integration layer by utilizing the 
Basic Architecture Blueprint in Section 5.4.1. This can be achieved by constructing three JSON 
documents, one for SMH’s FHIR services from Figure 7.10, one for SMH’s RBAC/DAC from 
Figure 7.11, and one for SMH’s MAC from Figure 7.12, and then sending them to the System 
Registry component of FSICC see Figure 7.22. 
 
Figure 7.10. SMH’s FHIR services in JSON 
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Figure 7.11. SMH’s RBAC/DAC policy in JSON 
 
Figure 7.12. SMH’s MAC policy in JSON 
 
7.3.2 Applying the Registering Requests Processing Phase on OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and 
SMH 
In this section, we apply the Registering Requests Processing Phase, labeled (2.a) in Figure 
7.1, to the OpenEMR, MyGoogle systems and the SMH client. In Section 7.3.1, OpenEMR, 
MyGoogle, and SMH were constructed and sent a registering request in JSON format to the 
FSICC, see Figures 7.4, 7.7, and 7.10 respectively. In this phase, the security engineer of FSICC, 
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as described in Section 7.2.3 and Figure 7.2, processes each of these registering requests through 
the three tasks as described in Section 7.2.3.  
In task 1, the security engineer of FSICC needs to configure each global service of the FSICC 
so that CRUD methods of the global services can send and receive data to/from the integration 
layers of OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and SMH. In this task, the security engineer of FSICC reads the 
JSON documents that include the registering requests of OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and SMH and 
initializes the global services of FSICC with five services as presented in Table 7.1. For example, 
the service (gs2) is a global service (Observation[GET]) that whenever triggered calls the mapped 
services ls2 of OpenEMR, ls2 of MyGoogle, and ls2 of SMH. Similarly, the services (gs1, gs3, gs4, 
gs5) are created and configured as described in Table 7.1. Note that for each created global 
service, only the specified CRUD methods of the mapped service are implemented. For example, 
only PUT and GET methods are implemented for the first global service (gs1) but not POST or 
DELETE methods.    
Table 7.1. Initial Set of FSICC’s Global Services   
Service ID Service Name Method Name Mapped to 
gs1 FSICC/Observation PUT ls1 (OpenEMR), ls1 (MyGoogle), and ls1 (SMH) 
gs2 FSICC/Observation GET ls2 (OpenEMR), ls2 (MyGoogle), and ls2 (SMH) 
gs3 FSICC/Patient PUT ls3 (OpenEMR), ls3 (MyGoogle), and ls3 (SMH) 
gs4 FSICC/Patient GET ls4 (OpenEMR), ls4 (MyGoogle), and ls4 (SMH) 
gs5 FSICC/Person PUT ls5 (MyGoogle), and ls5 (SMH) 
 
In task 2, to establish the global security policy the security engineer of FSICC needs to send 
the registered security policy of OpenEMR, MyGoogle, and SMH to the appropriate task 2 option 
based on the type of the registered security policy (RBAC, MAC, or DAC). First, as described in 
the first task option of task 2 labeled 2.a.2 in Section 7.2.3, the security engineer of FSICC sends 
the OpenEMR’s RBAC policy, Figure 7.5, MyGoogle’s RBAC policy, Figure 7.8, and SMH’s 
RBAC policy, Figure 7.11, to the RBAC integration algorithm that generates the initial global 
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RBAC policy as shown in Figure 7.14. Moreover, Table 7.2 has some information that the 
Global-RBAC algorithm uses to generate the initial global RBAC policy given in Figure 7.14. 
First, the algorithm uses the RBAC policy of OpenEMR to initialize the global RBAC policy so 
that OpenEMR’s roles, Physician and Patient, are added as the first two global roles. Then, the 
RBAC policy of SMH is integrated to the global RBAC policy so that six global roles, 
Physician_2, Patient_2, New_Role_1, New_Role_2, New_Role_3 and New_Role_4, are added 
(see the first four comparisons in Table 7.2). Finally, the RBAC policy of MyGoogle is integrated 
to the global RBAC policy so that two global roles, SMH and New_Role_5, are added (see the 
last eight comparisons in Table 7.2). Note that roles New_Role_1, New_Role_2, New_Role_3, 
New_Role_4 and New_Role_5 are abstract roles in which no users are assigned to them. Figure 
7.13 provides a clear view of the role hierarchy of the global RBAC policy. 
Table 7.2. Comparisons Information of the RBAC Integration Step 
ID System Role Global Role Direct Common 
Permissions 
Comparison 
Result 
Created Global Roles 
1 Physician Physician Observation [GET] Overlap Physician_2, New_Role_1 
2 Physician Patient Patient [GET] Overlap New_Role_2 
3 Patient Physician Patient [PUT] Overlap Patient_2, New_Role_3 
4 Patient Patient Observation [PUT] Overlap New_Role_4 
5 SMH New_Role_1 Observation [GET] SR contains GR SMH 
6 SMH New_Role_2 Patient [GET] SR contains GR Nothing 
7 SMH New_Role_3 Patient [PUT] SR contains GR Nothing 
8 SMH New_Role_4 Observation [PUT] SR contains GR Nothing 
9 SMH Physician Nothing Not related Nothing 
10 SMH Physician_2 Nothing Not related Nothing 
11 SMH Patient Nothing Not related Nothing 
12 SMH Patient_2 Person [PUT] Overlap New_Role_5 
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Figure 7.13. The Role Hierarchy of the Global RBAC Policy 
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Figure 7.14. The Initial Global RBAC Policy in JSON 
 
Second, as described in the second task option of task 2 labeled (2.a.3) in Section 7.2.3, the 
security engineer of FSICC and each of the security engineers of OpenEMR, SMH, and 
MyGoogle systems have a discussion in order to understand the semantic and usages of 
each sensitivity level of each system. In this case, the assumption is that all of the security 
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engineers of systems and FSICC have agreed to use different semantics of sensitivity levels, see 
Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, and thus generate a Sensitivity Levels Mapping List as described in 
Table 7.3. Note that in this example, the OpenEMR’s sensitivity levels set is used as an initial 
global sensitivity levels set. In this sensitivity levels mapping list, we can describe the differences 
in sensitivity levels as follows: ShareMyHealth’s sensitivity level SIS is mapped to global 
sensitivity level SID; while MyGoogle’s sensitivity level VSI is mapped to global sensitivity level 
SID. Note that global sensitivity levels SIS and VSI have no corresponding levels in 
ShareMyHealth and MyGoogle sensitivity levels, respectively.    
Table 7.3. An Example of a Sensitivity Levels Mapping List 
ID Global Sensitivity Level (OpenEMR) System Sensitivity Level System Name 
1 PI PI ShareMyHealth 
2 BSI BSI ShareMyHealth 
3 SIS - ShareMyHealth 
4 SID SIS ShareMyHealth 
5 VSI VSI ShareMyHealth 
6 PI PI MyGoogle 
7 BSI BSI MyGoogle 
8 SIS SIS MyGoogle 
9 SID VSI MyGoogle 
10 VSI - MyGoogle 
 
Third, as described in the third task option of task 2 labeled (2.a.4) in Section 7.2.3, the 
security engineer of FSICC is required to send the DAC policy of OpenEMR, Figures 7.5 and 7.6, 
and DAC policy of SMH, Figure 7.11, to the DAC Integration algorithm that generates the global 
DAC policy as shown in Figure 7.15. Note that MyGoogle has no DAC policy. The generated 
global DAC policy has two role delegations (one from OpenEMR and one from SMH), and one 
clearance delegation from OpenEMR. Note that the Global DAC algorithm changed the role Ids, 
clearance, and user Ids to the global equivalents. 
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Figure 7.15. The Global DAC Policy in JSON 
 
In task 2, to finalize the generation of the global RBAC policy and global MAC policy the 
security engineer of FSICC also needs to send the output of the first task option, labeled (2.a.2), of 
task 2 and the second task option, labeled (2.a.3), of task 2 to the appropriate remaining part of 
each task option, labeled (2.a.2.a) and (2.a.3.a) in Figure 7.2 respectively, based on the type of the 
registered security policy (RBAC or MAC). First, after generating the initial global RBAC 
labeled (2.a.2), Figure 7.14, that has some global roles with undesirable names such as 
New_Role_1 - New_Role_5, the security engineer of FSICC may wish to rename such roles via 
the step labeled (2.a.2.a) in Figure 7.2. To do this, the security engineer of FSICC first can review 
the names of all of the global roles, Figure 7.14, and suggest a new name for a subset of the global 
roles, e.g., based on the authorized permissions, as a corrected global roles list. In this case, the 
security engineer of FSICC would keep the role names New_Role_1 - New_Role_5 and change 
the role names Physician, Patient, Physician_2, and Patient_2 to Attending_Physician, 
General_Patient, Research_Physician, and Fitness_Patient, respectively, as described in Table 7.4. 
Then, the security engineer of FSICC, as described in the first task option of task 2 in Section 
7.2.3, needs to send the corrected global roles list to the Review and Correct Role Names 
algorithm labeled 2.a.2.a which updates the global RBAC policy with the new role names as 
required.  
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Table 7.4. An Example of a Corrected Global Roles List 
Global Role ID (Old Name) New Name 
1 (Physician) Attending_Physician 
2 (Patient) General_Patient 
5 (Physician_2) Research_Physician 
4 (Patient_2) Fitness_Patient 
    
Second, as described in the second task option of task 2 labeled (2.a.3) in Section 7.2.3, the 
security engineer of FSICC needs to Send the generated Sensitivity Levels Mapping List (Table 
7.3) to the Building Global MAC algorithm, labeled (2.a.3.a). This step composes the global 
MAC policy, Figure 7.16, utilizing users and services from MAC policy of OpenEMR, Figure 
7.6, MyGoogle, Figure 7.9, and SMH, Figure 7.12, in which users clearances and services 
classifications are assigned based on the global sensitivity levels in which the read/write 
properties of each user are remain unchanged. 
 
Figure 7.16. The Global MAC Policy in JSON 
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In task 3 labeled (2.a.5) in Section 7.2.3, the global RBAC policy, Figure 7.14, the global 
MAC policy, Figure 7.16, and the global DAC policy, Figure 7.15, are simply combined, utilizing 
the Combine Updated Global RBAC, Global MAC, and Global DAC and Control Data algorithm, 
in one JSON document that serves as the global security policy. Also, the security engineer of 
FSICC augments the global security policy with two pieces of information: one of the three read 
data access types, and the write data access type (i.e., Open to Same System Users) as described 
in Section 6.1.4 of Chapter 6. In this case, the assumption is that the security engineer of FSICC 
chosen to use the default read data access type (type 1 Open to All). Based on these settings: any 
user from OpenEMR, MyGoogle, or SMH who are assigned to the same global role, can read any 
data that the global role can retrieve; and, a user from a specific system, OpenEMR for 
example, who is assigned to a global role can only write data (only data of OpenEMR) that 
the global role can write.  
In summary, at this point of the example and the process, the complete details of the generated 
global security policy and global services (such as the way that to utilize the global services and 
global security policy) are not as yet published to the public.   
 
7.3.3 Applying the Constructing Clients Requests Phase on MyGoogle, SMH, and CT
2
 
We start by applying the Constructing Clients Requests phase, labeled (1.b) in Figure 7.1, to 
MyGoogle system. Since MyGoogle is a mixed system, the security engineer of MyGoogle, from 
a usage perspective, needs to answer the three main questions, as discussed in Section 7.2, see 
Figure 7.1, after visiting the available global services and global security policy webpage. In this 
case, it is assumed that the security engineer of MyGoogle has the following answers: the client 
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has no defined security policy (again from usage perspective); the client would utilize a subset of 
the available global services and global security policy; and, the client does not need to customize 
any subset of the global security policies. Based on these answers, the security engineer of 
MyGoogle should construct a JSON document for MyGoogle utilization request that specifies in 
detail the subset of global services (see Table 7.1) and global security policy, see Figures 7.14, 
7.15, and 7.16, that MyGoogle has interests in utilizing, as shown in Figure 7.17, in which 
MyGoogle would be assumed to utilize: the global services: 2, 3, and 4; and the global role 2. 
Finally, the security engineer of MyGoogle needs to send the JSON document to the Client 
Registry component of FSICC in Figure 7.22. 
 
 
Figure 7.17. MyGoogle Utilization Request in JSON 
     
Second, we apply the Constructing Clients Requests to the SMH client App. Since SMH is a 
mixed client, the security engineer of SMH, from a usage perspective, needs to answer the same 
three main questions: SMH client has a defined security policy (again from usage perspective); 
SMH client would utilize a subset of the available global services but not interested in the global 
security policy; and, the client does not need to customize any subset of the global security 
policies. Based on these answers, the security engineer of SMH should construct two JSON 
documents. The first one (Policy Mapping Request) is to specify the defined security policy 
against the global services, as shown in Figure 7.18, in which one role (i.e., Parent with id 12) is 
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defined that is authorized to access global services 4 and 5. This first JSON document needs to be 
sent to the security engineer of FSICC who needs to process and update the global security policy. 
Based on the updated global security policy, the second JSON document can be constructed for 
SMH utilization request that specifies in details the subset of global services (see Table 7.1) that 
SMH interests in, as shown in Figure 7.19, in which SMH would be assumed to utilize: the global 
services: 4 and 5; and the global role 12 which was added into the global security policy as a 
result of human intervention with the security engineer of FSICC. Finally, the security engineer of 
SMH needs to send the second JSON document to the Client Registry component of FSICC in 
Figure 7.22. 
 
Figure 7.18. SMH Policy Mapping Request in JSON. 
 
 
Figure 7.19. SMH Utilization Request in JSON 
 
Finally, we apply the Constructing Clients Requests phase to the CT
2
 client App. Since CT
2
 is 
a pure client, the security engineer of CT
2
 needs to answer the three main questions: CT
2
 client 
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has no defined security policy; CT
2
 client would utilize a subset of the available global services 
and global security policy; and the client needs to customize a subset of the global security 
policies. Based on these answers, the security engineer of CT
2
 should construct two JSON 
documents. The first one (Policy Customize Request) is to specify the customize security policy, 
as shown in Figure 7.20, in which the Physician role (id 1) of the global RBAC policy is 
customized to be also authorized to access the global service 3. This first JSON document needs 
to be sent to the security engineer of FSICC who needs to process it and update the global security 
policy. Based on the updated global security policy, the second JSON document can be 
constructed for CT
2
 utilization request that specifies in details the subset of global services (see 
Table 7.1) that CT
2
 interests in, as shown in Figure 7.21, in which CT
2
 would be assumed to 
utilize: the global services: 1, 2, and 3; and the global role 1 which can access the global service 3 
as a result of human intervention with the security engineer of FSICC). Finally, the security 
engineer of CT
2 
needs to send the second JSON document to the Client Registry component of 
FSICC see Figure 7.22. 
 
Figure 7.20. CT
2
 Policy Customize Request in JSON 
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Figure 7.21. CT
2
 Utilization Request in JSON 
 
7.3.4 Applying the Usage Requests Processing Phase on MyGoogle, SMH, and CT
2
 
As explained in Section 7.3.3, the MyGoogle system, and the SMH and CT
2
 client Apps are 
constructed and sent a utilization request and/or policy customize request and/or policy mapping 
request in JSON format, see Figures 7.17, 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, and 7.21, to the FSICC. In this section, 
we describe the way that the security engineer of FSICC, as described in Section 7.2.4, in Figure 
7.3, process each of these requests through the four tasks as described in Section 7.2.4. 
In task 1, the security engineer of FSICC needs to perform the appropriate task 1 option based 
on request type of the clients (policy mapping, utilization, or policy customization). First, as 
described in the left task option of task 1 labeled (2.b.1) in Section 7.2.4, the security engineer of 
FSICC needs to process the SMH’s policy mapping request, Figure 7.18. Since the SMH’s policy 
mapping request is RBAC-based, the security engineer of FSICC checks the global RBAC policy, 
Figure 7.14, and finds that the role (i.e., Parent with id 12) in the SMH’s policy mapping request 
is not similar to existing roles. 
Second, as described in the center task option of task 1 labeled (2.b.2) in Section 7.2.4, the 
security engineer of FSICC needs to process MyGoogle’s utilization requests, Figure 7.17, 
SMH’s utilization requests, Figure 7.19, and CT2’s utilization requests, Figure 7.21, by assigning 
an ID and generating a security Token for each client.  
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Finally, as described in the right task option of task 1 labeled (2.b.3) in Section 7.2.4, the 
security engineer of FSICC needs to process CT
2’s policy customize request, Figure 7.20. Since 
the CT
2’s policy customize request is RBAC-based, the security engineer of FSICC checks the 
global RBAC policy, Figure 7.14, to locate the requested global role (i.e., Physician with id 1) and 
add a new global role (i.e., Visiting_Physician with id 13) and limit it to only access the specified 
global service (with id 3). 
In task 2, the security engineer of FSICC needs to perform the appropriate task 2 option based 
on the outputs of task 1. First, as described in the center task option of task 2 labeled (2.b.1.b) in 
Section 7.2.4, the security engineer of FSICC adds a new global role (i.e., Parent with id 12), from 
the SMH’s policy mapping request, along with its permissions, to the global RBAC policy. This is 
because in the left task option of task 1 the security engineer of FSICC did not find a similar role 
in the global RBAC policy. Note that, in this case, the security engineer of FSICC will not 
perform the left task option of task 2 in Section 7.2.4 as no similar role was found.  
Second, as described in the right task option of task 2 labeled (2.b.2.a) in Section 7.2.4, the 
security engineer of FSICC needs to find one suitable system as repository for each of MyGoogle, 
SMH, and CT
2
 clients as follow. The OpenEMR system is chosen as a repository for MyGoogle, 
since the requested global services (2, 3, and 4) can be mapped to OpenEMR’s services. Then, the 
MyGoogle system is chosen as a repository for SMH, since the requested global services (4 and 
5) can be mapped to MyGoogle’s services. Then, the OpenEMR system is chosen as a repository 
for CT
2, since the requested global services (1, 2, and 3) can be mapped to OpenEMR’s services. 
In task 3, labeled (2.b.4) in Figure 7.3, the security engineer of FSICC needs to update the 
global security policy based on the outputs of the tasks 1 and 2 as follow. The security engineer of 
FSICC will add a new global role (i.e., Visiting_Physician with id 13) to the global security policy 
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and limit it to only access the specified global service (with id 3), from the left task option of task 
1. The security engineer of FSICC will also add a new global role (i.e., Parent with id 12) to the 
global security policy, from the center task option of task 2. 
In task 4, labeled (2.b.5) in Figure 7.3, the security engineer of FSICC needs to send separate 
JSON documents to each of MyGoogle, SMH, and CT
2
 clients that include: client’s ID, client’s 
security token, the available global services, the available global security policy, and instructions 
on the way to utilize such global services and global security policy.   
To give an overall view of the final output of applying all of the SSEP phases and tasks that 
described in Sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, and 7.3.4, we refine Figure 5.12 (from Section 5.4.2 of 
Chapter 5) to show the overall architecture of interactions: between OpenEMR and MyGoogle 
with FSICC; and between CT
2 
and SMH with FSICC, as Figure 7.22 shows. 
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Figure 7.22. Overall Architecture of the Interactions for Clients and Systems with FSICC.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation presented and explained a Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud 
Computing (FSICC) with RBAC (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001), 
MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976), and DAC (Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988) that allows clients 
and systems to interact with one another. The FSICC provided the unification of services and 
security capabilities from different paradigms (e.g., cloud services, programming services, web 
services), alternate cloud service providers, and diverse security/access control (RBAC, MAC, 
and/or DAC). From an overall viewpoint, each system may build and publish their cloud, 
programmatic, or web services into FSICC that combined such services into a unified set of 
global services in the cloud. Then, a developer of a mobile, web, or desktop client can discover 
such global services and utilize them to develop the client application. The five main research 
focus of the dissertation presented: Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC that contained 
different options for connecting clients and systems with FSICC;  an Integrated RBAC, MAC, 
and DAC Model for Cloud Computing via a Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model 
(UCCACM) that contained a set of definitions necessary for supporting our work on FSICC 
including Schema Definitions, Enterprise Definitions, Policy Definitions, FSICC Definitions, and 
Intercepting Definitions;   Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms for GSP (Global Security 
Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation which included Security Policies and 
Services Registration, Global Services Generation, and Global Security Policy Generation; a 
SOA-Based Security Engineering Process (SSEP) for FSICC that was utilized to combine security 
policies from different systems into one global security policy in which SSEP also included a 
process for security enforcement code generation; and,  Dynamic Enforcement via Intercepting 
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Process involved a set of programmatic mechanisms that were able to intercept a service call from 
a client app to a global service in FSICC in order to perform appropriate security enforcement 
checks. 
The reminder of this conclusion is organized as follows. Section 8.1 summarizes the 
dissertation, highlighting the attainment of the five research foci in detail. Using this as a basis, 
Section 8.2 discusses the research contributions of this dissertation, primarily in the areas of: 
Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC; an Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for 
Cloud Computing; Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP; and, Dynamic 
Enforcement via Intercepting Process. Finally, Section 8.3 details the ongoing and future research 
directions that include, but are not limited to: extending UCCACM of FSICC with Modern 
Access Control Models; implementing remaining components of the FSICC; providing a more 
fine-grained access control approach; and demonstrating the Architectural Blueprints on one or 
more different domains. 
 
8.1   Summary 
 
This dissertation presented a Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing 
(FSICC) that provides a set of global cloud services for use by clients and systems with access 
control provided by RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC models. The main objective of this dissertation 
was two-fold: to provide a solution to the service integration problem, which was the difficulties 
that occur when a client is trying to access services that could be operating with different types of 
application programmer interfaces (APIs); and to provide a solution to be security policy 
integration problem, that occurred since the different paradigms and alternate cloud service 
providers may all have different types of security and access control capabilities, that will allow 
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clients and systems to interact with one another in a framework.  Such a framework would 
provide the unification of services and security capabilities from different paradigms (e.g., cloud 
services, programming services, web services), alternate cloud service providers, and diverse 
security/access control (RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC). In support of our objective, the discussion in 
this dissertation was presented throughout seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduced the main areas for our research and a high-level view of the presented 
Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing. Section 1.1 discussed the motivation 
of restricting access to a unified set of global cloud services utilizing access control models as our 
main area of interest. Section 1.2 explored the motivation of the work in the healthcare domain as 
an appropriate context to present the work of the dissertation since healthcare represents as a 
critical emergent application for cloud computing. Section 1.3 provided a set of security 
requirements and cloud computing capabilities that the FSICC needs to support. Based on this, 
Section 1.4 presented and explained the Framework for Secure and Interoperable Cloud 
Computing with RBAC, MAC, and DAC of this dissertation. Section 1.5 provided a list of the 
research objectives and expected contributions for the dissertation. Section 1.6 discussed the work 
that has been published by us in order to support the work presented in the dissertation. Finally, 
Section 1.7 presented an outline of the dissertation.  
Chapter 2 presented background material on the main concepts and topics that supported 
our discussion and explanation of this dissertation. Section 2.1 discussed the cloud computing 
concept and underlined application programming interfaces (APIs), and presented the main 
technologies behind cloud computing with an emphasis on the service-oriented architecture 
(SOA) technology that emphasized the cloud service model. Section 2.2 reviewed the three main 
access control approaches: role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, 
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& Chandramouli, 2001), discretionary access control (DAC) (Dittrich, Härtig, & Pfefferle, 1988), 
and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976). Section 2.3 introduced and 
explained the Fast Health Interoperable Resources (FHIR) standard with an emphasis on the 
FHIR Resources and reviewed the HL7 Application Programming Interface FHIR (HAPI-FHIR) 
which is one popular reference implementation of the FHIR standard. Section 2.4 presented a 
sample healthcare scenario utilized throughout this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 presented the four Security Requirements and the three Cloud Computing 
Capabilities that underlined and supported FSICC. Section 3.1 defined and explained the four 
security requirements for FSICC: Numerous and Varied Access Control Models, Control Access 
to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support Delegation of Cloud Services Using DAC, and Control 
Access to Cloud Services Using MAC. Section 3.2 detailed the three cloud computing capabilities 
with associated components of the FSICC: Local Service Registration and Mapping to Global 
Services; Local Security Policies Registration to Yield Global Security Policy; and, Global 
Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and Service Discover for Consumers. Section 3.3 
discussed related research in cloud computing as compared with FSICC. 
Chapter 4 provided formal definitions of UCCACM in eight sections. Section 4.1 presented 
a set of core definitions on schemas to support authorizing users to a set of schemas based on 
roles and/or sensitivity levels. Section 4.2 provided core definitions on enterprise application 
that included definitions for clients, systems, and types of clients and systems as part of the 
enterprise application. Section 4.3 discussed core definitions on RBAC, MAC, and DAC 
models that described the way that such access control models can be modified to support the 
four security requirements of FSICC. Section 4.4 described advanced definitions on enterprise 
applications in which the security aspects of RBAC, MAC, and DAC models were introduced 
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into clients and systems of any enterprise application. Section 4.5 had core definitions on 
global resources and permissions by API in which definitions that described what were global 
services and the way that such global services were controlled via means of RBAC, MAC, 
and DAC were provided. Section 4.6 presented advanced definitions on FSICC that described 
the way that services and security policies of different systems were mapped. Section 4.7 
discussed core definitions on security interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and DAC along with 
enforcement checks that each security interceptor utilized. Section 4.8 presented related work 
on access control for cloud computing. Throughout the entire presentation of UCCACM, 
detailed examples were provided utilizing the healthcare scenario of section 2.4 Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 presented a set of Architectural Blueprints which were guidelines that defined the 
way of placing and creating an integration layer for a systems or client. In Section 5.1, we 
explored four issues that must be understood for an application of FSICC to support a 
discussion of the options and blueprints: the overall architecture of the application; the involved 
technologies that can be used to develop the application; the source code availability of the 
application, APIs, server code, or database; and, the allowable access to system sources. In 
Section 5.2, we examined the three different Architectural Blueprint options, namely, Basic, 
Alternative, and Radical, for integrating an application to multiple HIT systems via FSICC, 
utilizing FHIR. In Section 5.3, we provided an Architectural Blueprints for each of the three 
options that illustrated the way that the options can be realized using FHIR including the 
various phases and steps that are required. In Section 5.4, we presented a complex example 
that utilized the Alternative and Radical Architectural Blueprint options  applied to the 
healthcare scenario from Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. In Section 5.5, we discussed two related 
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works in the literature that explained alternative ways that FHIR can be implemented to 
integrate healthcare systems and/or applications in different settings.  
Chapter 6 presented Global Security Policy Generation process and Dynamic Enforcement 
implementation for FSICC in three sections. In Section 6.1, a set of security policy integration 
algorithms were presented and discussed for: global RBAC generation, global MAC generation, 
global DAC generation, and global policies combination. In Section 6.2, we demonstrated the 
realization of UCCACM of FSICC in HAPI FHIR utilizing the healthcare scenario of Section 2.4 
of Chapter 2 that involved the implementation of HAPI FHIR APIs and its server interceptor to 
support UCCACM checks with three different algorithms to support three different HAPI FHIR 
interceptors: RBAC interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor. Moreover, the 
interceptor discussions were supported by two access scenarios. Section 6.3 presented and 
discussed related work in both security policy integration and enforcing security policies on FHIR 
API. 
Chapter 7 presented a SOA-based security engineering and global security policy generation 
process for FSICC in three main sections. In Section 7.1, we briefly discussed a Pre-Process Step 
that described what each system and client needed to do before joining the FSICC. In Section 7.2, 
a SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) for FSICC was presented that was intended to 
assist security engineers of systems and clients and security engineers of FSICC with a structured 
process to define and maintain secure interoperable services for RBAC, MAC, and DAC. In 
Section 7.3, a complete and detailed example that illustrated the SOA-based security engineering 
process of Section 7.2 was provided to demonstrate the steps and sub-steps of SSEP coupled with 
security policy integration algorithms of Section 6.1 of Chapter 6 that can be utilized to establish 
and utilize security for interoperable services via FSICC.  
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8.2   Research Contribution 
 
This section revisits the expected research contributions given in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1 and 
provides insight of their attainment across the chapters of the dissertation. The Framework for 
Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) with RBAC, MAC, and DAC has the 
following contributions: 
 
EC-A. Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC: This contribution enabled the 
interoperability and information exchange of clients and systems and defined and 
explained a collection of three architectural blueprints (i.e., Basic Architecture, 
Alternative Architecture, and Radical Architecture) for the design and development of 
integration framework (IFMWK) servers utilizing a standard integration framework (e.g., 
FHIR in the healthcare domain) that facilitate the integration between HIT systems with 
applications. This was shown in the upper half (left) of Figure 1.2.   The architectural 
blueprints were represented as the first horizontal box Architectural Blueprints in Figure 
1.3 and included three main boxes for: Interoperability Issues, Integration Options, and 
Integration Blueprints.  Each blueprint was based on the location that IFMWK servers 
can be placed with respect to the components of the application (UI, API, Server) or a 
HIT system in order to define and design the required infrastructure to enable the 
exchange of information via IFMWK. In support of this contribution, Chapter 5 provided 
details of four interoperability issues, three integration Options, and associated 
integration blueprints. Chapter 4 also supported this contribution by providing four 
UCCACM definitions (Defns. 41 to 44 from Chapter 4) that described: the mapping of 
clients and systems, the set of all global resources, mapping clients and systems services 
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to the global services of FSICC, and the set of all global APIs for all clients and systems, 
respectively.     
 
EC-B. An Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for Cloud Computing: This 
contribution presented and explained a Unified Cloud Computing Access Control model 
(UCCACM) for the FSICC that provided a single view of global services to applications 
(i.e., clients) and enabled those global services to be authorized according to RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC policies. The UCCAC model was represented by the second horizontal 
box Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model in Figure 1.3 that included five 
main boxes for: Schema Definitions, Enterprise Definitions, Policy Definitions, FSICC 
Definitions, and Intercepting Definitions. The contribution involved a set of formal 
definitions for RBAC, MAC, and DAC access control models that specified, in detail, the 
way that: each system can register its services and security policies; and, a security 
engineer can define a set of global RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC policies on a unified set of 
global cloud services. The UCCAC model basically suggested formal definitions for the 
main components of Figure 1.2. In support of this contribution, Chapter 4 provided the 
Unified Cloud Computing Access Control model (UCCACM) for the FSICC that is an 
access control model that utilized three main access control models (RBAC, MAC, and 
DAC) and had a set of 60 definitions distributed in seven main groups: core definitions 
on schemas, core definitions on enterprise application, core definitions on RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC models, advanced definitions on enterprise applications, core 
definitions on global resources and permissions by API, advanced definitions on 
FSICC, and core definitions on security interceptors for RBAC, MAC, and DAC. 
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Chapter 3 also supported this contribution by motivating the UCCACM by the four 
main security requirements of FSICC (i.e., Numerous and Varied Access Control 
Models, Control Access to Cloud Services Using RBAC, Support Delegation of Cloud 
Services Using DAC, and Control Access to Cloud Services Using MAC) as presented in 
Section 3.1.  
 
EC-C. Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms and SSEP: This contribution 
included Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms realized within the horizontal box 
near the bottom of Figure 1.3, labeled GSP (Global Security Policy) Generation and 
GAPI (Global API) Generation which included Security Policies and Services 
Registration, Global Services Generation, and Global Security Policy Generation. In 
support of this contribution, Chapter 6 presented: a pre-process step for joining FSICC, a 
SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) for FSICC, a set of security policy 
integration algorithms, and a detailed example that illustrated the steps and sub-steps of 
SSEP along with the security policy integration algorithms. Chapter 4 also supported this 
contribution by providing eight UCCACM definitions (Defns. 41 to 48 from Chapter 4) 
which ensured that the global security policy can control access to a set of global services 
of FSICC. Moreover, Chapter 3 supported this contribution by motivating the cloud 
computing capability 2 of FSICC, i.e., Local Security Policies Registration to Yield 
Global Security Policy, from Section 3.2. This contribution also included a SOA-based 
security engineering process (SSEP) that couples Security Mapping/Enforcement 
Algorithms with EC-A Architectural Blueprints for Supporting FSICC via and EC-B An 
Integrated RBAC, MAC, and DAC Model for Cloud Computing into an for FSICC that 
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can be used to combine security policies (that can be RBAC, MAC or DAC) from 
different systems into one global security policy for security enforcement code 
generation. This was shown in the upper right half of Figure 1.2. A portion of the SSEP 
was human assisted in order to resolve naming issues of roles, mapping sensitivity levels, 
etc., that were combined from multiple clients and systems. Once the policies were 
successfully integrated, all of the security enforcement code can be automatically 
generated by algorithms. The SSEP for FSICC was represented by the left vertical box 
SOA-BASED SECURITY ENGINEERING in Figure 1.3 that spanned all of the five 
horizontal boxes: Architectural Blueprints, Unified Cloud Computing Access Control 
Model, Access Control Models, Global Security Policy and Global API Generation, and 
Global Security Policy and Global API Utilization and Security Enforcement. The 
Security Mapping/Enforcement Algorithms aspect of this contribution was realized 
within the horizontal box near the bottom of Figure 1.3, labeled GSP (Global Security 
Policy) Generation and GAPI (Global API) Generation which included Security Policies 
and Services Registration, Global Services Generation, and Global Security Policy 
Generation. In support of this contribution, Chapter 6 presented: a pre-process step for 
joining FSICC, a SOA-based security engineering process (SSEP) for FSICC, a set of 
security policy integration algorithms, and a detailed example that illustrated the steps 
and sub-steps of SSEP along with the security policy integration algorithms. Chapter 4 
also supported this contribution by providing eight UCCACM definitions (Defns. 41 to 
48 from Chapter 4) which ensured that the global security policy can control access to a 
set of global services of FSICC. Moreover, Chapter 3 supported this contribution by 
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motivating the cloud computing capability 2 of FSICC, i.e., Local Security Policies 
Registration to Yield Global Security Policy, from Section 3.2.  
 
EC-D. Dynamic Enforcement via Intercepting Process: This contribution provided a 
set of programmatic mechanisms that were able to intercept a service call from a client 
app to an API in order to perform appropriate security enforcement checks.   This was 
shown in the bottom of Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.3, these security interceptors were 
represented within the last horizontal box Global Security Policy and Global API 
Utilization and Security Enforcement in Figure 1.3, and the Security Enforcement via 
Interceptors box in Figure 1.2. Interceptors included: a RBAC Interceptor that was able to 
determine at runtime if the requested API call on a global service can be executed for a 
specific user with a specific role; a MAC Interceptor that was able to determine at 
runtime if the requested API call on a global service can be executed for a user with a 
clearance and limited by if the services was read or write; and a DAC Interceptor that was 
able to determine at runtime if the requested API call on a global service can be executed 
for a specific user with a delegated role/service/clearance. In support of this contribution, 
Chapter 7 presented an implementation of HAPI FHIR APIs and its server interceptor 
that supported UCCACM checks with three different algorithms to support three different 
HAPI FHIR interceptors: RBAC interceptor, MAC interceptor, and DAC interceptor. 
Chapter 4 also supported this contribution by providing 11 UCCACM definitions (Defns. 
50-60 from Chapter 4) that discussed concepts of Interceptor, RBAC Interceptor, 
MAC Interceptor, and DAC Interceptor. Moreover, Chapter 3 supported this 
contribution by motivating the cloud computing capability 3 of FSICC, i.e., Global 
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Registration, Authentication, Authorization, and Service Discover for Consumers, from 
Section 3.2. 
 
   
8.3   Ongoing and Future Work 
 
The work presented in this dissertation can serve as a foundation for further enhancements and 
extensions. A list of ongoing and future topics includes: extending UCCACM of FSICC with 
Modern Access Control Models; implementing remaining components of the FSICC; providing a 
more fine-grained access control approach to enable controlling data based on time period and 
data subset; and applying the Architectural Blueprints on one or more different domains using a 
standard integration framework and one of its implementations in that domain.   
 
Extending UCCACM of FSICC with Modern Access Control Models: As we presented in 
this dissertation, the Unified Cloud Computing Access Control Model (UCCACM) of the 
Framework of Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC) provides capabilities to 
register three type of access control models, namely RBAC, MAC, and DAC. As part of future 
work, we are interested in extending the UCCACM with modern access control models such as 
Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) (Yuan, E. & Tong, J. , 2005), Usage Control Access 
Control (UCON) (Sandhu, R. & Park, J. , 2003), History-Based Access Control (HBAC) 
(Banerjee, A. & Naumann, D., 2005), Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) (Saxena, N., Tsudik, 
G., & Yi, J., 2004), Organization-Based Access control (OrBAC) (Kalam, A., et al., 2003), and 
Rule-Based Access Control (RAC) (Carminati, B., Ferrari, E., & Perego, A., 2006). This way 
systems may define and register their ABAC/UCON/HBAC/IBAC/OrBAC/RAC-based security 
policies into FSICC that in turn combines: different ABAC/UCON/HBAC/IBAC/OrBAC/RAC-
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based security policies from multiple systems to generate a global 
ABAC/UCON/HBAC/IBAC/OrBAC/RAC security policy. The generated global 
ABAC/UCON/HBAC/IBAC/OrBAC/RAC security policies can be then enforced against each 
request to access global services of FSICC using a corresponding security interceptor.  
 
Implementing Remaining Components of the FSICC: Currently, four components of the 
Framework of Secure and Interoperable Cloud Computing (FSICC), see Figure 1.1 from Chapter 
1, are already implemented in this dissertation. These components are: Global Authentication, 
RBAC/MAC/DAC Interceptors, Global Services, and Global Security Policy. Moreover, in this 
dissertation we described the login and purpose of the remaining components of FSICC (i.e., 
Client Registry, System Registry, Services Mapping, and Security Policy Mapping). As part of 
future work, we are planning to convert the login of the remaining components of FSICC into an 
actual implementation as RESTful APIs that can be implemented using the JAX-RS Java library 
(Hadley & Sandoz, 2009). The implementation of these four FSICC components will enable the 
interested systems and clients to utilize all features of FSICC that we presented in this 
dissertation.    
 
Providing a More Fine-Grained Access Control Approach:  Presently, the global RBAC 
policy, global MAC policy, and global DAC policy that are used in the FSICC as a global security 
mechanism are defined to control who can access what set of global services. Moreover, the 
global security mechanism also controls what set of data, that global services can access and what 
each user can read/write using three read data access types and one write data access type. As part 
of future work, we are contemplating to further control accessing data based on time period and 
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data subset to support the FSICC with a more fine-grained access control approach. That is, time 
period feature will enable the global security mechanism of FSICC to specify: a start and end time 
(time period) in which a user is allowed to access a global service. The data subset feature will 
enable the global security mechanism of FSICC to specify what parts (fields) of data record, that 
is accessible via global services, each user is allowed to access.     
 
Demonstrating the Architectural Blueprints on Different Domains: Recall that in Chapter 
5, we presented a complex example that utilized the Alternative and Radical Architectural 
Blueprint options prototype applied to the healthcare scenario from Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 
utilizing the FHIR standard and HAPI FHIR (FHIR reference implementation) as a standard 
Integration Framework (IFMWK) in the healthcare domain. As part of future work, we are 
looking for applying a subset of our Architectural Blueprints from Chapter 5 to integrate systems 
and clients in domains other than the healthcare domain. This is to prove that our Architectural 
Blueprints can be utilized by any stakeholders in any domain who are interested in integrating 
systems and clients via FSICC. To do this, we may utilize one or more standard Integration 
Frameworks and their implementations (one IFMWK for each domain such as the financial 
domain) that are openly available.    
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